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“The social scientist is in a difficult, if not impossible, position. On the one hand, 
there is the temptation to see all of society as one’s autobiography writ large, 
surely not the path to general truth. On the other hand, there is the attempt to be 
general and objective by pretending that one knows nothing about the expe-
rience of being human…”  




It is said that when you visit Georgia for the first time, there are two questions 
you are usually asked: ʻHow do you like our food?ʼ and ʻDo you think Georgia 
is Europe or Asia?ʼ The following study is not an attempt to provide an answer 
to either one of these questions, but rather it tries to uncover the origin of 
Georgian societyʼs insecurity about its positioning in the East/West nexus and 
how such positioning is employed by the two competing narratives in the pro-
cesses of identity production. I conceptualize this stage of transition, being 
neither here nor there, as liminality and attempt to examine how various interest 
groups inside the state (liberals and populists1 in this case) make use of such 
positioning. How do two contradicting discourses produce and reproduce diffe-
rent identities, such as European/Western versus Eastern/Caucasian/non-Euro-
pean and how these discourses shape foreign policy goals?  
These tensions between identity and foreign policy trajectories became espe-
cially apparent with the NATO and EU enlargement to the East. As these insti-
tutions expanded, they discovered themselves sharing borders with such count-
ries as Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova. With the appearance of the new Others on 
the horizon, perception of the Self from both sides was also altered. In 2018 
National Geographic Georgia published an article by an anthropologist Nutsa 
Batiashvili (2018) with the same title as her book, “The Bivocal Nation.” 
Batiashvili compares the Georgian Self to Schrodingerʼs cat, composed of two 
mutually exclusive things:  
                                                 
1  I am following Laclau’s understanding of populism as being in opposition to civic 
national identity conception. As he argues, the institutionalized discourse limits discursive 
formation within the limits of the community, while populist discourse splits the society into 
two. “The people” as a signifier, in populist articulation, “is something less than the totality 
of members of the community” (2005, p. 81). “The people” representing the only legitimate 
totality, in fact, is only a part of given society (Zeemann, 2019, p. 43). Furthermore, what I 
identify as a populist discourse is characterized with disdain of the so-called elites and call 
for popular sovereignty. My empirics on this matter are not constrained by any ideological 
believes (left or right) since I do not intend to engage with actual scholarly debates on 
populism, but rather analyze the discourse which shares the core element of anti-elitism even 
if they disagree on who is to be blamed. That is why in the second empirical chapter of the 
following thesis one could find anti-Western sentiments, along with fascination with Donald 
Trump or “true Europe.” Thus, we can understand populism as a skeleton (consisting of anti-
establishment sentiments and demands for popular sovereignty), which is later on filled with 
different, and in some cases even contradictory, ideologies.  
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Hero and anti-hero civilized and backward, cultured and uncultured. This is the 
syndrome of nations at the edge of empires, that political and cultural, at the 
same time, is always geopolitical, since in this case faith (orthodox Christianity) 
and habitus (nose piercing) is pointing not only to the moral or lifestyle but to 
geopolitical orientation (ibid).  
 
This juxtaposition of two conceptions of national Self is evocatively illustrated 
by the image published together with the article which caused quite a discussion 
among the public. The caricature depicts a Georgian man in the shape of the 
two-headed god Janus. On the right side is a neatly shaved face holding a smart-
phone. The flag of the European Union, electricity, education, travel, pizza, 
cocktail and even a condom (possibly hinting at the open-minded approach to 
pre-marital sexual intercourse). This “civilized” and “progressive” man juxta-
posed with a bearded man face who holds a traditional Georgian drinking horn, 
is poor (wearing old, ragged pants), is using drugs, and adores Stalin. Even the 
choice of fruits in the picture is an interesting juxtaposition – a more exotic and 
foreign banana is juxtaposed with an apple, albeit more organic in the Georgian 
climate.  
In her book, Batiashvili argues that both memory narratives as identity 
constructs and strategies of political reasoning are articulated through two 
distinct stories, that of self-idealization and self-condemnation (2018b, p. XV). 
Within this fragmentation and “a constant tension between versions of “us” the 
Georgian Self is being imagined. Meanwhile, these different versions them-
selves are shaped by culturally pre-given discursive practices” (ibid, p. XVIII).  
This dichotomy depicted in the caricature and elaborated in Batiashvili’s 
book provides the starting point of my research. What I am arguing in this 
thesis is that such ambiguity emerges from liminal positioning between the two 
civilizational projects. This ʻin-betweennessʼ makes possible such a radical 
juxtaposition of two poles as Stalin and the European Union, wine and a 
cocktail or an oil lamp and electricity, exclusive of each other. In this research, I 
am studying how the articulation of national identity happens at both ends of 
the spectrum and how these articulations constitute and in turn, are constituted 
by, foreign policy trajectories.  
In his study of the use of military force by Russia in Abkhazia, Ted Hopf 
argued that different understandings of legitimacy are the products of the diffe-
rent identities of Russia. The national identity itself is the result of simultaneous 
interaction between domestic and international constructions of the Self (Hopf, 
2005, p. 225). In his article, Hopf claims that there were three main parallel 
constructions of national identity in Russia in the 1990s: Liberal, Centrist, and 
Conservative. Certain actions and policies abroad were constituted legitimate or 
illegitimate according to the one which was dominant at the moment. To quote 
Hopf (ibid, p. 227): “The puzzle in this article is to understand how such 
conduct became possible. The answer is that Russian identity made it possible.” 
Certain policy outcomes were made possible through the Russian identity being 
constructed in relationship with domestic and external significant others. Lisel 
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Hintz in her 2016 publication ““Take it outside!” National identity contestation 
in the foreign policy arena” develops a similar line of arguments by suggesting 
that there are three distinct identity proposals in Turkey (western liberalism, re-
publican nationalism and Ottoman Islamism) and that when “identity gambits” 
on the domestic level are blocked, elites tend to take it into the foreign policy 
arena. I discuss her framework and its applicability within the scope of my 
research in greater length in the theoretical chapter later on.  
My study follows this conception of identity/foreign policy relationship and 
examines how liberal and populist discursive constructions make sense of the 
Self at the point of the geopolitical East/West nexus. As is argued in most of the 
literature which deals with the issues of identity production, in order to under-
stand oneself, you need to define it in reference to the external Other. Or as 
Neumann (1996, p. 1) puts it:  
 
Identity doesnʼt reside in essential and readily identifiable cultural traits but in 
relations, and the question of where and how borders towards ʻthe Otherʼ should 
be drawn therefore become crucial. 
 
In this study, I explore this identity construction in the context of the EUʼs in-
creasing engagement with its Eastern neighbours, especially since the enlarge-
ment of 2004 and the appearance of the so-called “ring of friends.” As I con-
ceptualize the countries in between the European Union and Russia as liminals, 
I argue that this discourse was amplified with membership perspectives for CEE 
countries becoming more definite along with the new hopes of transformation 
brought by the waves of colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Once the 
transition or “journey back home” was completed for Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states, the torch of liminality was transferred farther to the east to their 
neighbours. As the CEE countries joined NATO and the EU, “the East” moved 
further and deeper into the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
Some states have been living within this context already for decades and 
have become used to such perceptions from the West. An example of such a 
long-term liminal country is Turkey, while for countries such as Georgia or 
Ukraine, such positioning of their identity is relatively new. Ukraine joined the 
Council of Europe only in 1995, while Georgia did so even later, in 1999, 
unlike Turkey, which has been a member since 1950 and an EU candidate 
country for more than three decades. Unlike the former, post-Soviet states came 
into the immediate neighbourhood of the EU only after the so-called ʻbig bangʼ 
of 2004, when 10 states, most of them from East and Central Europe, joined the 
union. In other words, with the enlargement of the European Union further to 
the east, new elements and points of reference come into picture for identity 
discourses in the eastern neighbouring countries. Liminal spatial and temporal 
dimensions keep expanding and altering the conceptions of the Self.  
Furthermore, I am arguing in this study that the anthropological concept of 
liminality i.e. of transition which was later theorized by the political scientists 
as a permanent transitional state (see the theoretical chapter) can become an 
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important tool in the hands of small states to guide themselves in the con-
temporary international system. The self-conception guides foreign policy and 
where the country sees itself within the East/West nexus. This is amplified by 
the reproduction of civilizational discourse that helps to locate the Self at the 
global, regional or individual level (OʼHagan, 2007, p. 22). For example, by 
contributing to the NATO missions in Afghanistan or the EUʼs mission to 
Central Africa, Georgian liberal discourse reproduces its European identity by 
being in the same team as the West; claiming that military operation in Afgha-
nistan serves the national interests of Georgia. It puts Georgia along with “civi-
lized” nations in opposition to “uncivilized” and “barbarian” terrorists. The 
Georgian military, along with allies from the West contributes to security all 
around the globe (“What are Georgian…”, 2016). Meanwhile, challenging this 
are populist discursive attempts to portray these developments as “the war of 
others, strangers” which Georgians have nothing to do with and consequently, 
argue for the withdrawal2.  
Based on the outline of the two poles of the narrative, the current study 
addresses the following research question:  
 
How is the liminal positioning of Georgia articulated in the public discourse, 
based on the geographical, cultural, historical and social circumstances?  
A number of sub-questions further guide this studyʼs focus on foreign policy/ 
identity relationship: 
 
a) What is the role of the liminal identity in the articulation of mutually exclu-
sive discourse of national identity (i.e. liberal and populist)? How the latter 
challenges the dominant liberal discourse through the reproduction of 
alternative Georgian national identity?  
b) How are foreign policy goals and security issues interlinked with identity 
discourses and how do they mutually (re)produce each other?  
c) How does the European Unionʼs policy towards the Eastern neighbours 
contribute to maintaining a sense liminality in the countries on its eastern 
border?  
 
Even though the research questions I put forward are of a descriptive character, 
the following wording of what this thesis is exploring is justified from the onto-
logical and epistemological perspective of the theoretical as well as the metho-
dological frameworks. My study falls within the broader spectrum of the post-
structuralist scholarship as it applies methodological tools of discourse analysis 
developed in the works of Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1990), Hansen (2006) as 
well as Wæver (2002, 2004) and Doty (1993, 1996, 1996b). It is important to 
note that most of the discourse-analytical approaches, despite critique from the 
positivist methodological school, can go beyond simply offering a critical 
problematization of the issue to the explanatory level, which itself “must be 
                                                 
2  Subchapter 5.5 provides detailed illustration of this narrative  
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seen as constitutive rather than causal” (Diez, 2014, p. 31). Such constitutive 
effects of discourse help to explain how particular policies were enabled 
through the meaning construction processes. In other words, what Doty (1993) 
argues, instead of asking ʻwhy-questionsʼ, posing ʻhow-possible questionsʼ 
makes the analysis of foreign policy more substantial. Unlike the former, which 
presupposes a certain social and discursive background as unproblematic, the 
latter examines the meaning production processes and thus tries to explain not 
“why a particular outcome was obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, 
and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain 
practices were made possible” (ibid, p. 298).  
Analyses from ʻhow possible questionsʼ help to examine not only how social 
identities become constructed, but also what practices and policies are made 
possible. ʻWhy questionsʼ presuppose identities of social actors and a back-
ground of social meanings, while “how questions examine how meanings are 
produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting 
particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude 
others” (Doty, 1996, p. 4).  
In order for an action to be performed by the actor or the agent, certain 
meanings must already be in place. For the policymaker to justify and argue for 
the implementation of a certain policy, articulation should take place, which 
illustrates how it is related to the boarded image or the idea of “we,” the nation. 
Thus, it must be related to and draw from the discursive structure (Wæver, 
2002). But at the same time, discourse sets the limits and boundaries of what 
can be uttered and done. Hence, with the focus on ʻhow-possible questionsʼ, the 
research framework looks at how this particular subjectsʼ positionings and the 
relationship between them are discursively constructed and, as a result, are 
enabling and/or limiting foreign policy agenda. It must be noted here is that the 
discourse or “the context in which an articulation occurs” and policy arti-
culation are mutually constitutive (Diez, 2014, p. 32). Discourses constitute the 
foreign policy and the other way around, but they are not in a causal 
relationship. Hansen (2006, p. 10) argues that they are not in such relationship 
as “representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and 
(re)produced through articulations of policy.” Mutual constitution implies that 
no social entities can be separated for the purpose of causal analysis (Vucetic, 
2011, p. 9). However, the rejection of causation by poststructuralist research 
design does not mean refusal of acknowledging any causality. This approach 
puts into question Humeanism and its understanding of the former i.e. ʻif A, 
then Bʼ type relations and regularities (Kurki, 2008, p. 138). Conditions of 
possibility or how do some policies and practices are made possible through 
discursive constriction do imply a certain level of causality but not in deter-
ministic, not in Humean sense. 
In spite of my study being designed as a single case study of identity 
construction processes in Georgia, it aims at including a comparative element. 
To be more exact, with the combination of the research questions, this study 
leads to looking at the construction of the collective identity as European, 
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Caucasian, orthodox Christian or any other on the temporal axis (1999 – 2017). 
Such a comparative design within the single case study unravels national iden-
tity as something in constant flux, the constitution of which changes in response 
to the foreign policy agenda and vice versa. In other words, the findings of this 
research contribute to the broader field of identity studies in International Rela-
tions by offering research of how the collective identity (re)production pro-
cesses change over time. This research contributes to the study of the effects of 
the foreign policy tools designed by the major players in international relations 
(ENP by the European Union, for instance) on the small states at the periphery; 
caught between the two civilizational poles of attraction. The case study of 
Georgia is important as it reveals the mismatch between the political elites on 
both sides in the perceptions of the significance of the Eastern Partnership or 
what a future with the European Union would look like. To be more precise, the 
membership prospects for the South Caucasian republic either in NATO or the 
EU are clearly off the table for the foreseeable future. But at the same time, as I 
am illustrating in this study, it is the prospect of integration on which the arti-
culation of the liberal national identity discourse is based, and that is invoked as 
the driving force behind the reforms. This case of a mismatch is what makes 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine i.e. the countries in the Eastern Partnership 
which decided to proceed with the signature of the Association Agreement with 
the EU, unique and worth studying. Unlike the case with the Central and 
Eastern European countries of the former socialist camp, it is still questioned by 
the West whether these states belong to Europe or not.3 This is especially the 
case with Georgia, which shares no land border with any EU member country 
and has historically been cut off from the rest of European civilization. I 
conceptualize these discursive processes which refer to history and reproduce 
the image of Georgia as European as self-colonization. 
In addition to the comparative perspective within the single case study of 
Georgia, the predicted findings of my study are deemed to be important in 
contributing to further the development of the scholarship on liminality. More 
specifically I intend to provide the study of one more liminal case and expand 
the geographical scope of regions analyzed under this concept so far (e.g., 
Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states).  
Stoicescu in her monumental work titled “Liminality in International Rela-
tions: A Comparative Analysis of Discursive Articulations in the Geopolitical 




                                                 
3  For instance, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica there are three ways that the border 
between Europe and Asia is drawn. The first goes along the Caucasus Mountains leaving 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in Asia. The second version divides the Caucasus in the 
middle, putting western part in Europe and eastern parts of Georgia in Asia. The third 
version, however, goes along the Aras River locating Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 
Europe (Bruk et al., n.d.).  
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in the Romanian and Turkish cases, decision-making elites and intellectuals of 
statecraft were relatively preoccupied with the issue of the liminal. The literature 
developed around the issue seemed to be an adapted for framing the findings in 
these cases, because, as it became apparent, Romanians and Turks have accepted 
to engage with Europe on its terms, and therefore with the liminal status that 
developed (ibid, p. 344).  
 
Meanwhile, Ukraineʼs case illustrated that elites in this country had not engaged 
with Europe in the same way. As she claims, “this essentially meant that a 
liminal imagery and corollary subject positions did not exist because the dia-
logue between the two entities (Europe and Ukraine) was different” (ibid).  
The Ukrainian case differed from Romania and Turkey, as it expressed the 
weakest presence of liminal images. One of the main explanations according to 
Stoicescu is Russia’s role and a large population of the country being Rus-
sophile. What is important to note here is that this study was produced in 2008, 
since which, the geopolitical picture in the region has shifted dramatically. The 
brief war between Georgia and Russia in August of the same year, the crisis in 
Ukraine later on, with the annexation of Crimea and escalated tensions with 
Russia, illustrated the need for research on the new foreign policy challenges 
affecting the identity discourse and whether it had any effect on the liminal 
imaginary.  
This particular research does not directly deal with the case of Ukraine but 
instead explores the case of Georgia, which, however, has similar foreign policy 
challenges. Hence, the theoretical and methodological framework developed 
within this study, in addition to its original empirical contribution, aims to offer 
the basis for further research on how to examine and explain developments in 
the broader region of the Eastern Partnership; what effects Russian and EU 
policies have on the identity discourses in the post-Soviet states and how these 
effects translate into later foreign policy agendas of these states. Following the 
logic of constitutive relationship between foreign policy and national identities, 
I am examining to what extent foreign policy discourse articulated by the 
decision makers in the Kremlin and Brussels play a role in the national identity 
discourses of the liminals in the common neighbourhood. These two civiliza-
tional poles that attract competing national identity narratives are concep-
tualized by Makarychev (2018, p. 205) as incomplete hegemonies, which 
 
suggests that there are no ʻnaturalʼ borders delimiting the area of their normative 
(in the case of the EU) or civilisational (in the case of Russia) extension... ...On 
the other hand, both hegemonies are incomplete in the sense that neither the EU 
nor Russia can fully and comprehensively (i.e. institutionally, normatively, eco-
nomically or security-wise) integrate their neighbours within their normative and 
civilisational projects.  
 
As examples of the latter point, Makarychev refers to Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia, as countries that demand much more from the Brussels than the EU 
can provide. In a similar manner, the Russian side for instance, fails to meet 
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Armenian requests to halt the supply of weapons to Azerbaijan. Yerevan has 
exchanged an AA with the European Union for membership in the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU). Yet, according to Makarychev (ibid, p. 227) this de-
cision is being questioned in Armenian political debates due to the role Russia 
plays in the conflict with Azerbaijan. Officials in the Kremlin do not provide 
clear support to Yerevan vis-à-vis Baku (not a member of the EEU).  
While speaking of the identity/foreign policy relationship, it is important to 
emphasize that identity within my study is not to be understood as a binary, 
clear-cut concept, but rather as a continuum with two ideals at each end i.e. 
European/Western and nationalist/populist, and most of the discourses fall in-
between. 
 
            Liberal   Liminality   Populist   
 
European/Western                                                        Nationalist/Populist 
           
This thesis argues that pro-Western foreign policy and its embeddedness in 
identity discourse is the key driving force behind social and economic trans-
formation taking place in the country. Even if the tangible results on the inte-
gration path seem to be indefinitely postponed, the idea contributes and justifies 
reforms.  
I take a discourse theoretical approach to identity, meaning it is not the 
starting point of politics, but identity is rather being constantly constructed and 
transformed through political struggles (Torfing, 1999, p. 82). A parallel can be 
drawn with poststructuralist research on gender as performative. Judith Butler 
(1988, p. 520) argues that constituting acts of gender constitutes identity as “a 
compelling illusion, an object of belief.” From this perspective, gender is under-
stood as having no prior ontological status. In a similar manner, Campbell 
(1992) suggests that the state should be seen as having no ontological status 
other than the acts which constitute it. Doty (1996b, p. 176) argues that the 
space which we conceive as a state is a social construction, but one which 
cannot appear as such, since the “successful practices of statecraft are practices 
that produce the state’s powerful image and simultaneously conceal this pro-
duction.” This is furthermore reinforced by the impossibility of fully fixed mea-
nings, identities, authorities etc. As a result, the state as such is “the never 
finally completed project of working to fix meaning, authority, and control” 
(ibid, p. 177). In the words of Auchter (2014, p. 5) the state is always in the 
process of being constructed even though it “casts itself as existentially for 
granted.” The constant processes of state constructions imply “ordering, 
bordering, and limitations that construct subjectivity/ies through an iterative and 
performative process” (ibid). This is precisely how I define national identity 
constitution within the framework of this study – something having no prior 
ontological status and in the process of constant reproduction without which it 
will cease its existence.  
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Traditional and dominant approaches of international relations, especially 
realists, have undermined the distinction between the state, nation and sove-
reignty by conceptualizing the state as a given and unitary actor. Hence, the 
national identity and its relevance to the issue of sovereignty was dismissed by 
these approaches as unproblematic (Doty, 1996c, p. 121). Furthermore, this 
conceptualization assumes that the distinction between inside and outside 
dichotomy is fixed and has “proceeded to study the world (although not always 
successfully) as if it were unproblematic” (ibid, p. 123). However, for practi-
tioners of politics that is not the case, as the nation is an intrinsically proble-
matic concept which is never a finished product and open for constant processes 
of reproduction.  
The poststructuralist research design of this study addresses these short-
comings by conceptualizing national identity as a discursive phenomenon and 
thus instead of assuming an a priori definition it emerges from the specific em-
pirical analysis. Unlike liberal and constructivist studies of International Rela-
tions, poststructuralist understanding of identity makes it impossible to concep-
tualize identity as a variable which “is casually separate from foreign policy or 
to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-discursive material 
factors” (Hansen, 2006, p. 1). Unlike more traditional IR theoretical frame-
works, critical approaches argue that no state processes a prediscursive, stable 
identity and that “no state is free from the tension between the various domains 
that need to be aligned for a political community to come into being” (Camp-
bell, 1992, p. 91). Campbell brings the example of the United States as “an 
imagined community par excellence” as it only exists “by virtue of people 
coming to live in a particular place” (ibid). This is precisely the key epistemo-
logical advantage of poststructuralism as it allows us to study Georgian foreign 
policy and civilizational belonging narratives as coming into existence by the 
virtue of their discursive reproduction.  
Although both constructivists and poststructuralists agree on basic ontology, 
that is, on reality and knowledge both being socially constructed, they disagree 
on epistemology. In other words, “poststructuralists and constructivists agree 
that objects of social science are also subjects, yet they disagree on theories of 
knowing” (Vucetic, 2011b, p. 1304). As a result, while poststructuralists focus 
on the power/knowledge relationship, constructivists tend to privilege the social 
construction of reality.  
A further advantage of poststructuralism over rationalist and traditional 
constructivist approaches is its ability to incorporate both material and idea-
tional factors, rather than privileging one over the other (Hansen, 2006, p. 22). 
Those theoretical approaches that try to explain certain foreign policy outcomes 
by rational calculations and pursuit of power or from economic calculations, are 
all committed to epistemic realism i.e. the world is comprised of objects whose 
existence is independent of ideas and beliefs about them. All the actions and 
events can be reduced to material causes. In contrast to poststructuralism which 
suggests that there is nothing outside discourse as “understanding involves 
rendering the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar” (Campbell, 1992, p. 4).  
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Applying this framework allows me to study foreign policy discussions in 
Georgia not as discussions about the policy per se, “but rather how the con-
ventional understanding of foreign policy was made possible via discursive 
economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a parti-
cular problematization” (ibid, p. 37).  
Poststructuralist scholarship in IR conceptualizes identity as discursive, poli-
tical, relational and social. This further differentiates this approach from tradi-
tional constructivists “who argue that identity need not be constructed as rela-
tional difference” (Hansen, 2006, p. 24). For the latter the states have a pre-
social identity with no particular other as well as a difference between the role 
and type of identities.  
The advantage of applying a poststructuralist research design for my study is 
that it helps to go beyond taking texts about threats coming from Russia or 
about the “global conspiracy against orthodox Christian civilization” as being 
presumed to exist materially and independently of national identity discourse. 
Poststructuralism, and more specifically discourse theory erases the distinction 
between discursive and non-discursive by suggesting that even technologies, 
productive organizations or political interventions are relational systems of 
identities rather than shaped by some objective necessity – hence, they are 
discursive articulations (Torfing, 1999, p. 90). In another words, the approach I 
apply in my research shifts the focus to the study of how those out there, 
whether it is Russia, the European Union or NATO are being constituted by the 
discourses of liminals about the Self.  
Finally, in this thesis I refer to power understood from the Foucauldian per-
spective as decentralized and pluralized. It is characterized by the ability to 
shape and mould individuals through institutions. Such an approach is vital for 
this particular research in two ways: Firstly, it allows a critical examination of 
how the image of European as “normal” in contrast to Russia is produced. 
Secondly, it enriches textual empirical data with symbols, institutions and other 
non-textual data produced outside the official political elite discourse. Although 
Foucault maintains distinction between discursive and non-discursive and hence 
is at odds with the discourse theory, his genealogical approach brings these two 
theories of discourse closer, as Laclau and Mouffe also emphasize the role of 
power in the discursive production of identities (Torfing, 1999, p. 91). Those 
features I have outlined, position my study in the broader post-positivist turn in 
International Relations scholarship.  
To summarize, the contribution this particular thesis aims to make is two-
fold. On the one hand, it sets as its goal to further theorize and develop such 
concepts as liminality and self-colonization in identity studies. As Neumann 
(1999) argues, all identities are in constant negotiation and are created through 
them. They are never fixed but are in ongoing flux. For the study of such socie-
ties which are in between, scholars such as Mälksoo (2010, 2012), Neumann 
(1999), Rumelili (2004, 2012, 2013), and others have proposed an addition to 
the Self/Other nexus, the concept of liminality. Hence, the dichotomy of the 
Self/Other gains a new dimension which can be applied to those entities. Addi-
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tionally, the theoretical and methodological framework put together within this 
research falls in line with those scholars who introduced and further advanced 
poststructuralism in International Relations. This thesis aims to further develop 
and extend the application of the concept of the liminality in International 
Relationsʼ research, more specifically by applying it to the case of Georgia and 
incorporating the post-colonial scholarship within it. This study expands on the 
argument that the liminal positioning or being in-between leaves the Georgian 
society in a constant state of transition and will always remain half-complete. 
Therefore, any foreign policy agenda constituted by identity discourses will be 
articulated in relation to this positioning.  
Secondly, this thesis aims to examine how the idea of Europe is discursively 
produced and to demonstrate the variance over time of Georgia’s Europeanness. 
I am arguing in this study that the image of the West is reproduced in the 
political discourse of the liminal states based on concrete goals political elites 
aim to achieve. To put it in other words, based on the discourse, the idea of 
Europe can be constructed as a danger to the nation or as strengthening it (Han-
sen, 2002). I am examining in this research how this discursive (re)production 
varied over time, that is, how the image of Georgia’s Europeanness has grown 
along with the EU’s enlargement to the east; how during the 2008 August war, 
in discourse theory terms, it managed to achieve hegemonic intervention and 
cease the social antagonism, and how social antagonism with the alternative dis-
course on Georgia’s identity has come back in the post-war political landscape.  
The key argument put forward in this thesis is as follows: Georgia’s liminal 
positioning vis-à-vis the West (understood as a permanent state/process of 
becoming European) causes social antagonism as the subject (i.e. the identity of 
Georgian nation) is articulated by various discourses in mutually exclusive 
ways. Liminality or the state of in-betweenness becomes an empty signifier, 
around which competing discourses start to organize. For instance, for liberal 
discourse, Russia is perceived to be a constitutive outside i.e. “a radical other-
ness that, at the same time, constitutes and negates the limits and identity of the 
discursive formation from which it is excluded (Torfing, 1999, p. 126). The 
Soviet legacy associated with Russia is constructed as alien to Georgia’s iden-
tity and imposed by the “Russian imperialism.” Meanwhile, the alternative 
discourse on national identity constructs the West in the same manner. By 
(re)producing the image of Europe as different, as an entity which would never 
accept Georgia as an equal, Russia with its Orthodox Christianity and common 
Soviet past becomes the key element in the chain of equivalence4 of, what I 
label in this thesis as the populist/exclusive discourse. These two narratives on 
national identity I describe as inclusive and exclusive. The liberal conception of 
the Self or what it means to be Georgian is inclusive, as it is not limited to 
ethnic or religious elements and is based on citizenship. While the populist 
understanding of national identity is exclusive, as I demonstrate in empirical 
                                                 
4  Nodal point (a central term that text articulates and gives a particular meaning to) is 
made equivalent to other signifiers in the chain.  
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chapter 2, it heavily focuses on the formula Georgian = orthodox Christian and 
excludes any other ethnic or religious identity of Georgians. It is similar to what 
is known in the literature as the division between civic and ethno-nationalism. 
The latter is rooted in “imagined ties of common ethnogenesis, or blood ties.” 
The former on the other hand, “is forged through alliances and experiences 
related to a national community” (Saunders, 2016, pp. 16–17), which itself is 







CHAPTER 1. STATE OF THE ART 
Due to the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine after Euromaidan in 2014, the 
relationship between the West and Russia has declined to the lowest point since 
the Cold War. Some experts go as far as to argue that we are witnessing the 
emergence of “the Cold War 2.0” (Hove, 2017). The annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula by the Russian Federation further shifted the geopolitical picture in 
the European Union’s neighbourhood, which had already been shattered by the 
brief August War in Georgia in 2008. The consequences of such developments 
and the effects they have on the region require more diverse and complex 
theoretical and methodological frameworks to study the states in the area. 
Association Agreements with the EU signed by Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine 
brought the engagement of the former in the neighbourhood up to a new level. 
As consequences of free access to the European common market and synchro-
nization of legislation, new dimensions of discourses on Europe have opened up 
in the foreign policy debates of the countries concerned.  
Regardless of the substantial literature examining these developments and 
Georgia’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the military conflict with its northern 
neighbour (see Kakachia et al, 2019; Batiashvili, 2018; Kakachia & Minesashvili, 
2015; Beacháin & Coene, 2014; Kakachia & Cecire, 2013; Rondeli, 2012), these 
accounts fail to fully address how the link between foreign policy and identity is 
produced and maintained in everyday discourses. The latter itself is being defined 
as the expression of civilizational belonging on a daily basis, either through the 
display of the flag of the European Union in front of every public institution, the 
label first Europeans used for the archaeological discoveries of early human 
fossils in Georgia known as homo georgicus, or denying LGBTQI community 
freedom of expression because the Caucasus is different.  
Most importantly, the framework I develop within my research helps to exa-
mine how the norms and standards imposed by the European Union are inter-
nalized or rejected by the political elites. As the membership perspective for 
countries of Eastern Partnership is not so clear, this adds a unique twist to this 
study and makes it different from similar research on the CEE states (Kuus, 
2004; Rumelili, 2004; Mälksoo, 2010). It explores how pro-European foreign 
policy trajectories are embedded in Georgian national identity narratives despite 
the differences between the political elites in Brussels and Georgia on what to 
expect from the deepened cooperation in the first place. To be more precise, 
what the EU promotes in its neighbourhood is ʻinstitutional identityʼ which 
stands in contrast to the ʻsymbolicʼ one, produced within the European Union 
itself. While for the latter such symbols as a common currency, the anthem or 
history are important, reproduction of institutional identity relies on specific 
institutions and the idea of their superiority (Karolewski, 2012). Karolewski 
suggests that the cases of the Central and Eastern European states offer a theo-
retical middle ground between constructivist and realist approaches. Brussels’s 
approach towards these countries was not only guided by conditionality but was 
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embedded in the collective identity transfer. Conditionality strategies towards 
the CEE were accompanied by the strong normative argument of “returning to 
Europe”, while the current ENP lacks the same status (ibid, p. 26). Although 
conditionality and socialization in the post-Soviet space is weaker as the EU 
uses the discourse of ʻidentity light, “by promoting notions, such as the circle of 
friends, rather than formulating a definitive membership perspective” (ibid, p. 
19), this does not stop political elites in Georgia from interpreting these policy 
tools differently. Additionally, despite the government’s consistent commitment 
to Euro-Atlantic integration, as polls from Caucasus Barometer illustrate, 
support for these institutions is in decline. Figure 1 shows that the support for 
EU membership has declined from 69% to 45% by 2017, while the percentage 





         
   
According to the second graph (figure 2), trust in the European Union among 
the Georgian population has declined from 54% in 2008 to 33% by 2017, while 
distrust has increased from 10% to 18%. This trend does not concern only the 
European Union, as attitudes towards NATO are following a similar pattern. 
According to figure 3 support for the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization has gone down. The reason for such decline has to be sought in 
the ambiguity over the nature of relationship ENP implies and the launch of the 
Eastern Partnership was not able to address (Nielsen & Vilson, 2014, p. 244). 
As the result of delayed and indefinitely postponed tangible results, spaces 
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appear where the official discourse or in Foucauldian terms, “regime of truth” 
could be challenged and disrupted. Poststructuralism, in contrast to other more 
traditional approaches of IR theories, offers the most adequate lens to address 










As the numbers above illustrate, despite the consistency of the political elite’s 
commitment to pro-Western foreign policy, the population’s attitude varies ac-
cording to the circumstances and context. This can be partially explained due to 
the ambiguous and vague European future of Eastern Partnership countries. 
France made it clear that EaP excludes all the prospects of membership and EU 
integration. Instead, it is focused on rule of law, the fight against corruption and 
modernization (Jozwiak, 2020).  
Scholars working on the EU’s neighbourhood policy argue that the ENP, 
which was launched in 2004 and aimed at creating the “ring of friends” instead 
of the “ring of fire” around the European Union, failed to achieve its goals. 
Unlike the successful transition of Eastern and Central European states, demo-
cratization in these countries was largely unsuccessful (Nilsson and Silander, 
2016). This is further amplified by the fact that regional projects be they either 
the EU’s or Russia’s do not take place in a vacuum. They are embedded in the 
preferences and perceptions of local actors, as well as on the calculations of 
costs and benefits by the elites (Delcour, 2015).  
Karolewski’s (2012) thesis on the EU’s two identities meant for the member 
and non-member states, this also implies the element of promoting the con-
ceptions of normal as well as conceptions of superior. While the first one pro-
motes the implementation of the EU’s own institutional rules, norms, standards 
in the neighbouring countries, the second refers to Brusselsʼ image of normative 
superiority.  
 
As a consequence, European institutions, procedures, norms, and values become 
new rules of conduct for non-member states: their internal institutions, as well as 
policies, are judged by the EU’s norms. Thus, by adopting these norms, third 
countries also assume the institutional identity of the EU (ibid, p. 14).  
 
Karolewski identifies two mechanisms at work through which an institutional 
identity of non-EU member states is created. The first one refers to the sociali-
zation of the actors when the political elite use norms genuinely, meaning they 
are committed to those values and believe in them. The second mechanism, on 
the other hand, is instrumental i.e. when the actors act according to the EU 
norms as long as such actions serve their interest. As a result, one can observe 
three major causal workings of norms vis-à-vis identities: first, the application 
of incentives and rewards by the identity-giving actors; second, the internali-
zation of norms and identities by the adapting actors, and lastly, “unselfish ex-
change of arguments with the goal of finding a consensus rather than negotia-
tions based on individual interests” (ibid, p. 17). Whereas the first two imply a 
one-directional framework, the last represents a two-way relationship. Hence, 
Karolewski concludes that it is possible to identify a theoretical middle ground 
between constructivism and realism while studying the EU’s identity transfer in 
the neighbourhood. The latter puts emphasis on conditionality as the key instru-
ment and more effective mechanism of identity transfer in contrast to construc-
tivistsʼ reliance on the legitimacy of norms. Instead, one could argue that the 
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European Union can change its mode of operation regarding the methods of 
identity transfer, that is, to use either normative or rationalist logic based on the 
country or the policy field. While applying this framework to the post-Soviet 
space, Karolewski (ibid, p. 19) comes up with the term ʻidentity lightʼ meaning 
that it involves fewer pledges of solidarity, less loyalty and commitment-orien-
tation, and fewer arguments related to common history and European together-
ness.  
Regarding how successful such strategies of identity transfer could be, he 
argues that it depends on the density of institutional ties and contacts between 
the EU and the third countries, as well as on how legitimate the norms coming 
from Brussels are perceived to be by the identity receivers. Drawing a parallel 
between the CEECs and current EaP member states, 2004’s enlargement, ac-
cording to Karolewski, was accompanied by the strong normative arguments of 
reuniting Europe, returning to Europe, etc. which is missing in Brusselsʼ dis-
course on the Eastern Partnership. Grajewski (2012, p. 151) compares this 
relationship of sharing “everything but institutions” to Robinson Crusoe and 
Friday, as the members of the EaP  
 
are expected to rejoice about being given the privilege of following the sug-
gestions of their enlightened Lord and Master and delighted with the possibility 
of implementing the laws created without their participation by the ʻcentre of 
modern civilization’, the source of which is, of course, Brussels. 
 
In this context neighborhood policies can be seen as a “bureaucratic answer” to 
the political question of where the eastern border of the European Union is 
drawn. In contrast to the enlargement, with the aim of creating “ideal mem-
bers,” the European Neighborhood Policy and similar tools aim to create the 
“ideal neighbor” which is both in and out at the same time (Wolzuc, 2018, p. 
280).  
Raik argued already in 2006 that while studying the Eastern Neighborhood 
Policy one needs to take into consideration the interconnection between the EU 
both as a security and as a value community. According to this argument the 
Eastern Neighborhood Policy does not provide sufficient motivation for neigh-
bors to pursue the fundamental values, such as human rights, the rule of law, 
etc. on which the EU is founded. “The ENP does not, therefore, function as an 
instrument for actively promoting the EU’s values in countries that are not 
already committed to these values” (Raik, 2006, p. 90).  
In order to shed some light on what Raik (ibid, p. 90) called a paradox inhe-
rent in the EU’s policies towards neighbors (namely, “the mechanism of ex-
tended governance works most effectively for those countries that need it 
least”) I propose to examine the Eastern Partnership project from a poststructu-
ralist and self-colonization perspective. In other words, as there is no clear 
membership perspective coming from the outside i.e. from Brussels, EaP count-
ries create this image from within, through embedding foreign policy agenda 
and domestic transformations into the identity discourse.  
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One important detail which should be mentioned here is that despite the ENP 
and EaP being two different policy tools, they are not drastically different from 
each other in terms of membership perspective. Although the latter was 
launched on the basis of the former, as it was meant to separate policies towards 
the Southern neighbors from the ones aimed at the countries on the Eastern 
frontier, most scholars agree that the two are not substantially different. One of 
the key areas where the confusion remains is the ambiguity regarding the notion 
of ʻpartnership’; its difference from the original ENP; and lack of detail 
(Korosteleva, 2011). As will be later elaborated in this study, the anthro-
pological concept of liminality fits perfectly to analyze the positioning of the 
EaP countries vis-à-vis the European Union, as they are at the same time in and 
out, included more than the countries of North Africa but still not enough so.  
This thesis also aims to dig deeper into what Delcour (2015) calls the deeply 
divided common neighbourhood between those countries that signed the 
Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA) with the European Union and those which decided to join the Eura-
sian Economic Union. She argues that the foreign policy directions of the 
countries in the region should not be viewed as “just the outcome of external 
actorsʼ stimuli and pressures” but also as the results of individual countriesʼ 
socio-economic needs, structural constraints, elite preferences, etc. The last 
point is especially important since the elite’s interpretation of pressures and 
stimuli affects the foreign policy agenda.  
In addition, I aim to illustrate with the findings of this research how the 
dominant discourse coming from the political establishment constructs Georgia 
as Eastern Europe. Some scholars argue that there is a fundamental difference 
between the Baltics and the South Caucasus.  
 
Whereas Baltic nations conceive their past as backward and uncivilized through 
the images and memory of violence and Stalinist despotism, in the South 
Caucasus the dominant local discourse is based on the return of Orientalism 
following the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Soviet past is seen, in contrast 
to the Baltic States, as a period of modernization, Europeanization, and the 
suppression of traditionalism (Darieva & Kaschuba, 2007, p. 20).  
 
My argument in this thesis is that the dominant discourse does exactly the oppo-
site, especially in the context of the AA and DCFTA. As will be illustrated with 
rich data in the empirical chapters, the political elite in Georgia follows similar 
articulations to those of the Baltics in the early 2000s, while it is the challenging 
and marginal narrative that constructs the Soviet past as the “period of moder-
nization” and in opposition to the West. 
Examining this tendency of dominant discourse on foreign policy, Kakachia 
et al (2019) in their paper ʻDefying marginality: explaining Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s drive towards Europe’, attempted to explain Georgia and Ukraine’s 
drive towards the core by both consequentialist i.e. security concerns and 
ideational (Europe as civilizational choice) perspectives. The paper defines 
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these two countries as “each on Europe’s periphery, attempting to define their 
relationship to Europe and trying to break away from the Soviet legacy and 
escape post-Soviet geopolitical space” (p. 1). This process of the “return to 
Europe”, supported by the population and political class, is arguably driven by 
two incentives: the EU and NATO as the only long-term solution for security 
risks coming from Russia, and Europe as the “historic homeland.” 
Although I mostly agree with the arguments put forward in this research, as 
they are illustrative of the case of both Georgia and Ukraine, my thesis takes a 
different angle. As my goal is to answer ʻhow-possible questionsʼ instead of 
ʻwhy-questions’, I examine how this transition from the periphery to the core is 
constituted; how these processes are constructed in relation to national identity 
discourses, and how the continuities and historic links with the West are 




CHAPTER 2. SELF-COLONIZATION:  
THE BREAK OF LIMINALS FROM THE FREEZE-FRAME  
As Shapiro (1988) remarked, foreign policy is about making the others (in Neu-
mann, 1999, p. 23). In order to examine how Georgian foreign policy is repro-
duced, we need to explore processes of making the others, articulations of 
exclusions and inclusions. By othering Russia, or creating “the East” at its 
border, Georgian policymakers reproduce the image of Europeanness. Due to 
the insecurity of the liminal state about its positioning on the East/West nexus, 
it becomes easier for the political interest groups to translate foreign policy 
discourses into the broader civilizational debates and legitimize or undermine 
the official agenda. Hence, while looking at these processes unravelling in 
Georgia, the following research follows the line of arguments developed by Iver 
B. Neumann in his famous work from 1999 “Uses of the Other: “The East” in 
European Identity Formation” arguing that Europe creates the East while the 
latter creates its own Orient to emphasize its Europeanness. “Inasmuch as Euro-
pean identity is tied to the existence of an Other, this other will be constitutive 
of Europe, and so European representations of that other will necessarily be 
marked by that very fact” (Neumann, 1999, p. 41).  
What should be noted here is that identity “is a fluid, many-stranded and 
perpetually negotiated phenomenon, and so all identities are ipso facto ambi-
guous” (ibid, p. 110). Neumann’s work is looking at the idea of Russia as 
Europe’s other along the temporal dimension, as a country in “some stage of 
transition to Europeanization” (ibid, p. 111). This thesis aims to contribute to 
the literature by introducing a postcolonial perspective in the study of the states 
which recently came into the picture of the European neighbourhood. The 
deeper engagement of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with the European Union 
introduced the need for further othering of Russia, in order to reaffirm one’s 
own belonging to the West. This articulation of Europeanness by the elites is 
what I will refer to in this thesis as self-colonization, and which, unlike the 
classical understanding of the colonialism is addressing the societies which 
have not been affected by colonial rule from Western powers (Kiossev, 1995). 
The relationships between the elites of Eastern Partnership frontrunner 
countries and Brussels are postcolonial as such relations cannot be defined with 
any pre-given criteria. Postcolonial is rather situational and relational (Moro-
zov, 2015, p. 9). Such self-colonizing collective entities usually go back to their 
historical roots to look for the justification and the proof of their belonging to 
the West. However, their current Self is being constructed from both sides as 
inferior to Europe. They simultaneously are being excluded from and belong to 
the West.  
This research is examining symbols (flags, anthems, monuments, etc.), histo-
rical facts and the meanings attached to them through discourses on Georgia’s 
European identity as instances of Georgians looking for justifications and proof 
of their belonging. Saunders (2016, p. 17) argues that there are a variety of 
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means through which national identity is reproduced. These means could entail 
visual/performative aspects, such as music, theatre or athletic competition, oral, 
written or historic narratives, sense of belonging and memory, or through 
associations. One could draw a parallel to Hobsbawm’s (1983) concept of the 
invention of traditions and the idea of the need to invent one in order to create 
the image of historic continuity. History becomes a vital domain in which 
meanings “are ʻembodiedʼ and in which things become meaningful is certain 
beyond the shadow of a doubt” (Castoriadis, 1975, 2005, pp. 22–23). In 
addition, Castoriadis argues that no particular historical fact has a meaning 
isolated from the society in which it is produced. Hence, the study of the 
references to the historical facts in the contemporary discourses become vital 
for identity studies, especially from the self-colonization perspective. In 
Foucauldian terms, one cannot look at history other than from the contemporary 
gaze. History is interpreted and reproduced according to the discourses which 
set limits on what can be said and what should not be altered. This will be 
elaborated in-depth in the discourse theory part, but before that I need to expand 
on some key theoretical concepts in detail. 
In the introduction I briefly mentioned the works of Hopf and Hintz, where 
each studied how different conceptions of the Self dictate specific policy 
moves. Hintz (2016, p. 361) in her study develops the classification of Turkish 
national identity contestations: Western Liberalism, Republican Nationalism 
and Ottoman Islamism. Each of the narratives has its own constitutive norms of 
membership and behavior (CN), Social Purpose (SP), Relational Meaning (RM) 
and Cognitive Worldview (CW). The first component refers to the rules and 
norms which define who the members are, and the appropriate behavior for 
them. The second component defines what constitutes the goals and aims of the 
group, the third defines how the group positions itself vis-à-vis other groups, 
while the fourth “provides an overarching sense of the group’s role in the 
world.” (ibid, p. 341). An important detail which Hintz notes is that none of 
these elements are fixed. They go through change as the result of contestations 
that can take place both within the group and between the groups. These 
struggles, according to Hintz, carry immense ontological significance, which is 
due to the subjects of competitions. As the struggles are over the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion, friends and enemies, it is essentially about “who “we” 
are and how we should behave” (ibid, p. 340). Furthermore, the supporters of a 
particular identity proposal tend to seek opportunities to spread its acceptance to 
more individuals. This leads her to conceptualize these attempts of spreading 
the support for a particular proposal as striving for hegemony, which itself is 
defined as the power wielded and legitimacy enjoyed by the identity proposal 
due to its widespread popularity. But what is important, is that hegemony, as it 
is met with active and sustained resistance, is almost impossible to be attained.  
Following the example of Hintz’s research framework, I also propose to 
break down two conceptions of Georgian national identity, liberal and populist 
(inclusive and exclusive) into these four components. This helps to better grasp 
the processes at play as well as provides an analytically useful tool to consider 
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the complexities of a vast amount of empirical data. Furthermore, the findings 
of the poststructuralist discourse analysis conducted within the scope of this 
research can be conceptualized as such striving for hegemony by the competing 
identity proposals/narratives.  
 
 
 Liberal/Inclusive Populist/Exclusive 
Norms of Membership Non-ethnic, civic member-
ship. Embraces (at least on 
the discursive level) indivi-
dual liberties, open trade, 
liberal immigration policies, 
etc.  
Ethnic, religious-based 
membership. Hostile towards 
immigrants. Embraces 
conservative and “traditional” 
values.  
Social Purpose  Implementation of the Euro-
pean norms and standards 
Promote spread of conserva-
tive, anti-western and anti-
globalization sentiments.  
Relational Meaning Constructs Europe as the 
natural “home” where 
Georgia belongs, while 
alienating Russia and the 
Soviet past. 
Constructs modern western 
civilization as perverted and 
degraded. Orthodox Christian 
Russia as a natural ally. 
Idealizes the Soviet past.  
Cognitive Worldview  Sees itself as a natural part of 
modern, Western civilization 
Sees itself as a part of Russia-
led orthodox Christian world  
 
Figure 4. Georgian National Identity Contestations 
 
 
Considering the ongoing fierce academic debates around the concept of popu-
lism, I need to clarify that within the context of this research what makes a dis-
course populist is “the people” as a nodal point in reference to which a collec-
tive identity is constructed. In contrast to the liberal narrative, “the people” does 
not represent the whole community of the citizens, but rather is constructed 
with chains of equivalence and difference, which limits it to a specific religious, 
linguistic and ethnic aspect. Furthermore, populist articulation creates the 
dichotomy between “the real community” and the establishment/elites. The 
latter is blamed for depriving “the people” of their sovereign rights, self-rule, 
values, etc. (Wojczewski, 2019, p. 254). These aspects give populist articula-
tions illiberal elements. “Populists tend to assume the ordinary people are a 
monolithic group, and that those governing should protect them against per-
ceived threats from “different” peoples such as elites, immigrants or some other 
minority with possible links to foreign countries and cultures” (Patman, 2019, p. 
282). Thus, populist discourse is skeptical of multiculturalism, free movement 
of people or capital and is more conservative and traditionalist. Hence, any 
discourse can be called populist on both the extreme political left and right, as 
long as the core of people vs. the elites is there. In Laclau’s (2005, p. 74) terms 
there should be at least the two preconditions for a populist discourse: the 
30 
formation of an internal Other that stands in opposition to “the people” and 
articulation that makes “the people” possible. Following this conceptualization, 
challenging Georgian discourse on national identity is qualified as populist not 
because of the certain ideological views, but whether it at least meets these two 
conditions or not. I am following Mudde’s (2017, p. 48) ideational approach to 
populism which defines it as an ideology that divides people into two groups: 
ʻthe pure peopleʼ vs. ʻthe corrupted elite’. Thus, it implies four key concepts: 
the people, the elite, ideology, and general will of the people.  
Liberal or inclusive discourse on national identity with the emphasis on 
Europe as the historic home of Georgia represents a hegemonic articulation. I 
elaborate on this in further detail in my discourse theory subchapter, but there 
are still several points to be made already here. Firstly, the discourse becomes 
hegemonic when its representation of reality is reflected in the articulations of a 
broad majority of interacting subjects. “It starts to be hegemonic when our 
everyday understanding of social relations and the world as a whole start to 
alter according to the framework that is set by the hegemonic discourse” 
(Nabers & Stengel, 2019, p. 107).  
Prevalence of a particular social force is what Nabers and Stengel (ibid) call 
sedimented practices. With the latter, the discourse generates specific practices 
and institutions and becomes “objective” by becoming institutionally fixed. In 
other words, “they legitimize a certain strand of action, while delegitimizing 
others” (ibid). However, as social institutionalization will always be incomplete, 
sedimented practices never achieve full fixation.  
Sedimented practices are characterized by three core elements: being as-
sociated with myths, being constitutive of historical change and entailing an 
ethical dimension.  
 
Myths provide powerful articulations of identity and difference. Importantly, 
myths essentially point to an absence, a fullness of society that can never be fully 
reached. Social transformation emerges as a result of struggles to fill that empty 
presence (ibid, p. 109).  
 
To put it differently, myth represents “the missing fullness of a nation” which 
has to remain empty. Otherwise, any attempt to actually fill a myth with 
meaning i.e. deciding what it is and what it is not “would mean to subject the 
myth to everyday political struggles, thus ending its mythical status” (ibid). 
Myth is the metaphor for absent fullness, fullness which cannot be achieved 
(Torfing, 1999, p. 115).  
This is precisely how we should view ʻthe Westʼ in contemporary Georgian 
context. It is a myth that points to the historic home that has been lost. At the 
same time, it remains empty with no clear definition of what this ʻWestʼ means. 
As a result, all the political actors who support Georgia’s pro Euro-Atlantic fo-
reign policy are labelled as ʻpro-Westernʼ despite some fundamental differences 
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amongst themselves or from their western counterparts.5 This is where identity 
comes in, as it can only be established by constructing the distinction between 
“the mythical Inside and negative Outside.” It unites all the ʻpro-Westernʼ 
actors vis-à-vis the rest (threatening outsiders). The concept of chains of equi-
valence from discourse theory helps to explain this phenomenon. It suppresses 
internal differences between those political parties and constructs them as a 




One of the key contributions of the following research is to develop and further 
expand the theoretical scholarship which applies the cultural-anthropological 
concept of liminality to identity studies in International Relations. The starting 
point of my research is the contested national identity of the societies on the 
European Union’s Eastern border and how it is constituted through discourses. 
What are the effects of policy tools designed in Brussels on the countries in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the EU and how do they contribute to competing 
articulations of national Self? In this regard, Stoicescu observes that the count-
ries in the East during the enlargement process of the European Union are never 
told “no” but rather “not yet” or “yes, but”, highlighting characteristics of being 
in and out at the same time and not the total absence of Europeaness (2008, p. 
38). Kuus (2004) argues that the EU’s enlargement policy and relations towards 
the candidate states become the disciplinary/policing tool. In addition, in line 
with Neumann, she suggests that the Central and Eastern European countries 
are constantly othering Russia as the East and Oriental in order to reinforce 
their Self or their belonging to Europe.  
I illustrate in this study how a similar tendency has shifted more to the East 
since the so-called “Big Bang” of 2004 when ten new members joined the EU. 
However, unlike the former, due to the so-called ʻidentity light,ʼ it is a different 
and unique case in its own right. If in the case of the CEE countries the ap-
proach taken by Brussels has been guided not only by conditionality, but also 
by being embedded in a collective identity transfer – “returning to Europe,” the 
Eastern Partnership lacks the same status. ʻIdentity lightʼ promotes notions such 
as “circle of friends” and instead of offering the frontrunners of EaP (Moldova, 
Ukraine, Georgia) a path towards membership, simply helps them to reform 
their domestic legislation in line with the EU’s body of law.  
                                                 
5  For instance, the libertarian political party Girchi believes in limiting the state’s 
regulatory power as much as possible, proposing such radical measures as elimination of 
mandatory schooling, state universities, ministry of education or food safety inspections. 
Such radical policies contradict the Association Agreement concluded and so greatly 
celebrated by the Georgian government, let alone meeting any European Union membership 
criteria. Yet, Girchi is always listed as a pro-Western party and other political parties would 
consider Girchi as a potential coalition partner, precisely because of ʻthe Westʼ as the myth 
with no actual meaning.  
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There are two key factors which make the cases of CEE, and the Eastern 
Partnership and the level of the EU’s engagement different and hence enable me 
to take this thesis further than just a regional amplification/replication of the 
previous research on Central and Eastern European states. Firstly, the overall 
geopolitical picture has dramatically shifted since the annexation of Crimea and 
Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine. These developments affected the percep-
tion of the European Union and NATO as the security actor in the region and 
the role of pro-Western foreign policy agenda in discourses of the countries 
concerned. Secondly, what makes states of the Eastern Partnership different 
from the processes that took place prior to the 2004 enlargement is that the 
membership prospects for Georgia or Ukraine are not so obvious. Despite the 
hopes and expectations, what is implied by the term partnership with eastern 
neighbors still remains vague and constitutes a threat to the effectiveness of EaP 
(Gretskiy et al., 2014; Korosteleva, 2014). As Park (2014, p. 6) argued, due to 
the vagueness of the benefits, citizens of partner countries did not push their 
governments for more vigorous Eastern Partnership reforms. In January 2019, 
France made it clear that the Eastern Partnership was not a path to membership 
for eastern neighbors and instead, it was about modernization, democratization 
and the fight against corruption (Jozwiak, 2019). Although the Association 
Agreement recognizes Georgia as an Eastern European country, it does not 
guarantee that it will be offered any membership perspective in near future 
(Paul, 2015, p. 5). These circumstances justify the relevance and importance of 
this thesis, as there is a clear discrepancy between the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
and political elite of Eastern Partnership states about the destination point for 
this long journey of engagement with each other. The adopted theoretical 
framework combining liminality with self-colonization and discourse theory 
provides a lens which enables light to be shed on the role of the West in 
Georgia’s identity discourses, particularly on how being European (but not fully 
so) is reproduced on a daily basis.  
As a result of some specific geographical and historical circumstances, the 
Eastern border of Europe is not clearly demarked, it is in a constant process of 
(re)making. Wolff (1994, p. 7) argues that scientific cartography seemed to 
contradict the philosophic construction of Eastern Europe from an Orientalist 
perspective, excluding it from Europe and shifting it into Asia. This means that 
already in the era of Enlightenment, a developmental division of the continent 
between the Western and Eastern Europe was established, and the border drawn 
by mental maps of the westerners was different from the border of Europe in 
scientific cartography. 
 
Such uncertainty encouraged the construction of Eastern Europe as a paradox of 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe. Eastern Europe 
defined Western Europe by contrast, as the Orient defined the Occident, but was 
also made to mediate between Europe and the Orient. One might describe the 
invention of Eastern Europe as an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization 
(ibid).  
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Following this perspective, the classical dichotomy of the Self/Other dynamic 
underpinning any identity fails to substantially address foreign policy dis-
courses of Eastern Partnership countries. Hence, liminality as a concept offers a 
better starting point for studying the constitution of identities which are in the 
stage of transition, at the crossroads of two civilizations, and are “neither here 
nor there.” Liminality, while anthropologically is defined as a transitory phase, 
and in the case of Georgian discourse on national identity is grounded in a 
constant feeling of inferiority and involves internalizing second-class status vis-
à-vis the core, which is the West. This is a major feature of societies that are 
located at the peripheries of Europe and are subject to inclusion and exclusion 
at the same time. They feel that they are not completely alien, external, or 
foreign to Europe, but at the same time, they are not perceived to be fully Euro-
pean either. 
The concept of liminality originates in anthropology. Arnold Van Gennep 
(1908; 1960) while observing the ceremonies of various tribes, concluded that 
in the rites connected with pregnancy, betrothal or initiations, the concept of 
transition plays a key role. He divided a complete scheme of rites of passage 
into three stages: pre-liminal, liminal and the post-liminal, or in other words, 
rites of separation, rites of transition and the rites of incorporation. This classi-
fication was further developed by Victor Turner, who argues that “if our basic 
model of society is that of a ʻstructure of positions,ʼ we must regard the period 
of margin or ʻliminalityʼ as an interstructural situation” (Turner, 1967, p. 93).  
He characterizes the transitional period as a process of becoming, the 
starting point of which is the detachment from “an earlier fixed point in the 
social structure or a set of cultural conditions (a ʻstateʼ)” (ibid, p. 94). This is 
usually followed by the liminal state of the subject, the stage of becoming, 
which is characterized by ambiguity as “he passes through a realm that has few 
or none of the attributes of the past or coming state” (Turner, 1967, p. 94). As 
the passage is completed, the subject returns to a stable state and through the 
new structural arrangements acquires new rights and obligations, as well as is 
expected to behave within the certain customary norms and standards. Limi-
nality, according to Turner, is characterized by an absence of any property, 
status, secular clothing, kinship, etc. but at the same time, it has positive 
aspects. It is an important process of passage, which leads to the transformation 
and rebirth of the subject undergoing it. Turner also argued that liminality as 
such, in this condition of being “neither here nor there” is a state in itself. 
Liminal entities are in the condition of being “neither here nor there; they are 
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, 
convention, and ceremonial” (Turner, 1969, p. 95). Thus, liminality is often 
linked to death, to darkness, to being in the womb, bisexuality etc.  
There is one important aspect when applying the concept to the whole 
society. While in anthropological usage what constitutes liminality is clearly 
defined, what is the way into and out of it, as well as that there are experienced 
“masters of ceremonies” to guide the subjects through the rituals, however in 
the case of the whole societies this is hardly so. According to Thomassen 
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(2015), there are two key differences: firstly, the future is unknown and 
secondly, there are no so-called masters of the ceremony, as there is nobody 
who has gone through it before. As I am demonstrating in this research, 
Georgia’s liminal identity or seemingly never-ending stage of transition 
becomes part of its national identity. The internalization of the concepts of 
being in transition; being located at the crossroads between Asia and Europe 
where two civilizations blend as well as the idea of a bridge between two 
cultures, become points of the articulation of Georgia’s national identity and of 
being transmitted to the foreign policy agenda. Szakolczai (2015) compares 
such a condition to a film stopped at a particular frame. To something, which is 
frozen in-between the separation and reaggregation and speculated that there are 
three types of permanent liminality: monasticism, court society, and Bolshe-
vism. 
The inclusion of the concept of liminality in political science or International 
Relations is especially important as it offers a new dimension to identity studies 
as this theoretical framework is able to overcome binary oppositions and further 
extend the understanding of political subjects as Self-Liminal-Other. This fea-
ture of liminality helps to better study the process of the formation of identities 
which are in constant flux, in the state of becoming, especially when the dis-
course of ʻbecoming Europeanʼ is analyzed or how countries which are going 
through transition fall short of completing the process and retain second-class 
status states in comparison to their Western European counterparts. “Thus, what 
constitutes liminality is not the (possibility of) transition, but rather the fact that 
this transition is priorly constituted to always remain half-complete” (Rumelili, 
2012, p. 503). However, according to Rumelili’s understanding, Turkey’s 
liminal identity is the product of specific discourses on international politics 
rather than an inherent trait (Rumelili & Suleymanoglu-Kurum, 2017). As is 
illustrated below, this is exactly the case one can observe in the foreign policy 
discourse vis-à-vis the EU of members of the Eastern Partnership.  
Liminality as a research toolkit has the “capacity to provide explanatory and 
interpretative accounts of seemingly unstructured situations” and hence links 
“experience-based and cultural-oriented approaches to contemporary political 
problems” (Horvath et al, 2015, p. 3) as well as offer comparisons across 
historical periods.  
Anne Norton, one of the first scholars to apply liminality to political science, 
was referring to the concept as a source of collective identity, writing: 
 
Liminars, whether their rites of passage are ritual or revolutionary, are between 
identities. In politics, they are between allegiances. This state is marked by 
ambiguity, ambivalence, and contradiction, yet it is from this disorder that new 
orders arise. In reflecting on the differences that mark out the liminal, people 




In other words, an important feature of liminality is its ability to form a new 
structure and a new set of rules for the subjects. Liminality can be regarded as 
the platform for new political beginnings, which, once achieved, return back to 
the status or the level of being taken for granted. Norton claimed that liminality 
not only provides the definition of the nation but at the same time implies the 
recognition of the source of the definition (Norton, 1988). Translating this into 
the context of the following research, as one of the Georgian politicians re-
marked “while Asia sees Georgia as Europe, Europe sees Georgia as Asia” 
(Kiknadze, 2015, p. 83). This ambiguity becomes the main source of one’s 
liminal identity and as is discussed later on, self-colonization as a concept helps 
to explain strategies such societies tend to employ.  
Referring to the stage metaphor, Szakolzai (2015, p. 28) argues that liminality 
is helpful to understand the importance of formative aspects of transitory 
periods. Here the concept of the transformative event is introduced, which is a 
technical term in sociological analysis, the degree and the direction of which 
depend on  
 
the surviving fragments of previous identities, the existence of external reference 
points that remain more or less intact, and the presence or absence of new 
models, forms, or measures (ibid, p. 30). 
 
In the case of the Eastern Partnership countries, such an event is the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, which altered what seemed to be already fixed, i.e. the 
identity of being Soviet. In discourse theory terms, this was a dislocation, as a 
result of which, established meanings were lost while new ones were still in the 
stage of formation. Szakolzai suggests that the scholarly concept of liminality 
leads to understating such major events as the transformers of “the very mode 
of being of the individuals involved” (ibid). The extent of the event forces 
individuals to look for models to follow or “imitate.” During the liminal or the 
transitory period, they could easily be misled or have their identity altered. 
Thus, looking at competing and sometimes even mutually exclusive national 
identity discourses (Western vs. post-Soviet) from the perspective of liminality 
helps to better understand the seemingly irrational foreign policy narrative. On 
the other hand, what should be kept in mind is that liminality is a concept, 
which points towards a certain kind of interpretative analysis, but it does not 
explain it in positivist sense (Thomassen, 2015, p. 40). It refers to something 
very simple “the experience of finding oneself at a boundary or in an in-
between position,” (ibid) both spatially and temporally. Hence, Thomassen 
argues for the necessity of the scale or the degree to which liminality is 
experienced. It becomes especially intense when personal and “civilizational” 
liminality converges. As I aim to establish with this study, this is precisely the 
case for post-Soviet Georgia, where personal experiences on a daily basis 
converge with a larger civilizational discourse shaping foreign policy dis-
courses.  
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The concept of liminality in Political Science and International Relations has 
been further developed by Rumelili, Mälksoo, Stoicescu, and other scholars. 
Application of this theoretical framework for identity studies in these fields 
allows us to go beyond the Self/Other dichotomy and add another dimension, 
where the identities of in-between societies fall. The Self-Liminal-Other nexus 
comes into play, which helps to analyze the processes of becoming European or 
the making of one’s European identity in the constant Othering and repro-
duction of “the East.” It also seems to represent the strength of the liminality as 
a concept, since it, unlike most of the positivist theories, instead of seeing 
reality as largely given, puts an emphasis on the power of agency to reconstruct 
existing realities and create new ones (Mälksoo, 2012, pp. 488–489). In addi-
tion, as Rumelili illustrated in her case study of Turkey, one of the important 
features of the liminal identity is that countries going through the stage of 
transition always fall short of completing the transformation, so will always 
remain ʻremain ʻsecond class statesʼ in comparison to their Western European 
counterparts. As she argues, one can observe the contradiction between the 
universal and exclusive. If human rights and democratization can be considered 
to be universal, something any state can achieve through reforms, Europeani-
sation is something exclusive, which stems from geographical location. 
Applying this concept to the study of democratization offers a new perspective 
to look at these processes. Instead of making either/or distinctions, it diffe-
rentiates between the Self and Other on a temporal basis. However, in order to 
validate and reproduce itself, such processes need to be recognized by those 
who are not democratic yet but are aspiring towards it. Or in other words, 
placing themselves in the liminal position. As Lene Hansen (2006, p. 40) put it: 
“Discourses of returning to ʻEuropeʼ or ʻthe Westʼ illustrate that the Self can be 
constructed through an identity that is articulated as both superior to the Self 
and as identical to it.”  
Democracy promotion thus becomes linked to identity reproduction, as it 
acquires hierarchical features by individual polities representing themselves as 
more democratic than their significant others (Rumelili, 2013, pp. 69–70). 
Meanwhile, the Europeanisation or Westernization is applicable only to those 
societies, which share cultural and historical narratives with Europe. As a result 
of the contradictions between the universalistic and particularistic discourses, 
discourse on democracy acquires hierarchical features where the West has 
superiority in criticizing the non-West. Or in other words, it leaves the non-
West in ae constant state of transition to become the West. In such contra-
dictions between the two, spaces constructed through discourses appear and 
represent a possibility of existing beyond a Self/Other dichotomy. These spaces 
are the ones, which can be characterized as liminals and where countries like 
Turkey, Ukraine or Georgia can be placed. 
Some liminal actors might reproduce and try to maintain existing social 
categories in response to their liminal positioning, while others might challenge 
the current social order through the employment of their liminality. These kinds 
of practices are usually the consequences of domestic discourses on their 
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liminality (Rumelili, 2012). Or as Stoicescu (2008, p. 16) puts it: “The develop-
ment of the liminal imaginary in geopolitical and foreign policy discourse can 
be seen both as a means of resistance to the fact of being defined by Europe, as 
in Turkey, and as a means of accepting definition coming from Europe, as in 
Romania.” In Georgiaʼs case, it can be argued that while liberals try to repro-
duce the existing social order by advocating further reforms and modernization 
with moves to become more Western or ʻcivilized,ʼ making up for lacking 
Europeanness through self-colonizing practices, populists tend to challenge 
existing social norms by voicing their support for better relations with the 
Russian Federation and rejecting plans for NATO membership, offering their 
own understanding of where the nation belongs in larger civilizational debates. 
Mälksoo (2010, p. xiii) characterizes liminality as “in-between situations and 
conditions where established structures are dislocated, hierarchies reversed and 
traditional settings of authority potentially endangered.” From this perspective 
we could argue that liminal condition is similar to what discourse theory calls 
organic crisis – the moment when the meanings of elements are altered and still 
in the process of acquiring new ones. As I elaborate later on in the dissertation, 
the collapse of the USSR could be conceptualized as such a crisis and the 
subsequent time period as liminal with the existing meanings being dislocated, 
challenged and destabilized. 
As I am arguing in the present study, the liminal space that the Georgian 
society finds itself in, is exploited by different groups with various interests in 
various ways. There is a liberal narrative around the liminal position vis-à-vis 
the West, which ascribes to Georgia a second-class status and pushes for self-
colonization. This is understood as the recognition of the superiority of the 
Western cultural power and succumbing to it, without actually being colonized 
or being part of the colonial system. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a populist 
discourse also organizes around the liminal positioning of Georgia, dwelling on 
this concept to propagate anti-Western policies. By claiming that Georgia is not 
perceived as an equal among the major Western nations, populist discourse 
subsequently supports their country’s membership of the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union, where it will be regarded as an equal among other post-Soviet 
states. The contradictions between these two competing discourses also heavily 
rely on the Soviet past and its interpretation. While liberals present the period of 
1921–1991 as the years of the occupation, which prevented Georgiaʼs return to 
its European roots, the populist narrative claims that in the Soviet times, unlike 
nowadays, Georgian society was highly developed and perceived as an equal by 
the other members of the USSR. 
As was already mentioned, one of the main contributors to the creation of 
the liminal spaces is the West itself, or more specifically the EU neighbourhood 
policy. It never denies prospects of membership for those states, but at the same 
time, leaves them in a constant state of transition. Formally any European 
country is welcome to apply for membership, in practice however, neither ENP 
nor EaP provide any clear prospect of membership. Despite countries like 
Moldova or Georgia expressed their interest in joining the European Union, 
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membership was not in the offering from Brusselsʼ side. Thus, they were not 
given sufficient reasons to embark on painful and costly reforms (Park, 2014, p. 
6). Signatory countries of the Association Agreement were asked to “swallow a 
significant chunk of the acquis communautaire without sufficient economic 
support or a clear membership perspective” (Paul, 2015, p. 5). Thus, EaP should 
be viewed in the context of the EU’s attempts to advance good governance and 
stability in the eastern neighborhood. With each round of the EU enlargement, 
border management priorities get reactivated or redistributed. This was espe-
cially the case with 2004ʼs so-called the “Big Bang,” when the union became 
the immediate neighbour of countries like Ukraine or Moldova; which were 
regarded as potentially endangering the EU member states with the possible 
penetrations of human trafficking and organized crime. As the result of the 
concerns with its own security, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
developed to promote the EU type of order in its neighbouring states, to transfer 
ʻstability, prosperity, shared values and the rule of lawʼ to these countries for 
the sake of its own security (Balzacq, 2009, Jeandesboz, 2009). As Hadfield 
argues, the ENP, “by denying standard membership while setting normative 
standards as benchmarks that will ultimately contribute to its own security,” 
reveals instrumental and cultural asymmetry embedded in the EU's relations 
with its new neighbours (2009, p. 98). Such absence of “methodologically 
identified incentives” from the EU might eventually ruin the credibility and 
legitimacy of the EU actorness, leading to disillusion, and to discontent. And a 
vacuum will emerge, which will be filled from “the only other continental 
powerhouse: Russia” (ibid, pp. 103–104). Unlike Georgia, Armenia and Azer-
baijanʼs unwillingness to deepen the relationship with the EU by signing the 
Association Agreement can be described as an example of such a trend.  
The same argument can be made in relation to NATO enlargement and 
Georgiaʼs aspirations of membership in the alliance. The communiqué of the 
NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008 stated: “NATO welcomes Ukraineʼs and 
Georgiaʼs Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed 
today that these countries will become members of NATO” (NATO, 2008), but 
without any concrete time frame or details. Such vague statements contributed 
to the further liminal positioning of Georgia, constantly failing to achieve stan-
dards high enough to even get a membership action plan (MAP), a commonly 
regarded technical predecessor of membership in the North Atlantic alliance. 
Georgia has become the second-largest non-NATO contributor to the ISAF 
mission. It managed to maintain expenses on defense above 2% of the countryʼs 
GDP, one of the key NATO requirements, which even most of the member 
states fail to meet. Georgia is recognized as one of the closest partners of 
NATO (Stoltenberg, 2016), it opened a joint military training facility with 
NATO but still falls short of being granted the MAP. This has led to the 
adoption of a liminal discourse on foreign policy from both sides, that is being 
democratic and modern, but still not enough. An important factor, which should 
be noted is that in the discourse of the liberal groups, the EU and NATO are 
both associated with the Europeanness and membership of both of them with 
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the main criteria of achieving the full transition from the liminal state. The 
discourse on NATO and Georgiaʼs aspiration for membership is rather vividly 
presented by liberals as an issue of identity and culture. The equal mark is 
usually put between NATO and the EU, both being associated with the Western 
identity. It should also be noted, that with the end of the Cold War, the 
discourse on the purposes and legitimation of NATO has shifted within the 
organization itself as well. It has acquired more normative and ethical dimen-
sions. As, the United States Secretary of State, Powell remarked in 2004, while 
welcoming new members: “NATO is now transformed, … into an alliance 
concerned mainly with the defense of common values and common ideas. 
NATO was determined, above all, to prevent aggression. Now it is determined, 
above all, to promote freedom, to extend the reach of liberty, and to deepen the 
peace” (Powell, 2004 as cited in Kuus, 2007, p. 273). Or in other words, the nor-
mative dimension brings in to play an important role and physical security threats 
are translated into more abstract, identity, cultural or civilizational threats.  
As Stoicescu (2008) argues, despite liminality being extensively explored 
and studied in anthropology or cultural studies, it has not really been applied to 
political science or International Relations. Her research of the cases of Turkey, 
Ukraine, and Romania contributes to the scholarship as there are almost no 
studies which look at how liminality has been “translated in the language and 
the self-image of liminars” (Stoicescu, 2008, p.7). The following research is 
contributing to this gap in the scholarship, which extensively covers such 
notions and concepts as borderlands, borders, frontiers, buffers, etc., but fails to 
fully reflect on the processes taking place in this region, especially from the 
perspectives of the in-between entities themselves. The following study engages 
with the case of Georgia, but extensively dwells on Stoicescuʼs findings and is 
trying to compare the discourses on the formerʼs liminal identity vis-à-vis the 
cases of Turkey, Romania, and Moldova. In addition, it introduces the concept 
of self-colonization and in line with Kuus (2004) tries to look at the idea of the 
West being created not only in Brussels but in the borderlands of Europe.  
 
 
2.2 Self-colonization  
I am suggesting in this study that the political elites of the societies in-between 
while dwelling on the liminal positioning tend to employ the tactics of self-
colonization vis-à-vis the West. For instance, discourses on implementation and 
justification of the reform agenda proposed by the Association Agreement with 
the European Union are better understood if examined from this perspective. 
This concept is different from classical colonialism as  
 
according to classical definitions, colonization (and its ideological system, colo-
nialism) refers to the processes of domination in which settlers migrate from the 
colonizing group to the colonized land (Etkind, 2013, p. 7).  
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Against this backdrop, according to Kiossev (1995), self-colonization as an 
analytical concept can be used for cultures that have succumbed to the actual 
power of the West even without being actually colonized. Kiossev claims that, 
despite them not having been directly affected by the colonial rule or any major 
colonial conflicts, historical circumstances transformed them into an extra-
colonial “periphery.”  
 
The same circumstances, however, put them in a situation where they had to 
recognize self-evidently foreign cultural supremacy and voluntarily absorb the 
basic values and categories of colonial Europe. The result might be named 
ʻhegemony without dominationʼ (ibid, p. 73).  
 
Since Georgia has never been directly colonized by any major Western Euro-
pean empire, the liberal narrative voluntarily tends to recognize the supremacy 
of the European cultural or other standards vis-à-vis the Russian Empire, Soviet 
or independence experience. In other words, Self-colonization is the outcome of 
self-Orientalization as the elites internalize European norms as universal (Mo-
rozov, 2015, p. 31).  
As the processes of self-colonization take place beyond colonial realities, 
such as economic exploitation, military or political dominance, social imagina-
tion becomes a vital element. Social imagination is understood as “a back-
ground intuitive knowledge, a body of stereotypes shared by a community” 
(Kiossev, 1995, p. 73). Kiossev understands self-colonization as an externally 
driven process and a parallel can be drawn with Ayşe Zarakol’s (2011) After 
Defeat. How the East Learned to Live with the West, where she introduces the 
notion of stigma into the study of international relations. She defines it as “the 
internalization of a particular normative standard that defines oneʼs own 
attributes as discreditable, as it is a label of difference imposed from outside” 
(ibid, p. 4). This definition fits Georgia’s current Euro-Atlantic foreign policy as 
it is haunted by a constant feeling of somehow always falling short of achieving 
the standards for NATO or the EU memberships, resulting in the internalization 
of this second-class status, of lagging behind the West. This stigma, which is 
the product of liminal positioning, becomes a reference point for two com-
petitive discourses. While liberals are willing to advocate further modernization 
and Europeanisation to shed the remaining doubts about being European, the 
populist discourse argues for the slowing down of the integration process in the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions since “Europe is different.” Or as Zarakol (ibid, p. 7) 
puts it:  
 
to be torn between the East and the West as a state, as a society, as a nation, is to 
exist in the international system with the dilemmas that are faced by stigmatized 
individuals in everyday interaction. The individual with stigma may accept that 
he has a stigmatized attribute and try to improve his life within the bounds of 
that awareness – but that choice implies resigning oneself to second-class status. 
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As a consequence, stigmatized individuals are subject to being perceived as 
“less than a human being” and such an attitude is backed up by stigma theory. 
This situation puts the stigmatized actor in a vicious circle it cannot break away 
from. If an actor becomes defensive of its stigma, such action is perceived as an 
expression of difference and therefore as a justification of the way it is being 
treated. It means that a stigmatized actor cannot escape normative standards 
being imposed upon and within this context, as even rejection of those 
standards or isolation 
  
are as much a response to the stigma as embracing the stigma would be. … In 
other words, the stigmatized agent deals with two kinds of “acceptance issues.” 
One that he requires from the wider society and the other that he requires from 
himself (Zarakol, 2011, p. 96).  
 
When this is the case, or the actor is stigmatized, two choices are available: 
either to return to normalcy or to embrace the stigma. The former, according to 
Zarakol, refers to the attempts of fixing oneʼs discrediting characteristics or 
simply by ʻpassingʼ which can be described as “sweeping under the rug certain 
historical periods of dissimilarity with the core and constructing a national 
identity that is centered on a period of common lineage” (ibid, p. 97). As is 
argued in the following study, the liberal discourse in Georgia focuses on 
normalcy through fixing differences. To put it in other words, by ascribing itself 
a second-class status vis-à-vis the West and going through a transformation, the 
liberal discourse tries to get rid of those elements which are presented as non-
European and usually associated with backwardness. Meanwhile, the populist 
discourse, dwelling on the same stigma, organizes around another approach, 
which Zarakol calls embracing the stigma. From this perspective, the populist 
discourse rejects the foreign policy goals oriented towards the European Union 
or especially towards NATO on the basis of being different or alien.  
The sociological notion of stigma itself, which was introduced later on in 
International Relations and Political Science was developed by Erving Goff-
man. He suggests that “society establishes the means of categorizing persons 
and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of 
each of these categories” (1963, p. 5). What constitutes stigma then, is the 
discrepancy between what he calls actual and virtual social identities of the 
subject. What is important to note is that these differences refer to the attributes 
which are “deeply discrediting.” Additionally, Goffman adds importance to the 
language of relationship. To put it differently, attributes such as race, gender, 
sexual orientation or ethnicity are important and rather difficult to change. 
However, what counts as normal varies over time.  
 
The crucial point is that stigmas are the result of historical interactions that 
produce not just deviant behavior, but deviant identities, which may remain 
“spoiled” even after behavioral change (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 146). 
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Link and Phelan (2001) conceptualize stigma as the convergence of four com-
ponents: labeling, stereotyping, separation and status loss/discrimination. The 
first component refers to distinguishing and outlining some particular diffe-
rences while ignoring others. This leads to the stereotyping of the labeled 
subjects. “In the third, labeled persons are placed in distinct categories so as to 
accomplish some degree of separation of “us” from “them” (ibid, p. 367). 
Lastly, the labeled subject experiences status loss and discrimination as he or 
she is treated as less of a human. Link and Phelan point out that stigmatization 
depends on social, economic, and political circumstances, and power relations. 
Each of those components mentioned above should be explored in greater 
detail. Starting with the labeling, Link and Phelan suggest that the process of 
identifying differences which matter is rather social. But once the differences 
are labeled, then they are taken for granted, as the way things are, and hence the 
whole process of making these differences socially important is overlooked. 
This leads to the second aspect of stigma – stereotyping or “linking a person to 
a set of undesirable characteristics that form the stereotype” (ibid, p. 369). 
Stereotyping is more easily accomplished, once the border between the Self and 
the Other is drawn. All the negative characteristics are attributed to the 
stigmatized person and make him or her different from those who impose the 
difference. This point can be further explored from the poststructuralist con-
ceptualization of identity with an emphasis on the constitutive Other. But for 
now, regarding the fourth component, stemming from what has been argued 
above, as a result of attributing all the negative stereotypes to the stigmatized 
person, “a general downward placement of a person in a status hierarchy” 
occurs (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 371).  
This research explores how stigmatisation/being on the receiving end of 
stigmatisation is internalised by the stigmatised, and subsequently translated 
into the competition over the national identity (re)production between the 
discourses. Adler-Nissen (2014, p. 144) argues that one needs to recognize that 
 
the states that are unable or unwilling to conform to “normal” standards are not 
merely objects of (failed) socialization. Rather, they are active agents, able to 
cope strategically with the shame they are subjected to and, in some cases, may 
even challenge a dominant moral discourse by wearing their stigma as a badge of 
honour.  
 
According to this passage, she develops a typology of distinct strategies of how 
states are engaging with stigma: stigma recognition, stigma rejection, and 
counter-stigmatization. For stigmatized actors the result of the first strategy is 
transformation of the stigma, the consequence of the second is reversal of the 
stigma, and the result of the third strategy is the creation of a “separate system 
of honor” (ibid, p. 155).  
Another key aspect of stigmatization, which needs to be explored in relations 
to identity discourses, is its ability to achieve order during the ontological 
insecurity in the society (Adler-Nissen, 2014). Following this line of argument, 
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I am claiming in this part of the thesis that since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, this has been the way the Georgian political elite has been trying to 
make sense of the national identity. But as this study shares the poststructuralist 
conception of national identity being the product of competing discourses, 
never stable and in constant flux, it is argued that one cannot pin down one 
particular strategy of the coping mechanism. To understand discourses on 
national identity more substantially and possibly shed some light on the various 
political actors at play, engagement with stigma should be explored based on 
the competing images of national identity and how it varies from discourse to 
discourse.  
There are two crucial factors Adler-Nissen identifies in the stigmatization 
process: the degree to which the norms are shared.  
 
Stigma recognition requires, a shared social ground and that the deviant group or 
actor sees itself as “failing” normal expectations. If these norms are shared and 
the moral authority of the stigmatizer is recognized, we can expect that 
stigmatized states want to become part of the “civilized group” and will try to 
overcome their stigma or try to pass as normal (2014, p. 154).  
 
However, if this is not the case, then the actors are most likely to reject the 
norms and “seek solidarity among the deviant.” Hence, stigmatization not only 
serves the purpose of maintaining the order but has the potential to undermine it 
as well. The second crucial factor is material and social recourses which 
influence the choice of the strategy. Counter-stigmatization strategies require a 
substantial amount of recourses to challenge the existing international order.  
What I need to note here, is that my research goes beyond the inter-state 
relationship and explores competing strategies of engagement with the stigma 
within the domestic dimension. I am interested to find out how the internaliza-
tion of stigma translates into domestic identity discourses and subsequently 
expresses itself in the foreign policy trajectories.  
Finally, there is a branch of postcolonial scholarship on Central and Eastern 
Europe and I need to explain where I situate my research in this field. Merje 
Kuus (2004) examined the European Union’s eastern enlargement from the 
perspective of nesting orientalism. The latter is the concept developed by Bakic-
Hayden (1995) who extended the classical notion of Orientalism to the Balkans 
and proposed a new term to apply to the region. “The gradation of “Orients” 
that I call “nesting orientalism”, which is a pattern of reproduction of the 
original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised” (Bakic-Hayden, 1995, 
p. 918). To put it differently, Eastern Europe is represented as the Orient but 
with the gradation within (the Balkans is designated the role of the most 
“eastern”). “Within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies” 
(ibid) and so on. What makes this region relevant to be studied from this 
context is the history of Ottoman rule, and hence, it is “as such, different from 
Europe “proper”” (ibid, p. 921). In a similar manner, as Georgia has been 
separated from the rest of Europe by the Ottoman empire laying between, later 
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being incorporated in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, means it is 
perceived as Oriental by the West and these perceptions are internalized by the 
discourses on national identity. In this context, creating one’s own Orient, other, 
which is more East than itself, is vital. The Soviet Union/Russia serves such a 
purpose in contemporary Georgian discourses and mutual historical experiences 
are labelled as backward, uncivilized, barbaric, etc. Application of the concept 
of nesting orientalism also addresses the issue with liminality raised by Moro-
zov in his study of Russia’s postcolonial identity. He argues that “liminality 
theory is yet to find a way of dealing with the situations where a liminal in one 
context (Russia vis-à-vis the West) occupies a dominant position in another, but 
related, context (Russia’s ʻinternalʼ periphery)” (2015, p. 24). I believe 
examining the gradation of the Orient and combining it with liminality deals 
with this concern.  
Transferring these concepts and putting them within the framework of the 
case study of Georgia, I argue that the liminal positioning of Georgian society 
within the East/West discourse and subsequent ambiguity regarding its identity 
becomes the key source of the social imagination. The Empirical analysis I have 
conducted, illustrates that the never-ending stage of transition, which is per-
ceived as destined to remain always half-complete, produces certain knowledge 
about the Self which is largely accepted by both sides. At the same time, it 
maintains the hierarchical discourse of the West being the superior. Subs-
equently, one might observe two parallel processes taking place at the same 
time: internalization of certain normative standards concerning modernization, 
democratization, etc., and stigmatization accompanied by the processes of self-
colonization. 
One of the vital features of the self-colonial cultures which allow drawing a 
parallel with the liminal entities is the formersʼ ambiguity about the Self vis-à-
vis the West. More specifically, self-colonizing cultures feel that “they are 
insufficiently alien, insufficiently distant and insufficiently backward, in 
contrast to the African tribes” (Kiossev, 1995, p. 75). In such circumstances, the 
doubt arises, that they are part of the West, as they are Europeans, but somehow 
not enough so. They are not the Other but not the Self to the full extent either. 
Hence, such entities are in the constant process of proving their Europeanness. 
They go back into the past to find the justification, proofs of their belonging to 
the Self i.e. they engage in the processes of self-colonization.  
 
The Others – i.e. the neighbours, Europe, the civilized world, etc. possess all that 
we lack; they are all that we are not. The identity of this culture is initially 
marked and even constituted by the pain, the shame – and to formulate it more 
generally – by the trauma of this global absence (ibid, p. 73).  
 
The idea of Europe in such discourses becomes the point of reference for iden-
tity production. It becomes something positive, universal, whereas “our own” 
lacks this universality and self-sufficiency. Or in the words of Kiossev (ibid, p. 
75): “the self-colonizing nations suffer a tragic paradox – for them the Alien is 
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the Universal, but the opposite is also true – the Universal remains forever 
alien.” This makes the process of Self-colonization also Self-traumatizing.  
 
By adopting these alien universal models, the self-colonizing cultures traumatize 
themselves – for they also adopt their own inferiority, their own painful lack of 
essential Substance and Universality (ibid).  
 
This paradox fits within the greater argument of the thesis that the liminal stage 
or the stage of transition for the countries in between will always remain never-
ending and leave them in the permanent stage of second-class status vis-à-vis 
the West. It is important to note that in the processes of the self-colonization or 
overcoming the memory of their own “birth-trauma” some cultures go back to 
the historical past and look for saints, medieval empires, ancient philosophers, 
works of literature and sometimes even to the mythological stories of the origin 
of the nation to find the connection linking them with the West, and creating the 
image of historical continuity.  
Approaching the case of Georgia from this perspective I depart from the 
postcolonial studies of the post-Soviet space with the focus on Russia as a colo-
nizer and focus on how self-colonization vis-à-vis the West takes place. The 
academic concept of self-colonization should be differentiated from internal 
colonization which is applied to the case of Russia and concerns the latter’s 
integration into the capitalist world system, leading to the expansion of moder-
nism and development of the rest of the empire (Morozov, 2015). Certainly, 
these developments were vital for introducing the European style in 19th-century 
Georgia as a part of the Russian empire, but the focus of this thesis is the 
contemporary liberal conception of national Self which projects Russia as diffe-
rent or a significant Other not only of itself but also of Europe. Russia becomes 
something the West is not, and thus, articulation of self-colonization takes 
places not as a continuation or the legacy of internal colonization in the Russian 
Empire, but in the context of othering that historical period. Russia becomes not 
the bearer of European values but rather the opposite and is responsible for 
“perverting” the Georgian European Self, starting with the annexation in the 
19th century.  
Within these circumstances, Georgiaʼs membership in the European institu-
tions is seen and represented as the return to its “European roots,” joining the 
“family,” it has long been separated from due to the Soviet occupation, through 
making up for the “lost years.” Late Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania’s historic 
speech of 1999, in connection with Georgiaʼs acceptance as a member of the 
Council of Europe which stated that, “We are so happy, and proud that my 
generation, our generation, was privileged to announce in this hemicycle these 
very simple words … I am Georgian and therefore I am European,” (Zhvania, 
1999) becomes not a simple statement of the fact, but rather a program of 
becoming European (Kiknadze, 2015, p. 96). Implementation of the agenda put 
into the Association Agreement with the European Union or following the 
suggestions and recommendations made by the Venice Commission on the 
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constitutional amendments should be viewed as the part of this “program” of 
becoming. As Kuus (2004) argues the EU is largely conceived of as a 
disciplining power, it is in the minds of the Eastern Europeans even when they 
are not aware of it. Reforms to be implemented on behalf of the AA and 
DCFTA are perceived by Georgians as ways of becoming more civilized and 
modern and hence the EU as a role model has a superior status. Liminal 
positioning reproduces and maintains the East/West hierarchy with the subject 
in between attempting to depart from the former and join the latter.  
 
 
2.3 Relationship between Identity and Foreign Policy  
Although this research is focused on the identity (re)production processes oc-
curring on a daily basis, the main focus of the study is the foreign policy 
agenda, as “foreign policy relies upon representations of identity, but it is also 
through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and 
reproduced” (Hansen, 2006, p. 1). By claiming that these two are interlinked 
and complement each other, Lene Hansen makes an interesting point, which can 
be also observed in the current Georgian competing conceptions of national 
Self. The reference to the European identity leads liberals to formulate a pro-
Western foreign policy agenda, while in contrast to that, putting oneself as the 
significant Other of Europe calls for a pro-Russian or more isolationist dis-
course. To put it in other words, perception of Russia as a threat to its national 
security, memories of the 2008 August war or Kremlin support for the two 
breakaway regions, leads part of Georgian society to reproduce its European 
identity. From this perspective, it can only survive within the European family 
of states it has always been part of, but due to the Soviet occupation, had been 
left on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The legacy of the August war and the 
developments around the two conflict zones is so sensitive, that even populists 
with their openly pro-Russian foreign policy discourse, cannot deny these facts. 
But unlike liberals, they see solutions in declaring neutrality or getting on better 
terms with Russia, which would imply halting the project of integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. In other words, it can also be argued that non-
Western/non-European identity discourse is reproduced through foreign policy 
considerations; projecting Russia as the only solution to existing problems 
while rejecting the West as the troublemaker. 
Thus, I am conceptualizing identity in this study following Hansen’s 
framework.  
 
Policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country, security 
problem, or crisis they seek to address. Foreign policies need to ascribe meaning 
to the situation and to construct the objects with it, and in doing so, they 
articulate and draw upon specific identities of other states, regions, peoples, and 
institutions, as well as on the identity of national, regional self (Hansen, 2006, p. 
6).  
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This leads Hansen to conceptualize identity as discursive, political, relational 
and social. The first two aspects signify that identities are not objective; identity 
cannot be found somewhere in the extra-discursive realm. In the words of Kuus 
(2002, p. 94): “Texts about identity do not reveal but produce identity.” The 
relational feature of identity means that it is always given through reference to 
something else, something it is not. While social features of identity stem from 
it being articulated collectively, individual identity is constituted within the 
collective. Identity and policy are understood to be linked through discourses, 
but not by being in a causal relationship “as representations of identity are 
simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of 
policy” (Hansen, 2006, p. 10). Those who formulate foreign policy or are actors 
interested in altering the existing goals, try to present their claims as legitimate 
and natural. In this research, identity is studied from this poststructuralist prism, 
as it helps to identify how certain facts are formed, how they come into being 
and how their interpretation is affecting foreign policy discourses. As Wodak 
argues:  
 
we assume that there is – in an essential sense – no such thing as one national 
identity. We believe rather that different identities are discursively constructed 
according to the audience, setting, topic, and substantive content (Wodak et al 
2009, p. 4). 
 
This makes national identities malleable, fragile, ambivalent and diffuse. To 
translate it into the framework of this research, any group, be it either liberal or 
populist, discursively constructs a national identity according to the foreign 
policy goals it is supposed to serve. As Stoicescu remarks in her study, foreign 
policy discourse is a primary discursive site for examination, since it is 
“connected more explicitly to the issue of the Self/Other nexus and that of self-
perception.” (2008, p. 8). However, it should be noted that it is not pre-
determined how liminality is displayed in the foreign policy discourse, it is 
rather produced and reproduced through the articulation of identity discourses. 
Furthermore, “all states are marked by inherent tensions between the various 
domains that need to be aligned for an “imagined political community” to come 
into being” (Campbell, 1998, p. 12). They are instead stuck in the paradox of, 
on the one hand, demand for the identity, but on the other hand, these processes 
are impossible to fully resolve. Hence, states are in a permanent stage of 
reproduction; if that was not the case, then they would simply cease to exist. For 
these processes to take place, the differentiation of the Self from the Other is 
vital as “constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boun-
daries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, as a “Self” from an 
“Other,” a “domestic” from a “foreigner” (Campbell, 1998, p. 9). Even national 
identities, while they appear as something natural, “are always contingent 
constructions made possible through a variety of practices, discourses, and 
language games, and they can be transformed and rearticulated in different 
ways” (Mouffe, 2013, p. 45). The creation of identity in such processes always 
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implies the establishment of a difference. The creation of ʻweʼ can only exist 
through the formulation of ʻtheyʼ (ibid). The constitution of the collective 
identity requires the creation of the frontier between those who belong to the 
community and those who do not. Regardless of the fact that in the case of 
liminal entities, such clear divisions are not present, and they are rather blurred 
and mitigated, it is still unavoidable to define one’s own identity within this 
mix. Because there is no answer to the question of who we are as a collectivity:  
 
without the ʻanswerʼ to these questions, without these ʻdefinitions,ʼ there can be 
no human world, no society, no culture … The role of the imaginary signifi-
cations is to provide an answer to these questions, an answer that, obviously, 
neither ʻrealityʼ no ʻrationalityʼ can provide… (Castoriadis, 1975, 2005, pp. 146–
147).  
 
This research follows Castoriadis in this line of thought and argues that liminal 
entities constantly need to search for their identities and hence engage in the 
daily process of identity (re)production through the tactics of self-colonization 
or other forms of transformation. What should be noted here is that the refe-
rence to identity also addresses the ontological insecurity of liminal societies 
(Mälksoo, 2010, p. 8) – defining who is being secured against whom reassures 
the collective Self of the subject and constitutes one’s security.  
 
 
2.4 Discourse Theory  
I locate my thesis within the broader poststructuralist scholarship on identity. 
This dissertation follows the poststructuralist mode of discourse analysis as its 
main methodological research tool. The methodological framework of my 
research is guided by the broader ontological and epistemological questions 
introduced by the school of poststructuralist discourse analysis; to be more 
exact, by the framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in 
their discourse theory (DT). Theirs is one of the approaches that gets closer to 
poststructuralists and a Foucauldian understanding of discourse than most of the 
other discourse-analytical schools. It is important to note that DT is not simply a 
method as it largely draws on the theoretical and epistemological concepts of 
poststructuralism and cannot be used in isolation from that context. Hence, it is 
important to briefly touch upon the roots of this theoretical school and elaborate 
on the relevance of this research project (to be expanded upon later in the 
methodology and research design section). 
Discourse theory (DT) “aims to describe, understand, and explain how and 
why particular discursive formations were constructed, stabilized, and trans-
formed” (Torfing, 2005, p. 19). This approach does not claim to provide 
generalizable theory, instead, it looks at specific historical contexts and 
circumstances which made certain outcomes possible. Even though it acknow-
ledges the central role of theoretical frameworks, in contrast to the positivist 
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approaches, instead of applying already existing theory to the empirical data, 
discourse theory seeks to articulate specific concepts according to the case 
studied. Hence, the theoretical framework should be flexible and able to be 
adapted and amended. Historically specific systems of rules, according to DT, 
produce meanings for objects and actions. Therefore, it sets as its goal to 
investigate the way in which social reality is constituted through discourses, the 
discourse itself being “a theoretical framework within which the being of an 
object is constituted” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 3). In other words, all 
objects are objects of discourse. As Young (2004, p. 11) puts it: “The politics of 
poststructuralism forces the recognition that all knowledge may be variously 
contaminated, implicated in its very formal or ʻobjectiveʼ structures.”  
With respect to what has been said above, discourse analysis of how the 
identity of collective entities such as state or nation is constructed can explain, 
and even to a certain degree, predict foreign policy outcome (Wæver, 2005). 
Additionally, because poststructuralism treats identity as discursive, it is impor-
tant to include in the analysis its relation to other identities. “Because all people 
construct their self with the help of a complex constellation of collective 
identifications, these have to be articulated with each other” (ibid, p. 38).  
Discourse theory helps to determine the role of Europe in Georgian identity 
discourse. This approach is most appropriate in problematizing the identity 
narratives of liminal entities because for poststructuralist approaches, the aim is 
not to identify true identities, but rather their construction (Laclau, 1994). This 
perspective of questioning the essentialism of social identity introduces the 
primacy of politics. It gives political dimension to the processes of formation as 
well as reveals the impossibility of achieving a full identity (Stavrakakis, 2005). 
As is illustrated in the theoretical discussions, such a conceptualization regards 
identity as open for constant negotiations and contestations. Instead of identity 
as a starting point of politics, it becomes “constructed, maintained or trans-
formed in and through political struggles” (Torfing, 1999, p. 82). Discourse 
theory helps to problematize taken for granted identifications.  
“Poststructuralists argue that ʻknowledgeʼ comes to be accepted as such due 
to the power and prominence of certain actors in society known as ʻelites’, who 
then impose it upon others” (Morrow, 2017, p. 56). The way this acceptance is 
achieved is through the manipulation of discourses, while the ʻelitesʼ should be 
understood in the broader meaning of this term as including not only govern-
ment officials, but also business leaders, media outlets, academics and scholars, 
etc. Discourses which are constructed by the elites are called dominant or 
official discourses. Their power is in their ability to make everything outside of 
them appear irrational. In the case of Georgia, pro-European foreign policy 
imbedded in the identity discourse is treated in the thesis as the dominant one. It 
then comes into practice through language, which places certain actors, 
concepts and events in a hierarchy, as binary opposites, etc. with the media 
serving as the primary site where these (re)production processes take place. One 
of the key arguments of poststructuralist research which relates to this thesis’s 
research design is that “discourse constructs meaning through difference, and 
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therefore through setting limits, is at the heart of analyzing the role of foreign 
policy in identity construction” (Diez, 2014, p. 28).  
Discourse not only constitutes social reality, but it also delimits what can be 
uttered or performed. This methodological approach highlights and exposes 
how:  
 
conventional ways of thinking and analysis in international relations are unable 
to point out how certain other possibilities are excluded by these discourses from 
the very start (Morrow, 2017, p. 58).  
 
Additionally, poststructuralism denies the existence of any essential identity and 
instead argues for forms of identifications, which are made possible through 
various social practices (Mouffe, 2013).  
Discourse theory can be described as a context-dependent, historical and 
non-objective theoretical and analytical framework. It is important to bear in 
mind that in addition to recognizing the impossibility of looking at history from 
an impartial perspective, as it is always studied and modified from a contem-
porary gaze, discourse theory neither seeks, nor has any ambition of attaining, 
objective truth. Rather what DT sets as its goal, is unravelling how concrete 
discursive processes create the effect of truth (Torfing, 1999, p. 12). Discourse 
theory contributed to the poststructuralist scholarship by arguing that social 
agents are unable to achieve their full identity. This condition leads to social 
antagonism discussed in greater detail below in this chapter. What should be 
noted here is that the impossibility of full identity is the result of the presence of 
the Other (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). Looking at Georgia from this 
perspective sheds some light on the ambiguous and sometimes even contra-
dictory role orthodox Christianity or the Soviet past plays in foreign policy 
discourse. In other words, applying Discourse theory to the case of Georgia 
shifts the focus to how it is possible that both pro-European and Western-
sceptic foreign policy discourses refer to orthodox Christianity as one of the 
legitimization sources. It should be viewed as a floating signifier i.e. a signifier, 
with a meaning which is subject to competition between various articulations. 
This is performed through the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference, 
which are explained below.  
The Application of discourse theory to the study of the Europeanisation of 
the EaP member states provides the possibility of escaping the essentialist 
approach and looking at these processes from their specific historical contexts, 
as well as specific discourses, naturalizing them. According to Torfing (2005, p. 
14), discourse theory can be characterized as a “relationalist, contextual, and 
ultimately historicist view of identity formation.” This means that identity is 
shaped in relation to something it is not. This contextual and historicist cha-
racter suggests that identities should be viewed within a specific discursive and 
historical context. Discourse theory tries to conceptualize and study a pheno-
menon which is necessary and impossible at the same time, i.e. it is necessary 
because without making sense of social phenomena such as national identity, it 
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is impossible to act upon and formulate foreign policy. While on the other hand, 
as full fixation of the meaning is not achievable, it remains open to constant 
rearticulation (Torfing, 2005, p. 4). This is precisely why this approach to 
studying foreign policy narratives vis-à-vis the European Union and the West in 
general from the perspective of the EaP member states in particular is the best 
approach to unravel the contextual and historical mechanisms at work.  
Moreover, the concept of dislocation developed by discourse theorists 
explains how the Soviet Union’s collapse facilitated and intensified new articu-
lations when already established meanings through the chains of significations 
had been dislocated. Dislocation is an event which disrupts the existing discur-
sive system. It means that the discursive system is disrupted, and it prevents the 
subject from fully determining its identity. The subject has neither a complete 
structural identity nor a complete lack of one (Laclau, 1990). In other words, the 
subject enters the liminal phase, which, in discourse theory terms is split and 
subsequently might disintegrate or try to identify with a political project 
offering fullness. As the hegemonic narrative fails to give meaning to the new 
event, political struggles for definition start. This involves competition between 
discourses to fix the floating signifiers by articulating them with a new set of 
nodal points (Torfing, 2005, p. 16). Nodal points are also known as empty 
signifiers and represent notions such as the Nation, the People or Communism. 
They signify “the lack of a fully achieved community” (ibid) in relation to 
which other sings are partially fixed.  
The application of poststructuralism for the following research is further 
justified, as the incorporation of this school of thought into the scholarship of 
International Relations as it encourages taking a bottom-up approach to 
studying foreign policy or the relationship between the states. Poststructuralism 
helps to look at the events unrelated to world politics, such as the discussions 
around celebrating Christmas on 25th of December instead of 7th of January, 
but specifically from an International Relations perspective. Or how such every-
day practices can be seen as attempts to fix meanings and hence “naturalize” or 
give the impression of objectivity to the identity discourse and to legitimize the 
foreign policy agenda.  
One of the first key epistemological issues which should be examined is the 
constitution of the identity of the subject. Three stages in the evolution of the 
subject can be observed in the social sciences. Beginning with the works of 
Descartes, the so-called Enlightenment subject, which is rational and fully 
aware and also known as the Cartesian, came into the picture. “The Enlighten-
ment subject was a unified individual with a center, an inner core that was there 
at birth and developed as the individual grew while remaining essentially the 
same” (Edkins, 1999, p. 21). Hence, from the Cartesian perspective, this core 
became the source of the subject’s identity. Later on, the idea of the subject 
evolved into what one could call the sociological subject. It still maintained the 
idea of the inner core, but it was not self-sufficient in itself, rather it was formed 
in relation to its “significant other.” “The identity of the subject was formed (or 
constructed) in the interaction between self and society” (ibid, p. 22). Such an 
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understanding of the subject recognizes the importance and the influence of 
socialization, culture, and historical and social contexts on the identity forma-
tion. But while the distinction between the Self and society is maintained, at the 
same time the focus of the research becomes the relationship between the two. 
The last stage in the evolution of the subject in the social sciences is the 
postmodern subject. One of the key characteristics of such a subject is the 
nonexistence of a fixed or permanent identity. “Subjectivity is formed and 
transformed in a continuous process that takes place in relation to the ways we 
are represented or addressed and alongside the production or reproduction of 
the social” (ibid). In this context, language becomes the key producer of the 
identity, as it is understood not as a channel of describing reality but the creator 
of the effect of the truth itself. It challenges the Cartesian subject which puts 
emphasis on thoughts, while Structuralism and the works of Saussure on 
linguistics, present language, not just as a mere tool to present thoughts about 
the real world, but rather to explore “how the speaking subject was thoroughly 
embedded in an always already preexisting language system” (ibid, p. 26). In 
other words, language as the tool of expressing pre-existing thoughts and reality 
was challenged. That does not necessarily mean that physical objects do not 
exist, but rather that they gain meaning through discourses. Language becomes 
a key channel which creates these representations of reality. “Language is a 
ʻmachineʼ that generates, and as a result, constitutes, the social world” (Jørgen-
sen & Philips, 2010, p. 9). Furthermore, language is understood to be structured 
in discourses, but unlike structuralism, poststructuralists argue that the meaning 
itself changes from discourse to discourse. From the discourse theory perspec-
tive, the subject is not autonomous but rather determined from his/her posi-
tioning in the discourse. When parallel discourses try to organize within the 
same social space, competing positionings of subjectsʼ clash with each other 
and social antagonism occurs. Following this line of thought, this study sets as 
its goal to unravel how the positioning of Georgian identity as European, 
Orthodox and Asian clash with each other as they try to articulate around the 
same social space i.e. the empty signifier national identity. All these competing 
discourses construct each other as the constitutive Other.  
To explore the poststructuralist relationship between the subjectivity and the 
social further, these two are not perceived to be separate. Rather its constitution 
is linked to the constitution of the particular or symbolic order, unlike the 
previous two stages of the subject’s evolution mentioned above. In addition, 
this school of thought claims that there is no “real community” one can observe. 
Žizek, for instance, argued that what we call “social reality” is fiction, but that 
does not necessarily mean that it is less real (Žizek, 1989). The same argument 
regarding the status of fiction applies to the understanding of the subject in the 
poststructuralist epistemology. Instead of the distinction between reality and 
ideas, or between the objective world out there and our subjective perceptions 
about it, the focus of the DT is the creation of the effect of truth or the attempts 
to fix meanings through discourses. The idea of a real community as fiction is 
further explored below when the revision of Marxism by discourse theory is 
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discussed. At this stage, it must be noted that whenever the text refers to 
ʻsubjectʼ it implies the positioning of the subject within a discursive structure.  
Discourse theory has foundations in Marxism, but at the same time chal-
lenges and modifies some key notions of it. Such a reading of Marxism, which 
developed within the framework of DT can be labelled as the theory of social 
development. Laclau and Mouffe, the main authors of the theory, tried to 
critically revise Marxism’s key notion of historical materialism. DT aims to 
overcome the image of economy as a determinant or the foundation for the 
superstructure which influences the rest of social relations. In addition, it pro-
poses the primacy of politics over the economy and subsequently challenges the 
division of society into two classes. The Scholarship on discourse theory has 
also utilized the definition of hegemony developed by Gramsci and advanced it 
further (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 32) Hegemony as such is “the expansion 
of discourse or a set of discourses … by means of articulating unfixed elements 
into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces” 
(Torfing, 1999, p. 101). DT draws on the understanding of the concept by the 
Italian thinker as class domination, which is exercised and naturalized through 
civil society institutions such as universities, the media, the Church, and the press. 
Those entities serve to achieve/manufacture consent within the population and 
subsequently reach domination. Against this backdrop, discourse theory 
characterized hegemonic discourse as the result of articulation, which itself is 
“practice establishing relations among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 105).  
Discourse theory was able to break the context of class struggle and eco-
nomic determinism and argue for the primacy of politics. The latter itself is not 
to be understood as a particular state, government or specific policies, but rather 
“an ontological dimension of social relations” (Howarth, 2015, p. 7). The 
argument DT put forward is that one cannot speak of some objective rules in the 
history of mankind that divide society into classes. Groups are always created 
and produced through discursive processes, which themselves are what consti-
tute the political for Laclau and Mouffe (Jørgensen & Philips, 2010). Discourse 
theory further challenges the historical materialism of classical Marxism by 
critically questioning its understanding of society as a totality. As the scholar-
ship on poststructuralist discourse analysis argues, no discourse is able to 
achieve the permanent fixation of meanings and hence, one cannot talk about 
society as an objective totality which is affected and divided as the result of 
economic relations. Discursive processes try to produce society as a totality, but 
as it remains unachievable, it is destined to always remain as an imaginary. The 
discourse which makes an attempt to articulate society as a nation, class or any 
other similar totality ends up in the paradox that – “society only exists as the 
vain attempt to institute that impossible object: society” (Laclau 1990 as cited in 
Edkins, 1999, p. 131). In other words, what discourse does is attempt to domi-
nate the field of discursivity by articulating meanings around the nodal points 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
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To relate this contest over the fixation of the society as a totality to the 
context of this research, one can argue that when liberal political discourse in 
Georgia speaks of European/Western Georgia, the image they articulate as a 
totality is different from the alternative discourse on foreign policy, i.e. the one 
a nationalist or populist would have in mind, when speaking of the Georgian 
nation, state or culture. In the words of discourse theory, terms used for the 
characterization of the society as a totality, like the one (nation, state, country, 
etc.) are floating signifiers. Discourses compete to invest those signifiers with 
different meanings by expanding their chain of significations and subsequently, 
alter and modify their identity. Here discourse theory introduces the concept of 
“the myth” – a distorted reality, which at the same time is vital and constitutive, 
as it establishes “a necessary horizon for our acts” (Jørgensen & Philips, 2010, 
p. 39). As the condition for the emergence of the myth is structural dislocation, 
the former acquires the hegemonic role of constituting the new space of repre-
sentation (Torfing, 1999). In the context of this particular research, the myth of 
Georgia as European, Orthodox Christian, etc. establishes the ground platform 
for political elites and groups to argue for very specific foreign policy agendas 
or legitimize domestic reforms, which sometimes can be very unpopular. The 
logic of equivalence simplifies the political space, while the logic of difference 
increases its complexity (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
It is important to note that as DT argues for the impossibility of achieving 
the total fixation of meanings, the myth becomes a “metaphor for an absent 
fullness” (Torfing, 1999, p. 115). Myths describe the fullness of society that can 
never be achieved. “Moreover, a myth has to remain empty because any attempt 
to actually fill a myth with specific meaning, … would mean to subject the 
myth to everyday political struggles, thus ending its mythical status” (Nabers & 
Stengel, 2019, p. 109). Identity then, can be constructed by drawing a line 
between the mythical Inside and a negative Outside. If the dominance of one 
particular myth is maintained on a continuous basis, it is transformed into a 
social imaginary. This research illustrated that such a social imaginary in 
liminal states vis-à-vis the European Union is the process of becoming Euro-
pean. In sum, both the myth and social imaginary serve to construct society as 
“positive and fully structured identities,” with the latter providing a horizon for 
meaning and action while the former represents reading principles embedded in 
values, norms, etc. and constitutes a new objectivity (Torfing, 1999, p. 115).  
One of the last points, where discourse theory is critical of classical Marxism 
is the collective class identity division. This criticism is in line with the 
discussion on the subject of identity mentioned above, so it is not elaborated on 
here. But one important notion which should be mentioned is that despite the 
identity of the subject being determined by his or her positioning in the 
discourse, DT sees the subject as being overdetermined. This is the result of 
constant parallel discourses at work, which (re)position the subject from 
discourse to discourse. This leads to the concept of social antagonism, which 
emerges as the result of the clash of mutually exclusive subject positionings. 
Within the framework of this research, I am arguing that the positionings of the 
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subject – Georgian national identity – in parallel discourses of populist and 
liberal groups are mutually exclusive and give rise to the social antagonism. 
The nation as orthodox Christian, Caucasian and post-Soviet is usually arti-
culated in the negation and exclusion of the West, Europe, etc. which is 
“perverted,” “ungodly,” and a stranger to Georgia. Meanwhile, the discourse of 
liberals articulates the subject’s identity in the negation of the Soviet legacy, 
Russia, etc. As is explored in the empirical section of this thesis, this social 
antagonism translates into the contestation over the foreign policy agenda, 
which is constituted by identity and at the same time constitutes the latter. 
Social antagonism, according to Torfing (1999), can be understood as a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it serves as a source of stabilizing a particular 
discursive formation. As this research explores the change of the discursive 
construction of identity over time, the case study illustrates that the process of 
othering Russia became the key stabilizing factor for the discursive formation 
constructed by the post-Rose Revolution Georgian government until the end of 
its term. Construction of the political opposition as the carriers of the Soviet/ 
Russian identity and hence uncivilized, corrupted, old-fashioned, etc. became 
vital for the reproduction of the government as the “beacon of democracy,” the 
sole political group who was loyal to Georgia’s European cause. The 2008 
August war further contributed to the stabilization of the country’s Western 
identity discourse and even managed to achieve a hegemonic intervention for a 
while, i.e. it became “accepted as the truth and/or common practice within the 
society or a particular policy realm” (Wullweber, 2015, p. 80). But, on the other 
hand, social antagonism, if the historical conditions are right for it, can 
contribute to destabilization and disruption.  
The main argument of the following thesis is that the protracted liminal stage 
of transition, the never-ending process of becoming European, alters circum-
stances in a way that allows social antagonism to become the destabilizing force 
in social identity construction. The collapse of the Soviet Union dislocated 
existing discursive constructions and the on-going Euro-Atlantic integration of 
Georgia has been the source of social antagonism between discourses 
competing for hegemony ever since.  
A key concept which was developed in relation to the social antagonism is 
the notion of the constitutive outside. “Social antagonism is defined in terms of 
the presence of the constitutive outside which, at the same time, constitutes and 
denies the identity of the inside” (Laclau, 1990: 17 as cited in Torfing, 1999, p. 
129). It stems from the idea that social identity formation rises through the 
processes of negation of the radical other. “Every objectivity, every identity, is 
constructed through the assertion of difference, the determination of an ʻotherʼ 
that serves as itʼs ʻexteriorʼ and the consequent establishment of a frontier 
between interior and exterior” (Mouffe, 2013, p. 45). In other words, discourse 
is the system of social relations, which involves the drawing of political 
frontiers between ʻinsidersʼ and ʻoutsidersʼ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). 
Hence, the constitutive outside is constructed through social antagonism, which 
itself involves the exclusion of certain identities, meanings of which are 
56 
articulated through the chain of equivalence (Torfing, 2005). The latter itself 
implies the ʻsamenessʼ of the elements being excluded. As the chain of 
equivalence keeps expanding, in order for the discursive system to stabilize 
itself, the constitutive outside should be constructed as the threatening other, 
and as a result defines the unity and the limits of the system. Translating this 
into the collective identity formation context, the idea of “we” is created 
through the formulation of “them.” This process forms the chain of equivalence 
with a negative meaning and constitutes the outside as the antithesis of the 
current discourse. For instance, Europe or the West is constructed in liberal 
discourse in Georgia by negating the “barbaric” Other. Russia, the Soviet 
Union, the Russian empire, etc. are united in such discourses through the chain 
of equivalence which defines them as “uncivilized,” “backward,” or any other 
characteristic, which would have one common element – the lack of Western 
civilization. This leads to the understanding of social antagonism as a 
constitutive of social identity. As “the desire to annihilate the antagonistic force 
that prevents us from achieving our full identity” (Torfing, 1999, p. 129) is what 
makes us “we”. The illusion of removing the antagonistic forces such as a post-
Soviet mentality, in the case of contemporary Georgia, constitutes the formation 
of the latter’s European identity. This process is also the same, but in reverse in 
the case of the populist discourse, which constructs its identity in opposition to 
the “perverted” West. The chain of equivalence can be said to be developed in 
the process of the negation of the radical other and constitution of one’s identity 
from the particular to the universal. But the latter, from the DT perspective, is 
rather an “empty space whose content is partially fixed in and through political 
struggles between the particular groups caught up in the chain of equivalence” 
(Laclau, 1995, p. 158). The discourse, which manages to successfully fill the 
empty space of the universal, is what can be called a hegemony. Here the 
concept of an empty signifier appears. It arises from specific political processes, 
“in which a particular statement, signifier or practice is transformed into a 
universality” (Wullweber, 2015, p. 80). It means that universal, general interests 
as such are not objectively given, instead, they are constituted through dis-
courses. Hence, the idea of emptiness, which should be filled by the actors 
articulating the competing discourses. In the case of this particular research, 
such empty signifiers are Christianity, Europeanness and Georgian. Political 
actors struggle with each other to transform the particularity of these signifiers 
into universals.  
As mentioned previously, in the following study I argue that the liberal 
discourse was able to achieve a hegemonic intervention during the 2008 August 
war and for the short period afterward. Laclau and Mouffe (1993) suggest that 
hegemonic intervention can cease social antagonism by allowing one discourse 
to take a dominant position. When such a development takes place, it manages 
to overcome the ongoing collision between the subject positionings through 
articulation within the social antagonism, instead of simply uniting forces 
around a set paradigmatic interest (Torfing, 1999, p. 14). In other words, a time 
span analysis of the identity articulation processes in Georgia revealed that the 
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actual ontological security threats (threats to the self-perception of the state) 
coming from Russia gave a considerable boost to the pro-Western foreign 
policy agenda and, in DT terms, achieved objectivity. But as the fixation of 
meaning attempted by discourse is never permanent and fully achieved, it is 
argued within this thesis, that the never-ending stage of liminality, the process 
of becoming European but somehow not fully so, led to the return of the social 







CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND  
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Research Design  
This research is designed as a single case study, which is defined in the litera-
ture as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop 
or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5).  
The case study approach shares the same epistemological logic as statistical 
methods and formal models in developing logically consistent models and theo-
ries and testing them in relation to the empirics. But at the same time, methodo-
logical reasoning is different. The aim of the following chapter / section is to 
provide an explanation of why a single case study as a research design is the 
most appropriate framework for the research problem under examination. In the 
next pages, I will demonstrate the advantages of the case study method vis-à-vis 
statistical or other quantitative research design regarding the case selection, 
operationalization, and conceptualization.  
Focusing on a single case study in International Relations allows for a ʻthick 
descriptionʼ i.e. knowing more about less, rather than knowing less about more, 
as would be the case with comparative case studies. Bennett and Elman (2007, 
p. 171) argue that case study methods are more applicable in this field “because 
of the complexity of IR and the ubiquity of phenomena that in many respects 
are sui generis, thus rendering many puzzles in IR difficult to model formally 
and to test statistically.” Furthermore, according to Gerring (2017, p. 30), the 
goal of a case study is not only the explanation of the phenomenon it is looking 
at but also to shed light on a larger group of cases. It is the element of genera-
lization, which makes the case study valuable. 
George and Bennett (2005) identify four key advantages of case studies. 
Firstly, the case study method, unlike statistical or formal modelling, provides 
stronger conceptual validity. As for such variables as democracy, power, poli-
tical culture, etc. context is very important. Statistical studies, which put 
together a large number of cases, runs the risk of “conceptual stretching,” as 
they fail to take into consideration the dissimilarities of those cases (ibid, p. 19). 
Secondly, case studies have a comparative advantage in studying deviant or 
outlying cases and hence, developing new hypotheses. The third advantage of 
case studies is the possibilities it offers to examine in detail how the casual 
mechanisms are at work within the case. The single case study helps to identify 
particular, context-specific intervening variables, which might end up being left 
out in the statistical models. Lastly, according to George and Bennett, case 
study methods have a relative advantage of being able to take into account 
complex causal relations.  
In addition to the advantages, the case study research certainly also has its 
own limitations and possible pitfalls. Case studies are vulnerable to selection 
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bias. The single case study can be designed in a way that it deliberately selects 
the particular outcome as the starting point of the research. However, one of the 
main objectives of interpretive readings of case studies is precisely to demon-
strate the dominant explanations, “exposing them not as truth but as narratives 
that are discursively constructed, assigned particular meanings, and reproduced 
from partial or limited evidence” thus indicating the possibility of other 
articulations and meanings of the same phenomenon (Lynch, 2014, p. 14). To 
further account for the potential selection bias, I rely on the knowledge and 
findings of the existing literature and use them as guiding tools.  
Case studies also fail to address the issue of how much the gradation of a 
certain variable affects the outcome. They can identify how and whether the 
variable mattered to the outcome but are rather limited in measuring the scope 
of the relationship. One way to address this limitation is to argue that the case 
study can be regarded as a powerful tool for assessing the necessity and 
sufficiency of the variable, as one single counterexample study can falsify such 
deterministic claims (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25). In response to the 
criticism that case studies have a problem with the degree of freedom, George 
and Bennett argue that the problem is a misunderstanding or because of the 
definition of the case as the phenomenon in which only one measure of the 
variable is reported. “In fact, each qualitative variable has many different 
attributes that might be measured”. Unlike the researcher who applies statistical 
methods, case study research treats variables qualitatively. It does not put 
together all the variables to get “fewer variables and more degree of freedom” 
(ibid, p. 28). It is important to mention that the lack of representativeness is not 
necessarily a drawback of case study research. Instead, great explanatory 
richness within the one case may actually lead to less detailed understanding of 
other (similar or related) cases. In other words, despite the possibility the case 
study has to unravel the particular causal mechanisms at work, which can be 
generalized, the effects of such mechanisms would vary from case to case and 
be very context specific. “Case study researchers are more interested in finding 
the conditions under which those conditions and their outcome arise” (ibid, p. 
31). Taking into consideration this possible pitfall of the case study research 
design, my thesis avoids overgeneralization of the findings and instead aims to 
uncover mechanisms, which might be in operation in less or more extreme 
cases, when applied across the other cases.  
The following case study of Georgia is designed to be disciplined configura-
tive, which George and Bennett (2005, p. 75) define as one, which uses already 
established theories to explain a particular case. In other words, this research 
does not set as its goal to establish a new theoretical framework to research the 
Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union, but instead takes existing 
scholarship on liminality, self-colonization, and the relationship between 
foreign policy and identity, and extends it to a new case. This also means that 
the thesis serves a partly heuristic purpose as well, as it combines the concepts 
mentioned above, into an interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological 
research tool, which could provide theory testing and illustrate the need for a 
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new approach to studying the identities of the regions in transition in Inter-
national Relationsʼ scholarship. It is important to note that the contingent or 
typological generalizations are the ones which are usually drawn from the case 
studies. They “build on and go beyond improved historical explanations” (ibid, 
p. 111) but at the same time limit the risk of overgeneralization. From this 
perspective, despite the extension of the findings of this study to other similar 
cases, it provides important points around which future research can develop 
and expand. Such a case study can also be qualified as estimating, meaning that 
it estimates causal effect instead of developing a new explanatory theory 
(Gerring, 2017). To be more precise, it represents the longitudinal type of 
estimating case study as it takes a single country (Georgia) and observes how 
the constitution of national identity as European changes over the time period 
and how this is affected by the liminal positioning, as well as how these 
articulations play out in the foreign policy discourse. 
 
 
3.2 Methodological Tools of Discourse Theory  
Discourse theory, belonging to the group of poststructuralist methodological 
approaches, does not investigate observable facts nor the real intentions of the 
actors. Instead, it looks at the emergence of discursive formations and the 
constitution of social being (Torfing, 2005). From the perspective of discourse 
analysis as a research method, there is no way of discovering real causes, but 
rather the processes which resulted in certain outcomes (Auchter, 2014, p. 35). 
Or as Wæver (2017, p. 41) puts it:  
 
Politics is by definition always in between individuals, and as such it is about 
regulating what can be done in a sphere that is stretched between us. Therefore, 
it is neither decisive nor easily researchable whether President Bush was moti-
vated by religious concerns in his politics, but it is possible to study what his 
discourse reveals about what can be done in the name of religion in the political 
sphere…  
 
This thesis is applying the methodological framework of discourse theory to the 
case study of Georgia. Hence, it borrows the research framework developed in 
the works of Laclau and Mouffe. However, as the focus of their work is mostly 
on theory development and does not include so many concrete tools for metho-
dological analysis, it is important to supplement the methodological framework 
with poststructuralist discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24). 
Hence, I will rely on the methodological tools developed by Hansen and 
Wæver.  
Furthermore, what should be noted is that discourse-analytical approaches, 
despite critique from the positivist methodological school, can go beyond 
simply offering a critical problematization of the issue, to the explanatory level 
which “must be seen as constitutive rather than causal” (Diez, 2014, p. 31). 
Such constitutive effects of discourse help to explain how certain policies were 
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enabled through meaning construction processes. In other words, this research 
follows Doty (1993) by instead of posing ʻwhy-questions’, examines ʻhow-
possibleʼ questions to make the analysis of foreign policy more substantial. 
Unlike the former, which presupposes a certain social and discursive back-
ground as unproblematic, the latter examines the meaning production processes 
and thus tries to explain not “why a particular outcome was obtained, but rather 
how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed 
such that certain practices were made possible” (ibid, p. 298).  
In order for an action to be performed by the actor or the agent, certain 
meanings must already be in place. For the policymaker to justify and argue for 
the implementation of a certain policy, articulation should take place, which 
illustrates how it is related to the boarded image or the idea of “we,” the nation. 
Thus, it must be related to, and drawn from, the discursive structure (Wæver, 
2002). But at the same time, discursive space also sets the limits for particular 
articulation processes. Hence, with the how-possible question, the research 
framework looks at how these particular subjectsʼ positionings and the relation-
ship between them are discursively constructed and as a result, enables and 
limits foreign policy agenda. Discourse or “the context in which an articulation 
occurs” and policy articulation are mutually constitutive (Diez, 2014, p. 32). 
Discourses constitute articulation and vice versa, but they are not in a causal 
relationship.  
As DT is the branch of the discourse-analytical approaches closest to the 
poststructuralist scholarship, poststructuralist discourse analysis and discourse 
theory are used as synonyms in this study. Before the data selection and 
sampling section, it is therefore important to elaborate on the methodological 
tools and some key concepts of discourse theory. 
In order to proceed, the definition of discourse should first be provided. 
Discourse is the result of articulatory practice which itself is “any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). Doty (1996, p. 
6) suggests that “a discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a 
particular “reality” can be known and acted upon.” Therefore, when we speak 
of discourse, it is not limited to a specific group of texts, but also implies social 
practices.  
Thus, discourse is “a decentred structure in which meaning is constantly 
negotiated and constructed” (Laclau, 1988, p. 245). The important characteristic 
of discourse from the perspective of the DT is that permanent, fixed totality of 
the meaning cannot be achieved, therefore it is in a constant process of 
renegotiating and attempting to reach complete closure (Torfing, 1999).  
 
A discourse is inherently open-ended and incomplete. Its exterior limits are 
constituted by other discourses that are themselves also open, inherently un-
stable, and always in the process of being articulated (Doty, 1996, p. 6).  
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Hence the focus of discourse analysis becomes “the productive effects of arti-
culations … and how this then shapes the debate” (Diez, 2001, p. 21). While 
discourse analysis itself refers to the practice of analyzing raw empirical 
materials and information (including institutions, organizations, etc.) as discur-
sive forms (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). In such an understanding of dis-
course as the partial fixation of the meaning, it is important to differentiate 
between moments and elements. The latter refers to the signs whose meanings 
are not fixed or yet defined by their contrast to others, while the former are the 
signs, which are already defined. This leads to the concept of discursive 
struggle, which refers to the competition over the definition of the subject’s 
identity among the various discourses. Hence, discourse theory argues that all 
social phenomena are the result of discursive constructions. This makes Laclau 
and Mouffe’s approach different from other discourse-analytical frameworks, as 
DT does not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive practices.  
 
The more we analyse so-called non-discursive complexes – political inter-
ventions, technologies, productive organizations, etc. – the clearer it becomes 
that there are relational systems of differential identities, which are not shaped 
by some objective necessity (God, Nature, or Reason) and which can only, 
therefore, be conceived as discursive articulations (Torfing, 1999, p. 90).  
 
Another important concept which is introduced in DT and is applied in the 
following case study is nodal points. They are privileged signs around which 
discourse starts to organize. “The nodal point creates and sustains the identity of 
a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definite meanings” (Torfing, 1999, 
p. 98). The meaning of signs is defined in relation to other signs. To put the 
process in simpler terms,  
 
a variety of signifiers are floating within the field of discursivity as their tradi-
tional meaning has been lost; suddenly some master signifier intervenes and 
retroactively constitutes their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a 
pragmatic chain of equivalence (ibid, p. 99).  
 
Field of discursively is understood as all the possible meanings that a sign could 
have, and which are excluded by the particular discourse. Every discourse then 
becomes the expansion of the signifying chains itself to partially fix the 
meanings of the floating signifiers within the field of discursivity. Here it is 
important to mention the distinction between the discursive and the discourse. 
The latter is a partially achieved fixation of the meaning of signifiers, however, 
the field of discursivity, is where the “unfixed elements of a disintegrated 
discourse” fall (Torfing, 1999, p. 93). Disruption of the conditions of possibi-
lities upon which the partial fixations achieved by concrete discourse rests, 
might lead to the reincorporation of other meanings, which were previously 
excluded by the discourse or in other words, would be drawn and transferred 
from the field of discursivity to the discourse. Following the fluctuation of the 
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discourse on Georgia’s Europeanness over the time span is an example of such 
a development taking place.  
Signifying chains, which are chains of difference and chains of equivalence, 
are the links elements have with the meaning invested in them. The formation 
process of the chain of equivalence was discussed in the theory section above. 
What is important to note, is that in order for the chain of equivalence to 
expand, the presence of a constitutive outside is vital. This study is identifying 
master signifiers or nodal points around which the chain of equivalences of each 
discourse starts to articulate. It is argued that the nodal point of what this study 
labels as the liberal discourse, is Europeanness, hence the chain of equivalence 
starts organizing around this master signifier and negates Russia as a consti-
tutive Other, which is articulated as barbaric, Asian, backward, etc. In contrast, 
nationalist-populist discourse organizes around Orthodox Christianity and 
constructs the chain of equivalence while negating the West as the other. The 
key to discourse theory as a research tool is to identify nodal points. Once this 
takes place, then the study shifts its focus to how identity is constituted through 
discourses, and it itself takes place through the formation of the chain of 
equivalence.  
As the study follows Hansen’s (2006) conceptualization of identity, it is 
important to further elaborate on what she calls “particular attention to the 
methodology of reading” (ibid, p. 2). All the texts that constitute the foreign 
policy debates are organized around common themes, “around certain 
constructions of identity” and as a result, foreign policy debates become bound 
together by a small number of discourses. She suggests guidelines for how to 
identify and select a small set of discourses, the so-called the “basic dis-
courses,” which can provide a lens, through which one can see the represen-
tations and policies as systematically connected, or key points around which the 
disagreement within the debates structure. This research follows those metho-
dological guidelines for identifying the basic discourses.  
First, basic discourses are based on the reading of a larger number of texts. 
Within the scope of the following research, not only official statements and 
speeches are analyzed, but also TV shows, commercials, symbols, etc. Second-
ly, according to Hansen, “basic discourses should be built on the explicit 
articulation of key representations of identity, for example: “ʼ The Balkansʼ and 
ʻgenocide’…” (Hansen, 2006, p. 53). In the case of Georgia, the following 
research is examining how the articulation of the European identity is expressed 
within the mainstream narrative. Hansen further argues that basic discourse 
should draw upon “available conceptual histories of the representations chosen” 
and should be composed of Others and Selves being differently articulated as 
spatial, temporal or ethical constructions of identity. She also claims that due to 
the fact that basic discourses articulate different Selves and Others, it is logical 
to expect that they will argue for different foreign policies. The final point 
Hansen makes in terms of tracing those discourses is that  
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it is likely that at least one discourse will be argued relatively quickly as an issue 
manifests itself on the foreign policy agenda, while the other basic discourse(s) 
will be argued in response to and in criticism of this position (ibid).  
 
To translate this to the scope of this study, the pro-European discourse on 
foreign policy, due to security issues, the 2008 war legacy, and historical 
experience, remains the dominant basic discourse, and is manifested in the 
foreign policy agenda, such as signing the Association Agreement with the EU 
and openly declaring the desire to join both the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, one 
can also observe the development of an alternative, populist basic discourse, 
which is organized as a critical response to the former and tries to challenge its 
dominance by the articulation of different foreign policy goals.  
There is an important methodological aspect which should be mentioned 
here. Poststructuralists take the understanding of identity one step further from 
constructivists and regard it as in the process of constantly being made. 
Constructivism in a similar manner to realists and their take on national 
interests, sees identity as unitary. Furthermore, despite conventional constructi-
vists allowing more scope for non-causal theory, they still “mobilize causal 
concepts of testing to assess theoretical validity” (Hansen, 2006, p. 9). For 
poststructuralists, on the other hand, what constitutes ʻproper knowledge’, is 
always historically and politically situated and hence not derived from a 
theory’s ability to uncover causal truths (ibid, p. 10).  
Another concept which I apply from Hansen’s methodological framework is 
intertextuality or that “every individual text is always located within a shared 
textual space” (Hansen, 2006, p. 55). It helps to examine not what the texts are 
that are being quoted or linked by other texts, but rather how they are read and 
interpreted. Intertextuality can be implicit (secondary sources, conceptual, 
catchphrase) and explicit (quotes, references) (ibid, p. 57).  
While the discourse analysis of the text is performed, it is important to look 
at how they are presented in “later re-readings” and how these two differ from 
each other. In the words of Hintz (2016, p. 342) intertextual analysis “involves 
inductively recovering existing identities by comparing oral, written, and 
image-based texts, organically constructing collective proposals that cohere 
around shared understandings.”  
Such intertextual reading within the framework of discourse analysis helps 
to understand how discourse embedded within the official texts and repre-
sentations is projected to the wider public and legitimized. It is also useful 
within the scope of this study, as it locates debates on identity and foreign 
policy outside the official discourses enabling the highlighting of how different 
types of actors, who claim to be detached from politics, try to affect the foreign 
policy goals of the country.  
This leads to the concept of interdiscursivity which “indicates that discourses 
are linked to each other in various ways” (Wodak, 2008, p. 3). Such inter-
discursive reading, in addition to intertextuality, helps to identify how the 
discourse on security for instance or discourse on human rights, urbanization of 
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the city, etc. is linked to foreign policy goals and how the latter are themselves 
interlinked with discourses on identity.  
Texts to be analyzed to identify basic discourses should meet the following 
criteria: they should include a clear articulation of identities and policies, should 
be widely read and attended to and should have “the formal authority to define a 
political position” (Hansen, 2006, p. 85). Based on this, as was already men-
tioned, the materials which were analyzed as texts not only included official 
statements, but also TV shows, documentaries and visual images where the 
articulation of these identities was clearly present. 
Another methodological tool that is applied in this research is Foucauldian 
discourse analysis a.k.a. the genealogical reading of texts. This kind of analysis 
rejects universals and starts research by asking what kind of history one can do 
when universals do not exist (Foucault, 1979). What Foucauldian discourse 
analysis studies is how a particular regime of truth makes something that does 
not exist able to become something, which does exist. Tickner (2001, pp. 47–
48) on the other hand, defines genealogy as a style of historical thought that 
uncovers power/knowledge relations. “Claiming that there can be no one true 
story or historical narrative, genealogy situates knowledge in a particular time 
and place and demonstrates how it is constituted from particular perspectives.” 
Genealogical reading contributes to the research by helping to examine the 
processes which are behind the constitution of what we come to believe as 
irrefutable, irreducible truth, as well as, bringing power into play as an analy-
tical principle (Procacci, 1991, p. 151). Whether it is a study of the concept of 
sovereignty (Bartelson, 1995), the chemical weapons taboo (Price, 1995) or the 
emergence of the Anglosphere and its effects on international relations 
(Vucetic, 2011), genealogy, instead of asking ʻwhat happened and why?ʼ asks 
“‘how did X get here?ʼ or ʻhow did Y become possible?’” (Vucetic, 2011b, p. 
1303). Application of genealogy in International Relations examines how 
particular representations take hold and produce a specific political effect.  
 
 
3.3 Case Selection and Data Sampling  
The case of Georgia has been selected as its positioning between the West and 
the East has always been ambiguous. The reasons for such a liminal condition 
can be traced to geography, being located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia 
and Georgia’s subsequent historical experiences. Georgia being an Orthodox 
Christian kingdom, lost its connection to the rest of Europe after the collapse of 
the Byzantine empire and became surrounded by Muslim empires (i.e. Persian 
and Ottoman) which highly influenced its further development. The Soviet 
experience increased Georgiaʼs alienation from the West even more, and the 
dominant Euro-Atlantic integration discourse is framed within this need to 
recover what has been lost. It is important to note that while the concept of 
liminality has been widely explored in the context of the Baltics, Turkey or 
Ukraine, as well as internal-colonization being applied to Russia (see Etkind, 
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2011; Mälksoo, 2010, 2012, 2016; Morozov, 2015; Rumelili, 2004, 2012, 
2017), a country like Georgia remains largely outside of the lens of these 
studies. This research is trying to address this gap, which is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, as Georgia came into the immediate neighbourhood of the EU 
after the 2004 enlargement.  
The timeline for the selection of texts which were analyzed is from 1999 to 
2017. This particular year was selected as the starting point of the analysis, 
because it was the year Georgia joined the Council of Europe and the famous 
phrase by the late Prime Minister, Zhvania (1999), was coined: “I am Georgian 
and therefore I am European.” 2017 is the year when visa-free travel with the 
EU was granted to Georgia, thus seemingly marking a major milestone in the 
closer association with the European Union.  
Despite start date of the date from the analysis being1999, as outlined above, 
interdiscursivity and intertextuality are vital tools for poststructuralist discourse 
analysis. In addition, with the passage of the time, one is able to trace the 
gradual disruption or destabilization of the regime of truth created through the 
dominant discourses (Morrow, 2017). Hence, the empirical chapter will also 
frequently refer to texts, which were created much further in the past, as the 
contemporary discourses are deeply embedded into this history and refer to 
them. 
While considering the data to be analyzed there are a couple of points to be 
taken into consideration. Firstly, that discourse is the result of the political 
decision taken not on the bases of rational calculations by conscious indivi-
duals, but rather “an endless series of de facto decisions, which result from a 
myriad of decentred strategic actions undertaken by political agents aiming to 
forge a hegemonic discourse” (Torfing, 2005, p. 15). 
In other words, the list of texts under investigation should be extended to 
unofficial documents and to ones, which might seem, at first glance, unrelated 
(the branding of archaeological findings, winners of competitions at the aca-
demy of arts, etc.). Secondly, according to Wæver (2005, p. 35), discourse 
analytical approaches work on public texts. This means that discourse analysis 
does not look for the motives, hidden intentions or secret plans of the actors. It 
stays at the level of discourses, which gives discourse theory a methodological 
advantage, especially in the field of foreign policy where much is hidden.  
According to what has been outlined above, there is no limit to what can be 
considered as the data for discourse theory. Resulting from this assumption, all 
available research methods can be useful in processing data and incorporating it 
into the research project. As I have already mentioned, the methodology of 
discourse theory needs to be complemented using tools from other discourse 
analytical approaches.  
Finally, the research strategy for discourse analyst is “to look for key 
concepts and their mutual relationship. One asks how the text argues, not what 
it says” (Wæver, 2005, p. 41). For instance, in a debate on Bosnia in the 
German parliament, the interesting question is not who takes what position 
regarding what intervention, but how they argue their case. What are the 
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powerful categories on which the argument rests, how are they related, are some 
concepts presented as, by necessity, companions (for example, ʻus’, Europe, 
Germans, civilization), and are some presented as self-evident opposites (for 
example, Balkan and peace or nationalism and Europe)? More interesting than 
the arguments made are the assumptions not stated, but necessary for the 
argument to be meaningful, the structural arrangements of key concepts, and 
chains of equivalence and oppositions. There can be many of these, but one 
tries to boil them down to the most general and recurrent axes of valorisation, 
which enable the text to generate meaning (ibid, p. 41). In other words, this 
thesis aims to map out discourses and illustrate how the chain of equivalence is 
expanding in the field of discursivity. The public sources are the primary sites 
where these articulations take place. As Wæver (2002, p. 26) argues: “If one 
sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic of the argument remains 
much clearer – one works on public, open sources and uses them for what they 
are, not as indicators of something else.”  
In Appendix A is the full list of texts selected for the analysis. It consists of 
inauguration speeches delivered by presidents, several strategic and foreign 
policy documents as well as newspapers.  
The following newspapers were selected, as they are widely read and 
represent one of the two discourses on national identity suggested above. To be 
more precise, Asaval-Dasavali and Saqartvelo da Msoflio clearly articulate an 
exclusive national identity which is based on xenophobia, homophobia, and a 
portrayal of the Orthodox Christianity as the master signifier. As a result, it is 
expected that such identity discourse will reproduce the foreign policy agenda 
which is oriented towards the Kremlin. According to the study from 2019 titled 
“rusuli samq’aro sakartveloshi” (“Russian World in Georgia”) published by the 
Media Development Foundation, ist’oriuli memk’vidreoba (“historical legacy”), 
an organization behind the newspaper Sakartvelo da Msoflio, is the official 
partner in Georgia of the foundation “Russian World” (Pataridze, 2019, p. 4). 
The latter itself is an institution founded by President Putin’s decree in 2007 
with the aims of promoting Russian culture and language abroad. The projects 
supported by the foundation include the celebration of the Victory Day on the 
9th of May, the so-called march of the immortal regiment, funding of studies 
for Georgian students in Russia, and so on (ibid). In comparison, two other 
newspapers in the list reproduce the dominant discourse with an emphasis on 
Georgia’s pro-European future. Each year for the newspapers was divided into 
three periods, January-March, June-August and October-December and one 
issue from each period was randomly selected. The aim of the discourse ana-
lysis is to map out and illustrate the main trends, rather than cover all the texts 
available, which is physically impossible. Therefore, data sampling of the 
printed media in this manner is justified, as it aims to simply unravel and show 
the basic tendencies in the discourses.  
Regarding the TV shows on the list, they are the products of Rustavi 2, 
which is one of the most popular and widely broadcasted TV channels through-
out the country. Additionally, the two shows mentioned above, have a clear 
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reference to Georgia’s European identity and engage in the process of othering 
Russia and the Soviet past of the country.  
When it comes to official documents, these particular texts (foreign policy 
strategies, national security strategies, and presidential addresses) were selected 
in order to examine how does discourse (re)produce and replicate in concrete 
policies and practices. Since the purpose of my research was to examine and 
illustrate the constitutive relationship between foreign policy and national 
identity, I believe these documents are one of the primary sources. Here it also 
needs to be mentioned that since the pro-Western foreign policy has been 
dominant in Georgian politics for more than two decades, there are no similar 
documents for challenging articulations. Hence, in the case of the populist 
narrative, empirics are limited to party documents and media.  
In addition to the systematized sampled data listed above, interviews, state-
ments, and speeches made by officials, symbols, and institutions which are 
relevant and refer to the identity discourses identified within this research, were 
analyzed. 
Finally, despite this study being designed as strictly qualitative due to the 
theoretical and methodological framework applied, some quantitative data, 
which was already available prior to conducting my research, is used to further 
illustrate the argument. The dataset used was produced by the Caucasus Baro-
meter, which itself is the project of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre. It 
provides the results of surveys for all three South Caucasian republics on 
various social and political issues. In addition, results from the National Demo-
cratic Institute’s (NDI) studies on public attitudes in Georgia are included.  
This research is a single case study of Georgia; however, it attempts to offer 
a comparative perspective. As the hypotheses and research questions aim firstly 
to illustrate how the level of the European identity varies over time. Second, 
how has the so-called Big Bang, development of the ENP and Eastern Partner-
ship, etc. affected Georgia’s European identity construction processes and the 
increase of the challenging, populist discourse? Hence, the quantitative data 
which measures the perceptions of the EU and NATO in the population and 














CHAPTER 4. PRO-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY AND 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
4.1 A Brief History of Georgia-NATO and  
Georgia-EU relations  
Although I chose the year 1999 as the starting point of the empirical analysis, it 
is important to offer an overview of the background in which this data is em-
bedded. Methodological tools of interdiscursivity and intertextuality imply that 
no texts can be seen in isolation and independent from each other. Thus, 
following the poststructuralist approach to research, it is important to outline the 
evolution of the institutional and legal as well as normative environment, 
contemporary discourses emerge from.  
Georgia experienced several rather rocky years starting immediately after 
the restoration of its independence (Nodia, 2018). Based on the results of the 
referendum conducted in March of 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurida on 9th of April 
of the same year, declared the independence of Georgia restored. Only five 
months later, in December 1991, he became the subject of a military coup. 
Democratically elected president Gamsakhurida had to flee the country, while 
the state council took over the control of the state. Soon afterward, former 
minister of the foreign affairs of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze was invited 
to hold the post of the head of a country ravaged by civil war, criminal gangs, 
and total chaos. It is because of these historical developments that Georgia was 
the last of all the former Soviet Union states to join the United Nations, in July 
1992. The first years of Shevardnadze’s rule were occupied with stabilizing 
country and building the key state institutions. In 1995, a new constitution was 
adopted, which replaced 1921’s outdated version and allowed Shevardnadze to 
restore the post of the president, which was suspended after the coup.  
It is not surprising that the European Union and NATO, occupied with 
developments in the Balkans, Eastern, and Central Europe, had neither the 
political will nor economic capability or interests to engage with one more 
region overrun by ethnic conflicts. Consequently, desperate for stability, the 
Georgian political elite was forced to compromise and in 1993 join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and accept Russian peace-keeping forces 
in the conflict zones.  
The main objective of the EU in the first years after the USSR ended its 
existence was to maintain the peace and stable borders between the former 
members of the Soviet Union. Brussels implemented TACIS (Technical As-
sistance to the Community of Independent States), which aimed to help newly 
independent states in implementing reforms. It became the main tool of coope-
ration between the EU and the states of the South Caucasus (Lussac, 2012, p. 
168). In 1992, the European Council started to negotiate the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The 
aim was to develop a framework for political dialogue between the sides, 
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support the development of market economies and democracy (ibid). It was 
finally signed in 1996 and ratified in 1999. President of Georgia, Eduard 
Shevardnadze remarked in connection with the signature of the document:  
 
Our wise ancestors always had been looking for the ways to get closer to Europe 
and, today, it can be said, that their thoughts are gaining some shapes – the first 
specific step towards the integration with Europe has been made (Shevardnadze, 
1996).  
 
He described the European Union as “an example of civilized integration” 
which paved the way for the rest of the world. In reality, though, there is a 
considerable mismatch between the interpretations the Georgian political elite 
and the EU officials made of the document. The text of the agreement lists as its 
objectives:  
 
–  to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the 
Parties allowing the development of political relations; 
–  to support Georgiaʼs efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its 
economy and to complete the transition into a market economy; 
–  to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between 
the Parties and so to foster their sustainable economic development; 
–  to provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, civil scientific, 
technological and cultural cooperation (Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment, 1999).  
 
In short, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provided the legal and 
institutional framework for the partnership, but it left open the question of 
whether the South Caucasus was in or out of Europe. In the first decade, 
assistance from the European Union was mostly technical and humanitarian. 
Only after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which was followed by similar 
developments in Ukraine the next year, officials in Brussels faced a need to 
redefine policies towards the region. Furthermore, in 2004, 10 countries joined 
the European Union, thus bringing Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus into the 
immediate neighbourhood of the organization. As Müller (2013, p. 65) puts it, 
from being considered no more than a footnote in the EU’s foreign policy until 
the early 2000s, Georgia made a big leap towards formal integration with the 
European Union.  
On the bases of the PCA, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
launched with the aim of creating a “circle of friends” around the EU. Although 
it was initiated in 2004, the South Caucasus was only included two years later. 
The main goal of the ENP was to share the benefits of EU enlargement and 
avoid the emergence of new dividing lines. The European Union and Georgia 
adopted the Action Plan and the National Indicative program, which provided 
the ENP with a specific agenda and the ways to monitor its implementation 
(Müller, 2013).  
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In the literature on the EU’s foreign policy, the ENP is described as 
promoting “institutional identity,” which stands in contrast to the “symbolic” 
European identity promoted within the member states (Karolewski, 2012). 
Unlike the common currency, common anthem or holidays it implies trans-
ferring the conception of normal and superiority into the neighbourhood.  
 
European institutions, procedures, norms, and values become new rules of 
conduct for non-member states: their internal institutions, as well as policies, are 
judged by the EU’s norms. Thus, by adopting these norms, third countries also 
assume the institutional identity of the EU (ibid, p. 14).  
 
Despite this, there is a lack of clear membership perspective, which makes the 
conditionality strategies of the EU weaker in relation to the ENP countries. The 
institutional identity transfer is not supported by an actual identity offer. What 
some scholars have noted is that the ENP mostly failed to achieve its main 
objective of promoting democracy and security in the countries concerned 
(Nilsson & Silander, 2016), and the issue of inclusion/exclusion lies at the core 
of these developments.  
The Georgian-Russian military conflict in August 2008 called for deeper 
engagement of the European Union in the region as two countries in its im-
mediate neighbourhood entered into a full-blown war. After the cease-fire 
agreement was achieved with the mediation of France (president of the EU at 
the time), the European Union sent a monitoring mission, which to this day 
patrols along the administrative border and observes the situation on the ground. 
On the basis of the ENP, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched, which is 
specifically focused on the six states on the EU’s Eastern Border (Moldova, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). But the latter shared the 
same ambiguity and divergence between Brussels and the Eastern neighbours 
about what to expect from the partnership and what the end goal of this 
cooperation is (Korosteleva, 2011, Nielsen & Vilson, 2014, Paul, 2015). The 
key breakthrough in the relationship between the two (The EU and Georgia) 
was the signature of the DCFTA and Association Agreement in 2014 and the 
granting of visa-free travel to Schengen countries to Georgian citizens in 2017. 
As written on the European Union External Action Service’s website, the 
objectives of the agreements are to strengthen the political association and 
economic integration.  
 
They entail significant reforms that aim to bring the Partner Countries closer to 
the EU by aligning their legislation and standards to the EU ones. Most 
importantly, they have the objective of improving the lives of citizens in a 
tangible way (EEAS, n.d.).  
 
2017 is the final year for the empirical data used in my analysis as I consider the 
signature of the Association Agreement and visa-free travel as important 
milestones for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. However, despite the 
AA recognizing Georgia as an Eastern European state, it “represents no 
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guarantee that the EU will ever open its door to Georgia” (Paul, 2015, p. 5). 
Below is the table (figure 6) which illustrates the evolution of EU-Georgia 
relations and some key dates. The evolution and fluctuations of identity 
discourses and its constitutive relationship with the foreign policy should be 
perceived in the context of those key points in the timeline.  
 
 
April 1999 Georgia Joins Council of Europe 
July 1999  PCA with the EU enters into force 
November 2006 ENP Action Plan for Georgia approved 
August 2008  France negotiated ceasefire between Russia and Georgia  EU deployed monitoring mission along the administrative border  
April 2007 Black Sea Synergy  
May 2009 Eastern Partnership launched  
June 2014  Association Agreement and DCFTA signed  
March 2017  Visa-free regime with the EU for Georgian citizens was launched  
 
Figure 5. Georgia-EU relations timeline 
 
 
The discourse analysis of the liberal narrative, which I will be presenting in this 
chapter, is a detailed examination of how the agenda of reforms included in 
those various agreements with the European Union is constructed as particular 
tool for externally driven transformation and self-colonization. Usually examp-
les from everyday language help to better and more easily illustrate the points I 
want to make. In 2017, while giving an interview to TV Pirveli, a local TV 
channel in Tbilisi, comedian Giorgi Janelidze made the following remark, 
which, in my opinion, nicely sums up the key argument I am advancing in this 
empirical chapter.  
 
How is it here with us, that in order for something to be done, you have to be 
told from above. He/she has to be told from above as well, and for them it has to 
be put in the Association Agreement with Europe (Janelidze, 2017).  
 
This joke shows the perception of DCFTA, AA and visa-free travel with the 
European Union. They are not simply tools in the process of economic develop-
ments or security, but instead guidelines for “normalcy”, for transformation for 
the better and for becoming more “civilized” i.e. more European. The aim of 
this empirical chapter is to examine these discursive constructions and follow 
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the evolution of articulation through the years 1999–2017. This grand narrative 
on foreign policy, which I call the dominant discourse on whether Georgia 
belongs to Europe or Asia, can be viewed as an overarching discourse binding 
several themes together. An analysis of the empirics revealed that the broader 
discourse on liminality takes three directions. I have labeled them in my re-
search as following: a) discourse on transformation, b) Geographical discourse 
i.e. the bridge between Asia and Europe and lastly6 c) civilizational discourse 
with a heavy emphasis on orthodox Christianity. These three elements are 
united with one common characteristic i.e. despite having different dimensions, 
all of them carry orientalist and stigmatization aspects. Whether the discourse 
concerns Georgia’s geographical belonging, reforms or Orthodox Christianity, 
self-colonization and construction of its own Orient are present as a background 
theme in all of those narratives. The discourse analysis of the texts selected for 
this chapter reveals that Russia is articulated as an eastern constitutive Other 
vis-à-vis Georgia and later is projected as oriental but still not as oriental as 
Russia. I must also note here that the study of empirical data revealed that this 
image of Other is not limited to contemporary Russia. This articulation also 
involves a temporal dimension. It is expanded to the Soviet Union and the Rus-
sian Empire in some instances. Furthermore, in liberal narratives, by expanding 
logics of equivalence and difference, former-Soviet states in the region, 
especially those, less eager to engage with political projects coming from the 
West, are constructed as less “civilized” and “modern” hence, less European. 
Constituting its own orient and transferring the East to the borders with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan is how the national identity/foreign policy constitutive 
relationship deals with its own insecurity on the East/West nexus. To provide an 
example of what I consider as the construction of temporal and spatial construc-
tion of the own Orient, I would like to quote president Mikhail Saakashvili’s 
remarks while speaking with students about reforms in the education sphere.  
 
In recent years I have travelled a lot in the republics of the former Soviet Union. 
… I have practically been in every one of them … and visited universities in all 
of them … and I want to say, despite having been very critical of our own 
education system … it is like night and day what Georgia has achieved in the 
sphere of education in last years. … It is still the Soviet Union in those countries. 
When you enter … from the very first step, as you step into the universities, in 
the former USSR countries, I go back to the Soviet Union of my youth. … You 
can feel the smell of the Soviet Union in those rotten buildings. The Soviet 
Union smells very bad, we do not want it anymore, we should air it, and in the 
last few years we have been airing this smell from our buildings to get rid of the 
rotten Soviet smell from the Georgian university system… (“Saakashvili: Soviet 
Union…”, 2013). 
                                                 
6  Geographical location is understood as discursively constructed. In other words, how. 
despite having no actual physical border with the EU member states, the perception of 
belonging, of being part of that community is discursively reproduced.  
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Georgia as “modern” and “developed” is constructed in contrast to other 
former-Soviet states (except the Baltics) as more European and western. 
Meanwhile, corruption, outdated study methods, etc. are projected as Russian 
and the Soviet way of doing things. It is articulated as the legacy of the Com-
munist past, which needs to be “corrected.” In stigma theory terms, meaning 
attributed to the policies aimed at reforms in post-Soviet Georgia is “normalcy.” 
In addition, this image of the Self is further reinforced and made stronger by 
constructing the spectrum of orientalism in the region. It serves the purpose of 
constituting oneself as not yet fully European such as Latvia or Estonia, but still 
more European than Armenia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. To quote Georgian 
politician, Ivliane Khaindrava (2015, p. 51) “in this non-region of the world, 
Georgia is a European island in the South Caucasus.” To put it differently, what 
makes liberal discourse on national identity self-colonizing is its projection and 
construction of the West. Furthermore, the fact that it is externally driven i.e. by 
the incentives embedded in the Eastern Partnership or the Association Agree-
ment with the European Union.  
Kuus (2004, p. 479) suggests that in order to understand the relationship 
between the western and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries during 
the EU’s enlargement to the east, one needs to go beyond the simple Self/Other 
dichotomy and examine the gradation processes and the othering of Russia by 
the CEE states themselves.  
 
The orientalist assumptions about East-Central Europe persist not simply be-
cause they are imposed on the accession countries but also because they are 
actively used by these countries against their particular Easts.  
 
She further argues that by constructing and projecting themselves as the most 
eastern outpost of Europe, Central and Eastern European countries are able to 
escape their own East. What I argue in this empirical chapter is that similar 
developments can be observed in Georgia. As it has been fifteen years since the 
so-called “Big Bang” when the CEE countries joined the European Union, the 
term Eastern Europe has been extended to include not only Ukraine and Mol-
dova but also the countries of the South Caucasus. Thus, I believe it is im-
portant to research how the social construction of identity constitutes foreign 
policy, and how certain foreign policy moves are made possible in the region 
through this nesting orientalism. Studying external policies through this theo-
retical prism helps to see perspectives which traditional schools of IR focused 
on the balance of power or region-building are omitting. As an example of the 
advantage that following a theoretical approach offers, I want to briefly touch 
upon the difference between the CEE and the EaP countries. Although one 
could argue that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) represents the extension of the 




The EU did not invest much effort in extending its previous success stories of 
regionalism further eastward and did not think of projecting its experience of 
creating regional political spaces onto its European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). 
 
In other words, unlike the Central and Eastern European Countries, in the case 
of the South Caucasus, Brussels was not able to play the role of region builder. 
Makarychev offers two possible explanations: either the European Union 
initially tried to avoid irritating Russia, or Brussels preferred to engage with 
individual countries, rather than invest in region-making (ibid, p. 5). However, 
there is yet another, and indeed more important, aspect to why normative power 
of the European Union in the common neighborhood is weakening and the 
former cannot act as the region-builder. Namely, the lack of a shared identity 
between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. There are no common foreign 
policy goals all the countries aspire to. Sometimes even civilizational narratives 
are at odds with each other within the region. For instance, president Aliyev’s 
declaration in Autumn of 2019 that they were building the state based on tradi-
tional values and therefore there was no place for Azerbaijan in the European 
Union. “Where do we integrate into the society of those who say, ʻStop Islam?ʼ 
Where to integrate into the society of those who do not see the difference 
between men and women? I do not want to go deep. We will by no means 
integrate there” (“‘Azerbaijan is a traditional country…’”, 2019).  
The theoretical framework I apply in my thesis goes beyond causality in the 
positivist understanding and argues for the constitutive relationship between 
foreign policy and identity. If we examine the South Caucasus through this lens, 
we can see this relationship in action. Different foreign policy trajectories of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are constituted by different civilizational dis-
courses and the other way around. Whether or not, for instance, the officials in 
Baku are willing to implement the reform agenda coming from Brussels and 
sign the Association Agreement, is largely embedded in identity articulations. 
Azerbaijan is an especially interesting case, as it hosted the European Games in 
2015, as well as the Islamic Solidarity Games in 2017, illustrating the fluidity of 
liminal identity and how different actors can act upon this positioning. 
Due to the limited scope of this thesis and in order to avoid superficial 
analysis, I am not studying the South Caucasus as a whole, but only the case of 
Georgia. This empirical chapter is divided into six subchapters, each developing 
the separate trajectory along which the pro-Western foreign policy/national 
identity relationship takes place. But, at the same time, all six are united by the 
one grand narrative of the East vs. the West, uncivilized vs. civilized, where the 
Soviet Union and Russia, as its legal successor, are designated the role of the 
constitutive Other, while Georgia’s Self is in the process of “returning back to 
Europe” through self-colonization and normalcy, through “re-discovering” 
Europe in its own culture and “correcting” the stigma of being European, yet 
not European enough.  
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4.2 Discourse on Transformation  
The theoretical argument I put forward in this thesis argues that the states in the 
neighbourhood of the EU, or in between Russia and the European Union, which 
have not been historically subjects of colonization by European powers, 
voluntarily engage in the strategies of othering and orientalization of Russia and 
recognizing the superiority of the West. The process of ascribing oneself 
second-class status is traumatizing as it implies recognition of one’s own “back-
wardness” due to some historical circumstances. Furthermore, it is traumatizing 
as it involves self-colonization i.e. accepting that one’s own culture is still in 
need of “development” and has some “catching up with the West” to do. This 
process involves stigmatization, which Zarakol defines not only as a label 
imposed from the outside but also as “the internalization of a particular norma-
tive standard that defines oneʼs own attributes as discreditable (2011, p. 4). 
Stigmatized actors engage with the strategies of either correcting or rejecting 
the stigma. Annual addresses to the parliament of President Shevardnadze, 
between the years 1999–2003, are an example of such strategies.  
“The substitution of one type of governance for another is mostly finished. 
Independently, the democratic state was built” (Shevardnadze, 1999) claimed 
the head of the state in his address to the legislative branch of the government, 
while speaking about independence from the USSR.  
He repeated the same message, and even expanded a bit more on it in 2001, 
by saying that 
 
Georgia, as of now, is n established sovereign, democratic, social and just state 
… We went through the demolition of the old, totalitarian system and the first 
stage of building a new, democratic state, which took longer in historical terms, 
than it seemed it would from the beginning… (Shevardnadze, 2001). 
 
As I have elaborated in the introduction of this chapter, Europe and the West in 
general are the reference points and driving factors behind the discourse on 
transformation. By framing itself as the most eastern outpost of Europe, Geor-
gian pro-Western foreign policy reinforces its own Europeanness and makes up 
for what the years, if not centuries, “lost” under the Russian Empire or the 
Soviet rule. 1999 is a turning point in this regard, as Georgia became the first 
country in the Caucasus to join the Council of Europe (CE) and was therefore 
able to build on actual empirical progress to support its claims. The President, 
in his address to the parliament from that year stated:  
 
With the membership of the Council of Europe ends the key stage in Georgia’s 
acceptance into the European family as a full member. This is the great victory 
of our people (Shevardnadze, 1999). 
 
But it is not simply the discourse on “returning back home,” but also on trans-
forming oneself and becoming “normal” and “civilized,” in contrast to the Soviet 
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past. It is an externally driven process imbedded in the Eastern Partnership, ENP 
or bilateral agreements which existed between the sides before. 
 
As the Council of Europe requires, the whole package of laws was adopted, 
which deals with the perfection of human rights … the legislative base was 
created for managing processes of migration and emigration (ibid).  
 
Or as the year 2000’s address illustrates, the membership in the Council of 
Europe is not just the confirmation of Georgia’s European identity, but it is also 
about reforms and transformation, with the recognition of Western superiority, 
as the background.  
 
The success over the last five years in the building of democracy, in the sphere 
of political civilization and culture, and the protection of human rights, was so 
impressive that we were accepted in the Council of Europe (Shevardnadze, 
2000).  
 
It has been articulated not only as a simple fact that Georgia’s belonging to 
Europe has been recognized and confirmed, but as assessing and praising the 
country’s transformation. How the membership of the Council of Europe is 
framed and projected to the broader audience, illustrates how the self-coloni-
zation discourse is unfolding. Integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions is a 
step-by-step process with the transformation of society, as the final point of 
destination. To paraphrase Kiknadze (2015, p. 93), the late prime-minister 
Zurab Zhvania’s famous sentence “I am Georgian, therefore I am European,” 
should be interpreted not as a simple statement of the fact, but as a program. 
However, it does not imply that one who is of Georgian origin is European, but 
rather, that one can become European, through the transformation. This is 
precisely where the gradation and multiplicity of the Eastern Europe step is a 
useful theoretical phenomenon, which needs to be taken into consideration. 
Constituting oneself as less European vis-à-vis Western Europe, but still more 
European in comparison to Russia or Azerbaijan. Hence, Georgia qualifies 
more for the membership than the countries on its eastern border. Such dis-
courses require the recognition of Western superiority and the acceptance of 
condescending and patronizing attitudes coming from the Brussels, as well as 
transmitting them farther to its own East. It implies articulation of the Self as 
simultaneously inferior and equal to other European countries.  
One important aspect, which became apparent during the discourse analysis, 
is that although NATO and the European Union differ in many ways, for the 
discourse on transformation these two organizations are allocated equal impor-
tance. For instance, in 2000’s address, president Shevardnadze characterized the 
year 1999 in regard to relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as 
fruitful, since Georgia joined the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and achieved 
the status of an associate member in the North Atlantic Assembly. This was 
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described by the head of state as “one more important step on the road to full 
integration into the European structures” (Shevardnadze, 2000).  
In other words, NATO, despite covering countries, which are geographically 
beyond Europe, is still articulated as a European structure. One important aspect 
which should be kept in mind while analyzing the data from the early 2000s is 
the level of the EU’s and NATO’s engagement with the region. In this time 
period, countries of Central and Eastern Europe were in the middle of the 
accession process, and therefore the South Caucasus was outside the focus of 
these organizations. This was a period when the whole Neighbourhood Policy 
was in the early stages of conception and the relationship with the former Soviet 
states with the exception of the Baltics, was largely based on individual partner-
ship agreements. Hence, examining this discourse is especially interesting as it 
illustrates another dimension of Europeanisation, which involves constructing 
the idea of the West as the image of a “perfect” society, to aspire to, with no 
specific tools or practical program. It is based on a broader, abstract discourse, 
reproducing the image of the superiority of the West. Therefore, when in his 
2001 address to the parliament, president Shevardnadze lists “building of a 
sovereign just state, forming civil society, and creating a socially-oriented 
market-based economy” as strategic vectors of the country’s development, one 
can easily spot the difference from the discourse of the later period, as they are 
more abstract and less imbedded in the European integration narrative.  
Again, this is projected in more general terms, which clearly stand out in 
contrast to post-Rose Revolution discourse. Although such vectors are projected 
in abstract terms, it still carries strong self-orientalization connotations. As the 
president claimed in the same address in 2001,  
 
current difficulties are caused not by democracy itself, but by not enough demo-
cratic development, not enough culture, and the fragility and weakness of demo-
cratic institutions, which is often followed by unlimited populism and unlimited 
demagogy.  
 
Such discourse illustrates voluntarily assigning second-class status to oneself, as 
well as “discovering” its own Europe within itself through what this thesis 
labels as self-colonization. In this same address, president Eduard Shevardnadze 
spoke of Georgian national identity in a very interesting manner:  
 
I think it is unrelated to those never-ending discussions on Georgia’s pro-
Western or pro-Russian orientation. If it means the nature of the state, then we 
have a democratic orientation, as democracy is not an achievement of one 
country or group of countries, it is a value of humankind and to establish this 
ideal, our small nation, within its capabilities, but worthily, contributed with a 
word and pen as well as with blood and sacrifice.  
But if under orientation it is meant as the coordination between the systems 
of state stability and security, then the keys to our policies are the principles of 
pragmatism and thoughtfulness: we cooperate with everybody who would help 
us to strengthen the state’s independence, would actually do it and in reality 
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would recognize Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity for real, as our 
friends are doing (Shevardnadze, 2001).  
 
Although at first sight, this might seem a very balanced and more multi-
vectored approach to the foreign policy agenda, already in the early 2000s, 
national identity discourse had a Euro-centric dimension, by universalizing the 
West and constructing a civilized/barbaric dichotomy, with Georgia being in the 
middle, in the liminal stage of transition. “The main vector of our foreign policy 
is directed towards the European Union. Europe should be the country’s final 
harbor. It is a long and most difficult road…” (ibid).  
For the study of transformative discourse, it is important to examine pre-
sident Shevardnadze’s 2002 annual address to the parliament, as he presented 
his program of future reforms and development for the country, titled “New 
Project for Georgia.” The aim of the project, according to the head of state was 
to “finally establish a free, independent, and happy – Georgian democratic 
country, to establish its deserved position on the world stage” (Shevardnadze, 
2002).  
Stemming from the title, it is logical to expect that the discourse around this 
project even more consistently engages with the discourse on transformation. It 
articulates around the idea of being in transition, in the liminal stage, which 
covers all the social and political fields.  
 
It remains unchanged, in the direction of the transition stage: the legislative, 
social, building of the national state, perfection of the president’s institution, 
assessment of the executive government, government, ministries, their coopera-
tion with the legislative government; … formation of the civil society, final es-
tablishment of a market economy, domestic and foreign politics, social policies 
… The concept of deepening reforms implies not only working on a future 
economic and political development program and its adaptation to the new reali-
ties, but extremely deep and radical changes in the content of the state-political 
course, also, what might painful, but are brave steps in every aspect of state life 
(ibid).  
 
Analysis of the early 2000s political elite’s discourse and its comparison with 
the post-Rose Revolution narrative revealed an interesting perspective to look at 
the evolution of the national identity as being in a permanent stage of transition. 
President Shevardnadze claims that  
 
For the first time in Georgian history, Georgia is (or has) a new, independent, 
democratic, sovereign, just and socially oriented sate; A new constitution, 
according to the achievements of the world constitutionalism, was created; For 
the first time ever, a real presidential republic was formed; The first time the 
government was divided into three branches; For the first t time, a new, truly 
democratic parliament was established (ibid). 
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Although these reforms and the creation of basic state institutions from scratch, 
according to this narrative, were important in order to join the UN or OSCE, the 
membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions carries a more normative agenda and 
requires transformation which goes beyond simple institutional reforms. To 
provide a specific example from the 2002 address:  
 
Since independence, Georgia’s key vector of foreign policy became membership 
in the European and world structures. Georgia had already joined the UN and 
OSCE as a member 1992. It was more difficult joining structures with strict 
ideologies, like the Council of Europe and the World Trade Organization. This 
required substantial internal transformation from Georgia (Shevardnadze, 2002). 
 
In the beginning of the new millennium i.e. in the year 2000, “Georgia and the 
World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future for Georgia” was published by the 
government of Georgia. Discourse analysis of this particular document is 
important to gain an even more detailed picture of foreign policy’s mutually 
reproductive relationship with identity discourse, as well as how the role of the 
country is constructed in the broader civilizational discourse. The opening 
passage of the document states:  
 
Georgia is at a unique and critically important moment in its long history. 
Georgia has not only regained its independence; it has also set out on a path of 
transformation of the features of its society. The people of Georgia have chosen 
unambiguously to join the community of nations that are governed demo-
cratically, that value the rights of the individual under the rule of law (“Georgia 
and the World”, 2000, p. 1).  
 
It clearly outlines the transformative, self-colonizing agenda, which is then tied 
to foreign policy and international relations of the state.  
 
Georgia’s goal is to integrate into all of the major institutions of the European 
and Euro-Atlantic communities… as the only way to achieve the ambitious 
goals, they set themselves as a nation. At the same time, Georgia intends to 
sustain its rich and unique cultural identity (ibid, pp. 4–5).  
 
This document even further expands on “correcting the stigma” and Europe’s 
role in such transformation. 
 
On April 27, 1999, Georgia became the 41st member of the Council of Europe. 
Georgia regards its accession to the Council of Europe as a unique opportunity to 
advance European values and norms in the political, legal, cultural and social 
realms. Georgia adheres to the standards of the Council of Europe, which 
provide for the establishment of a democratic state and according to western 
norms. Georgia has also voluntarily become one of 10 states that have accepted 
monitoring arrangements through which the Council of Europe works with the 
government to stamp out corruption. 
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With assistance from the Council of Europe, Georgia has undertaken widespread 
reforms of its judicial system. The Law on Courts of Common Jurisdiction and 
the Law on the Supreme Court were adopted and, a new judiciary system has 
been established. In 1997, an institution of the Public Defender of Georgia was 
established. Capital punishment has been abolished and a new criminal code and 
code of procedure have been adopted (ibid, p. 8).  
 
There are two interesting passages in these paragraphs, which are of particular 
importance for my research. Firstly, the idea of the membership as an oppor-
tunity to advance European values and norms and taking them as standards to 
aspire to and to transform oneself. To put it in the theoretical framework of this 
thesis, membership is perceived as the tool of correcting the stigma, of 
becoming fully European via self-colonization. This part is even more strongly 
reproduced by the second part of this extract, which talks about voluntarily 
accepting the monitoring arrangements, hence giving the organization superio-
rity and ascribing oneself second-class status in relations to former. Examples 
from the judicial reforms in the country, which were carried out “with the 
assistance from the Council of Europe” listed in the document, is what this 
thesis identifies as a self-colonizing strategy of liminars to “correct” the stigma 
of not being European enough and achieve the closure of the transformation 
processes.  
In a similar manner, part of the strategy which touched upon the military and 
security issues, describes reforms in the sphere as following:  
 
Georgia has embarked on an ambitious national effort to establish a democratic 
society based on the rule of law, separation of state powers, respect for indi-
vidual rights, and a market economy. A central objective of Georgian foreign 
and security policy is also Georgiaʼs progressive integration into European and 
Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures. For these reasons, 
reform and restructuring of the Georgian armed forces are taking place along 
Western lines (ibid, p. 18).  
 
Looking at the evolution of foreign policy discourse from a distance, one can 
claim that the post-Rose Revolution period brought an increase of the narrative 
of “returning back to Europe” and transformation. Such change is the product of 
the change of the government as much as it is the result of the developments 
within the EU and NATO. The revolution took place on 23rd November 2003, 
in the period of the so-called “Big Bang” of the European Union, that is, its 
enlargement to the East. Consequently, the Georgian political elite’s discourse 
on transformation, on building a new, modern state, became heavily embedded 
in Europeanisation. The appearance of the European Union closer to the horizon 
has drastically affected the intensity of pro-European national identity dis-
course, as well as, how less abstract and more practical such narratives became.  
Such a strong emphasis on the country’s pro-Western foreign policy was 
even more strongly articulated around the idea of the rapid transformation of 
society and building a new, modern Georgian state. The change of national 
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anthem, coat of arms and flag, immediately after the revolutions, should be 
viewed in this context. Previous state symbols, despite being the legacy of the 
First Republic of Georgia (1918–1921), have been projected as something 
associated with the rule of Shevardnadze, who himself was an embodiment of 
the Soviet Union (serving as the head of the Georgian SSR, and the foreign 
minister of the USSR). Hence, in the process of constructing an image of the 
new, modern and developed Georgian state, “starting from the scratch” was 
necessary.  
President Saakashvili, the main political figure behind the Rose Revolution 
and the president of Georgia from January 2004, in his first annual address to the 
parliament, focused on domestic reforms, the transformation of society and such 
fundamental changes, to “correct” the stigma of not being European enough.  
 
Today, I and my friends are happy that we were given a second chance for re-
forms. … Right now, we have a unique chance: there is a reformatory president, 
reformatory government and reformatory parliament, and we can fully change 
Georgia for the better. … Our future is membership of the European Union and 
full membership of all the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, which are 
important to us. This is no fantasy anymore. In June, there is a chance that the 
European Union will recognize Georgia as a member of the European Union’s 
immediate neighbourhood. This means that Georgia is becoming the main 
landmark of the EU’s enlargement, and later, maybe, through Georgia, other 
countries of the South Caucasus (Saakashvili, 2004).  
 
This passage is of particular importance, since, in addition to transformation 
discourse vis-à-vis the European Union, it provides instances of discourse on 
foreign policy orientalizing the neighbourhood and constructing its own “East.” 
This extract from the speech also illustrates the role of the eastern enlargement 
in the identity discourses of societies in the South Caucasus. 
Taking this point even further, the newspaper “Akhali Taoba” in 2004 
published a statement made by the president of Georgia, while visiting the 
United States. He once again outlined how foreign policy is not only about 
certain practical goals, but rather carries transformative connotations and 
constructs a certain gradation of Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Western Europe.  
 
In Russia, they know very well, that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania 
managed to escape their trap and became normal countries, this will happen in 
the case of Georgia as well (Saakashvili, 2004b).  
 
While delivering the speech at John Hopkins University in the States, the leader 
of Georgia reinforced the image of the Rose Revolution as a transformative 
event and the importance of identity as a reference point.  
 
The second lesson from “the Rose Revolution” is that Georgians are full 
members of Europe and the European family. When I say this, I mean national 
identity and not the geographical location. In November, the population united in 
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defense of the principles of liberal democracy. … The revolution was not pro-
tests caused by low salaries, limited electricity, or because of the lack of security 
guarantees of the state. … People made the revolution happen due to their wish 
to live in a free and democratic society (Saakashvili, 2004c). 
 
This narrative of presenting the Rose Revolution as the ground zero for building 
a new, modern and European state, is further reinforced in president Saakash-
vili’s 20005 address to the parliament. The opening of the speech declares:  
 
About one year has passed since Georgia made a choice for freedom, and Geor-
gian people designed a difficult and ambitious path for returning their lost and 
stolen motherland. … For the first time in modern history, Georgia became a real 
state (Saakashvili, 2005).  
 
This discourse on transformation is applicable to all the public and state institu-
tions and how there are perceived in post-Revolution Georgia. It articulates the 
all-encompassing idea of the change, which should touch every sphere of social 
life. 
 
I am really excited for our Parliament. This is the first legislative organ, where 
an absolute record has been achieved – members of parliament have not beaten 
each other up. This is a real achievement of democracy. … This is a new type of 
politics (ibid).  
 
This passage also serves as a good example of an orientalization discourse 
being applied voluntarily by the countries concerned. Fist-fighting between the 
members of parliament is presented as something oriental and uncivilized, and 
the eradication of which was an example of Georgia on a civilizing mission.  
In 2005, the National Security Concept of Georgia was published. This is an 
important text to be examined as it outlines the narrative constructed by the 
political elite which came into power through the Rose Revolution. Further-
more, it helps to see how foreign policy discourse has evolved over time, and 
what the main nodal points around which it is articulated and (re)produced are. 
The comparative perspective within the narrative of one single country reveals 
not simply the domestic dimension, but the effects and the role the EU and 
NATO enlargement as well as foreign policy tools designed by these organiza-
tions, has on national identity discourses of so-called countries in-between. 
Those are the states which are in the common neighbourhood of Russia and the 
European Union.  
The 2005 National Security Concept devotes a whole separate subchapter to 
NATO and the European Union. It starts by emphasizing the point that Georgia 
has always been part of Europe, either historically, geographically or culturally.  
 
Georgia, as a Black Sea and South-Eastern European state, has historically been 
a geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. Therefore, integration into 
European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security systems is the firm 
84 
will of Georgian people. Georgia welcomes NATO and EU enlargement and 
believes that integration of the Black Sea states into NATO and the EU will 
significantly reinforce the security of the Black Sea region as the South-Eastern 
border of Europe. Integration to NATO and the EU represents a top priority of 
Georgian foreign and security policy (p. 7).  
 
There is an important point in this passage, which clearly illustrates the way 
discourse is constructed, and in post-positivist terms, how certain foreign policy 
moves are made possible through the language. Georgia, despite certain geo-
graphical controversies and vagueness, is articulated as a South-Eastern Euro-
pean state and this is given as historic truth, an uncontested fact, or in Fou-
cauldian terms – as the “regime of truth.”  
The 2005 document presents very good empirical examples of the arguments 
I made in the theoretical discussions of this thesis. To be more precise, foreign 
policy instruments designed in Brussels for addressing the challenges arising in 
the common neighbourhood, are differently interpreted by these countries them-
selves. Discourse analysis revealed that political elites in the states concerned 
adopt the reform agenda coming from the West, however, they are embedded 
and reproduced in self-colonizing and nesting orientalist discourse. The framing 
of the annual actual plans within the ENP in this strategy document represents a 
sound example of such an articulation.  
Georgia attributes great importance to the elaboration and successful imple-
mentation of the action plan within the ENP in order to exploit fully all oppor-
tunities offered by the EU. After achieving tangible progress in socio-economic, 
institutional, legal and political spheres, Georgia intends to develop a format 
ensuring a higher level of integration with the EU until full membership 
becomes possible. Legal and institutional reforms are underway in Georgia 
according to EU standards. … The assistance of the EU to Georgia through 
various projects under the Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program 
and EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) has been 
instrumental in fostering Georgia’s reforms in a variety of spheres (National 
Security Concepts, 2005, p. 8).  
As in this thesis I follow a poststructuralist understanding of identity and put 
forward the argument that the existence of a constitutive Other is vital for the 
Self, I needed to devote special attention to how the USSR/Russia was 
constructed as such the Other in these texts. The passage in the National Secu-
rity Concept which addresses the relationship with the Russian Federation 
illustrates this point.  
 
Georgia aspires to build cooperation with Russia upon the principles of good 
neighborly relations, equality, and mutual respect. Georgia would welcome the 
transition of Russia into a stable democratic state with a functioning market 
economy and respect for European values. Democratization and foreign policy 
predictability of the Russian Federation would positively influence Georgia’s 
and the regional security environment (ibid, p. 10).  
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The wording and the language in which the attitudes towards the state of demo-
cracy in Russia are framed represents the creation of the Orient on its borders. 
By constructing the northern neighbour as being less democratic and still in 
need of a stable, functioning market economy, Russia is articulated as the East 
with which issues regarding her foreign policy predictability would remain and 
thus, negatively affect the security environment in the South Caucasus. Further-
more, one could interpret this passage as representing what, in this thesis, I have 
described as nesting Orientalism, by projecting a certain hierarchy of transition, 
where Georgia is less democratic than the West, but is more advanced on the 
road of transition than Russia.  
Another important document, which was produced by the post-Rose Revo-
lution government and falls under the analysis of this thesis is the Foreign 
Policy Strategy of Georgia for 2006–2009, published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The document engages into what this research labels transformation 
discourse by articulating the events of autumn 2003 as the starting point, or the 
ground zero for new, modern and therefore European Georgia.  
 
After the Rose Revolution, Georgia embarked on a comprehensive reform pro-
cess aimed at establishing democratic governance and the rule of law, securing 
sustainable economic growth and restoring territorial integrity peacefully – in 
sum, turning Georgia into a European State with strong institutions, fully 
integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures (Foreign Policy Strategy 
2006 – 2009, 2005, p. 3).  
 
This narrative, which is present in this passage and runs as the background 
theme throughout the whole foreign policy discourse relies on the East/West 
dichotomy where the latter is attributed all the characteristics of a liberal-
democracy: rule of law and democratic governance, as well as economic 
sustainability or peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. Georgia is projected 
as something in-between, in the process of transition i.e. in the liminal stage 
with reforms meant to help and finish the process of becoming. The West, 
which includes both the European Union and NATO is constructed as a role 
model for voluntary transformation, for becoming “a stronger state that meets 
European standards” (ibid).  
In this time period, the 2008 August War between Georgia and the Russian 
Federation, which has dramatically changed the geopolitical picture in the 
region, occurred. An open military confrontation between the two countries, 
recognition of two breakaway territories as independent states by the Kremlin 
and subsequent establishment of a large military presence in these entities, 
postponed Georgia’s NATO membership perspective for an indefinite future. 
What should be noted, is that one could observe a certain chain of events 
unfolding on the world stage for a couple of months before the war, which 
could logically be linked to the escalation of the situation in the Caucasus. To 
be more exact, I have in mind the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the 
USA and most of the European states in opposition to Russia as well as the 
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refusal to grant NATO Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine in 
2008. In such circumstances, when Georgia’s future with the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions came under question, the dominant discourse on national identity 
faced the need to intensify the pro-European identity reproduction processes, or 
in discourse theory terms, expand the chains of equivalence and differences 
further into the field of discursivity and attempt to fix more signifiers.  
After the Russian-Georgian war, 25th of February, the day of the Soviet 
invasion of the Republic of Georgia in 1921, was officially declared as 
occupation day. Every year public lectures, discussions and other events were to 
be organized around this day. On the other hand, the 2008 war coupled with the 
world financial crisis, has caused serious social and economic problems for the 
country. As a result, the political elite’s discourse, along with its foreign policy, 
is dominated by socio-economic issues. Despite this, President Saakashvili’s 
2009 annual address to the parliament also contained elements of what I have 
labeled in this thesis as a transformation narrative. While speaking about the 
country’s foreign policy trajectories, Russia is articulated as a threat not to just 
the Georgian state or the region in general, but to the whole “civilized world.”  
The Kremlin is portrayed as a country which “threatens all the freedom-
loving nations in its neighbourhood” (Saakashvili, 2009). Georgia, along with 
Moldova, Ukraine, and the Eastern European countries is projected as the part 
of the civilized world, despite their differences, while Russia is the Other. “An 
enemy, which rules the country by dictatorship and is cooperating with the 
sources of international terrorism” (ibid). NATO and the European Union are 
presented as an alternative to the world “ruled by dictatorship.”  
How the transformative discourse constructs Georgia as on the way to 
becoming more “civilized” and thus more European and Western, is visible in 
president’s the address from the next year. That is, in 2010 while talking about 
the street manifestations organized by the opposition, and the fact that it did not 
turn into violent clashes, Saakashvili said the following:  
 
with this [meaning peaceful end of the protests] our people have demonstrated a 
whole new level of political culture, which was not common for the Caucasian 
political culture before. … Has not the time come, for our politics to be more 
civilized? … If we try, we can for sure turn our politics into civilized, European 
politics (Saakashvili, 2010).  
 
One could clearly observe self-colonial connotations and the role of the Euro-
pean identity as a reference point for something civilized, the normal way of 
doing politics in contrast to the “Caucasian political culture”. As a result of such 
discourse, foreign policy agenda is reproducing as the transformation, as change 
for becoming better, more civilized, which means more European. Our choice is 
to build a European, civilized, modernized, democratic Georgia. Our foreign 
policy course is the return to the European family… (ibid).  
In other words, European means civilized, democratic, modern, etc. while 
the Soviet past and Russia as the successor of it, is backward, barbaric and 
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Other to Georgia’s Self. In the same address, president Saakashvili referred to 
jokes which are common in Georgian society regarding the possibilities of 
cheap travel to Russia during the USSR and framed it in a modern and civilized 
West/uncivilized, barbaric East dichotomy. It was achieved by claiming that 
although there were cheap plane tickets to Russia during Soviet times, some 
cities had no proper water systems, or that only 30% of the population had 
access to natural gas at home. “It is much better, to pay the market price for the 
flight to Moscow and arrive there as free Europeans, than to fly cheaply, and be 
treated like vassals from the periphery…” (ibid).  
As was already mentioned, the discourse on transformation penetrates all 
fields of social life. In 2010, the Georgian government launched a program 
called “Teach & Learn with Georgia.” The project brings foreigners into the 
country to assist English language teachers in public schools. In his 2011 
address to the parliament, president Saakashvili touched upon this issue and 
framed it in the narrative of catching up with the West and leaving behind the 
Soviet legacy. He drew a parallel with the 19th-century intellectuals introducing 
European education to Georgia and argued that educational reforms are meant:  
 
to transform Georgia from a post-Soviet country into a European, democratic 
state; … modernization means the reforms carried out and to be carried out by 
the state, which leads to a more civilized, more progressive, more democratic 
country (Saakashvili, 2011).  
 
In a similar manner to education reforms, changes in the healthcare system are 
articulated in the same manner by being presented as modern and civilized 
which is equated with being European and Western at the same time.  
“In Georgia, modern, European healthcare is being built” (Saakashvili, 
2012), said the president in his annual address to the parliament in 2012.  
The Presidential address of this year contains one of the most prominent 
examples of the creation of its own East and constitution of the European Self 
through orientalizing Georgia’s neighbours.  
 
The Georgian nation’s historical choice is the West, but our region is the 
Caucasus, and therefore we should not forget Georgia’s long-term security 
without Caucasian security…. Georgia is the window to Europe for the 
Caucasian nations (ibid).  
 
In other words, the spectrum or pockets of Orient are present as the Self is 
constructed as less civilized than the West, but on the other hand more Western 
than its neighbours.  
The Office of the State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia, 
which was founded in 2004 and existed until being integrated into the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, held annual European Days. Events organized within the frame-
work included public lectures, meetings with school or university students, etc.  
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Below (Fig. 6) is a screenshot taken from the official Facebook page of the 
ministry. The picture “evolution” is described as the winner of the competition 
“My European Choice” in the Tbilisi Academy of Arts in 2014. A discursive 
reading of this image perfectly captures the self-colonization narrative vis-à-vis 
the West. After all, “images and visual artefacts tell us something about the 
world and, … about how we see the world” (Bleiker, 2018, p. 2). Images not 
only capture, but also communicate to others some key aspects of human 
existence. This specific image from May 2014 not only depicts the way one 
particular artist sees the European Union but is illustrative of the dominant 
narrative and how it penetrates all aspects of public life. The fact that this 
submission was the winner of the competition and not just one of the many, 
underlines that this is the ʻoffspringʼ of ʻthe regime of truthʼ constructed by the 
hegemonic discourse. It represents an example of popular international 
imaginaries which Salter (2002, p. 14) describes as the popular beliefs about 
the world outside the state. “The nature of that ʻoutsideʼ – the international 
society, and the place of the state in that society.” This depiction of the 
European Union as the last point of this “journey” of human evolution not only 
reproduces well established civilized/uncivilized, modern/barbaric etc. dichoto-
mies. It also engages with self-colonization i.e. voluntarily assigning second-
class status to oneself and articulation of integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions as the way to transform oneself, “correcting” the stigma of not being 
European, western, or civilized and making up for what had been lost as a result 
of the Soviet occupation. Postcolonial scholars argue that the concept of 
ʻcivilizationʼ has been used by dominant groups as a standard, “that determines 
the boundary of a particular, often European, community” (Salter, 2002, p. 18). 
This is precisely what this picture illustrates, and even more, as it is not so 
much the projection coming from the West, but rather voluntary internalization 





Figure 6. The winner of the competition “My European Way” from the official Face-
book page of the Office of the State Minister of Georgia and Euro-Atlantic Integration  
89 
Elaborating on this image, one could also draw parallels with discourses taking 
place in Central and Eastern Europe as the European Union enlarged to the 
East. In 2005 magazine “Veidas” in Lithuania was published with a title page “a 
long way to Europe”, depicting three types of a Lithuanian man: Homo Sovie-
ticus, Homo Lituanus and Homo Europaeus (Vonderau, 2007, p. 225). It is pre-
sented as an evolution, as stages of becoming. This image makes a clear distinc-
tion between “Homo Lituanus” and “Homo Europaeus.” The former is not 
portrayed simply as something positioned between the two but is depicted as 
backward. It is not only an Orientalist gaze coming from the West, but self-
Orientalization. “Homo Lituanus” in such a depiction is liminal, in the stage of 
transition, which is completed by joining the European Union. After approxi-
mately ten years, this dimension has shifted further to the east. Comparison of 
these two images represents a good example of the similarities between the 
Central and Eastern European states and the South Caucasus. It illustrates the 
fluidity and ambiguity of Europe’s eastern border.  
Those pictures of evolution directly echo president Margvelashvili’s 2014 
and 2015 state of the nation addresses to the parliament, as the overarching 
theme for both of the speeches was “from post-Soviet country – to European 
state” (Margvelashvili, 2014, 2015). He argued that the aim of the government 
was building a modern state with a human being at its centre. Modern European 
Georgia, in the centre of which stands a human as “the successor of great 
culture, modern Georgian, and therefore – European citizen” (Margvelashvili, 
2015).  
Very soon after the Association Agreement was signed, the Parliament of 
Georgia together with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
EU started a brief campaign called “Europe is progress! Georgia is Europe!” 
which included several video clips with Georgians from different sections of 
society, speaking about how the European standard requirements in the AA 
helps the transformation of the country for the better. For instance, one of the 
half minutes videos on education argues:  
 
Universities in Georgia were founded by European thinking scientists. The 
Association Agreement gives us the opportunity to get even closer to European 
standards of higher education and go back to the European educational space 
(“Education”, 2015). 
 
In other words, what can we read from this passage are two basic themes: 
firstly, it is about change and transformation. The need to adopt European 
standards, as “Europe is progress.” And second, it also has the aspect of going 
back, returning back home, not just progressing. If “Georgia is Europe” that 
means that catching up to European standards is not simply a matter of im-
provement, but most of all, it is about coming back to its true Self, making up 
for what had been lost during the Soviet occupation. A similar logic is deve-
loped in other videos, which concern environmental protection, agriculture, etc.  
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In his first address to the parliament as the president of Georgia, Giorgi 
Margvelashvili declared that one of the challenges facing Georgian society was 
the transfer of European value systems to the contemporary Georgian state.  
 
A Georgian by his/her individual consciousness is European, is an organic part 
of western civilization by his/her nature. But, unfortunately, up to this day, we 
have not been given the opportunity to create a Georgian state based on this 
individuality and of transferring Georgian traditions to the state context and state 
institutions (Margvelashvili, 2014).  
 
This is a clear example of how the articulation of transformation as the nodal 
point takes shape. Georgian state institutions are represented as not civilized 
and evolved enough yet. They are in need of transfer from Georgian traditions 
i.e. individual consciousness of being European.  
 
 
4.3 The Bridge Between Europe and Asia 
Geographically, the South Caucasus is located at the crossroads between 
Europe and Asia. Some geographical texts place Georgia in Europe and draw 
the border between the two continents along the border of Armenia and Iran. 
According to another version, the dividing line between the two runs some-
where in the middle of Georgia, splitting the country in two. While the most 
widely established approach, follows the Ural mountain range and, continues 
down to the Caucasus, leaving most of the South Caucasus in Asia. As of 
writing this thesis, the United Nations puts Georgia in Western Asia despite 
being a member of the Council of Europe. Although geographically the 
country’s positioning is vague and ambiguous, culturally there is less doubt on 
whether Georgia belongs to Europe or Asia.  
 
Georgian culture has its geographic roots in Asia, yet it has never been Asian/ 
Eastern as such. The greatest achievements in Georgian culture – and this 
concerns solely oral and written literature – are all built upon European values 
(Kiknadze, 2015, p. 78).  
 
Georgia is one of the oldest Christian countries in the world, with independent 
Christian kingdoms existing on its territory for almost two millennia. According 
to Gigineishvili (2015, p. 100), Georgians viewed the Christian world, with the 
centre in Constantinople as the most progressive and civilized. All the major 
cultural and intellectual events in Georgia took place “against the background 
and in light of the processes in the Christian world” (ibid).  
This very brief summary provides the context which illustrates that this in-
betweenness goes beyond and is not limited to the positioning between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation. It is part of the larger civilizational 
narrative and along with discourse on transformation, this image of being 
located at the crossroad makes certain (especially economic) policies possible. 
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In other words, placing oneself in Asia and in Europe simultaneously, allows 
the discourse to accommodate large infrastructural projects aimed at connecting 
the two continents and big economic benefits coming with them. As my thesis 
follows a poststructuralist research design, it sets as its goal to examine how 
certain policy moves are made possible through discourse constructed around 
this nodal point – the bridge between Europe and Asia.  
By the 1990s the foundation had already been laid for projects transporting 
Caspian oil to Turkey through Georgia. Despite the geographical location of 
Armenia offering a shorter route, political disagreements and military conflict 
with Armenia’s neighbours excluded that option. The Baku-Supsa pipeline, 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, etc. were the outcome of cooperation between 
the political elites of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. What is important about 
this for my research, is to explore the national identity discourse and foreign 
policy interconnection in relation to this nodal point.  
“Georgia and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future of Georgia” 
opens by describing Georgia as a country that has “productive land and a 
strategic location astride the crossroads between Europe and Asia (2000, p. 2). 
The strategy document, while focusing on the identity of in-betweenness 
constructs the following narrative:  
 
…geographic location provides numerous sources of opportunities. Lying astride 
the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and between the Christian and Moslem 
worlds, Georgia has always served as a vital link-physically, economically, and 
intellectually-between East and West. With global trade blossoming and new 
markets and resources opening in Central Asia, Georgia can become a key factor 
in the growing exchange of goods, people, and information between East and 
West and North and South (ibid, p. 3). 
 
An emphasis on being the connection point of Asia and Europe is especially 
important for this narrative, as it adds a political dimension to the discursive 
frame.  
 
As part of South Caucasus and the bridge connecting East and West, Georgia 
pays a great deal of attention to the development of close relations with the 
Central Asian states. The main goal of co-operation with the countries of Asia 
and the Pacific Rim is to promote and provide the free flow and exchange of 
goods, labor force and information between East and West by means of the 
Trans-Atlantic Corridor (ibid, p. 12).  
 
As an example of these grand projects, which are framed in such discourse, one 
could look at the new silk road. The idea, which has been circulating in 
Georgian discourse for many years now and has its roots in the history of the 
South Caucasus being located on the route of the historic silk road from Europe 
to China. Internalizing these discourses has become constitutive of the Self. 
This image is strongly imbedded in national identity discourse and is strongly 
present despite the increased engagement of the European Union with the 
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region and the signature of Association Agreement or DCFTA. Examining the 
presence of this nodal point in post-Rose Revolution Georgia reveals how this 
takes shape.  
To be more precise, the Rose Revolution and the subsequent wave of drastic 
reforms aimed at building a modern and effective state was accompanied by the 
euphoria of Europeanisation. Furthermore, within the same time period, the 
European Union enlarged and entered the post-Soviet space; launched the 
Neighborhood Policy and other initiatives to engage with the countries in the 
immediate neighbourhood. Although this was the case, a discourse analysis of 
texts produced in post-Rose Revolution Georgia reveals that the perception of 
the European Union is strongly interlinked with the image of the bridge 
between the civilizations, and a projection of itself as the most Eastern outpost 
the Western world. “In this new formation, Georgia is not just a corridor, or 
only a transit country. Much higher is its prospective role as an economic and 
financial center connecting the West and East, North and South” (Saakashvili, 
2007) claimed the president in his annual address to the parliament. Or, as was 
articulated in his 2008 address: “secure borders should serve as bridges, not 
barriers. Bridges to the north, the south, the east, and west” (Saakashvili, 2008).  
Examining this particular line of narrative in other texts, with the help of 
intertextual and interdiscursive readings, it is possible to see a broader picture 
of how it complements the “regime of truth.” To be more precise, the Foreign 
Policy Strategy published for the years 2006–2009 by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, frames the geographical location of in-betweenness in the Euro-Atlantic 
foreign policy discourse in the following manner: “The Diplomatic Service will 
work to stimulate Euro-Atlantic interest and involvement in developing 
alternative energy projects and new routes for energy transportation” (Foreign 
Policy Strategy 2006 – 2009, 2005, p. 15). 
This passage is important, as it outlines the specific way the discourse under 
examination frames the geographical location of in-betweenness as the 
justification for NATO and European Union membership. In other words, by 
arguing that Georgia has a strategic location at the meeting point between Asia 
and Europe, the political elite reinforces its argument for the need for its 
security to be provided by the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
 
 
 4.4 Civilizational Discourse  
The Discourse analysis of empirical data revealed a third dimension, which this 
liberal discourse on national identity articulates. I have labeled the following as 
civilizational discourse and I will argue that it is very different from the other 
two I have discussed so far. While the articulation outlined in the first sub-
chapter was about transformation and normalcy i.e. becoming European and the 
second subchapter demonstrated how the in-betweenness constitutes large 
infrastructural projects, this subchapter focuses on how Georgia’s Self as 
93 
belonging to the European civilization is constructed. This narrative is not about 
transformation and “correction” vis-à-vis the west, but about being the west.  
One of the key contributions I aim to accomplish with my thesis is to 
examine how the chain of equivalence constructing Georgian national identity 
expands into the field of discursivity, and subsequently produces foreign policy. 
The discourse analysis conducted in this thesis reveals that Orthodox Chris-
tianity is what discourse theory refers to as an empty signifier and competing 
discourses on national identity struggle to invest meaning in it and construct 
discourse around it. This articulation is precisely what I call the civilizational 
narrative and argue that it represents one of the cornerstones of a pro-Western 
foreign policy narrative. Orthodox Christianity is interpreted by the political 
elite in Georgia as proof of the country’s belonging to European civilization. If 
we regard orthodox Christianity as an empty signifier, it implies that there is a 
competition over attributing meaning to it. Furthermore, as this particular 
branch of Christianity is in many aspects different from Catholicism and 
Protestantism which are so widely spread across Europe, it provides a founda-
tion for anti-western discourse. The latter is one instance of what I call populist 
and examine in the second empirical chapter of this thesis. In this chapter, on 
the other hand, I examine how the dominant discourse is structured around the 
empty signifier of orthodox Christianity. 
“Georgia and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future for Georgia” 
(2000, p. 2) devotes a rather large part to the discussion of the importance of 
Christianity for its identity and positioning on the East/West nexus.  
 
The adoption of Christianity as a state religion at the beginning of the 4th 
century A.D. accelerated the cultural development of Georgia, and strengthened 
its affiliation with the Western, Christian world. 
 
The strategy document engages in a discussion of the country’s history and its 
relationship with the Christian world.  
 
Political vicissitudes that started in Georgia in the 13th century brought frequent 
challenges from outside aggressors. These hindered the economic and cultural 
development of Georgia, and eventually, the nation faced the threat of dis-
appearance. Georgian monarchs sought help from Western European countries 
and the Pope, but they were unable to assist … Georgia sought to re-establish 
social, economic, and political links with the Christian world. As part of this 
effort, Georgia eventually established close relations with Russia (ibid, p. 3).  
 
In other words, orthodox Christian Russia was seen historically, as the best 
alternative to the surrounding Muslim realms. But the partnership did not live 
up to expectations, as he Georgian Kingdoms were soon annexed by the 
Russian empire, and later on, by the USSR. Therefore, contemporary Georgian 
identity discourse translated into foreign policy trajectories engages with the 
othering of Russia due to these historical experiences and constructs a chain of 
equivalence about what it means to be Georgian and European in opposition to 
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Russian/Soviet experience. The whole narrative of orthodox brother Russians, 
protecting Georgia from Muslim invaders, predominant in the 19th and 20th 
century, was to be updated and substituted with the former taking the place of 
the constitutive Other.  
The way the narrative is built, offers a good example of how a very specific 
foreign policy or security agenda is embedded and legitimized through the 
civilizational discourse. It is constructed as a given fact, as something natural, a 
“regime of truth,” thinking outside of which, is irrational, treason, etc.  
 
The highest priority of Georgian foreign policy is to achieve full integration into 
European political, economic, and security structures, thus fulfilling the histo-
rical aspiration of the Georgian nation to participate fully in the European 
community (ibid, p. 6).  
 
In 2002, under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, the constitutional 
agreement between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the state was signed. 
The document, which is still valid, regulates the relationship between the two, 
issues of funding, property, etc. However, the content of the document is not as 
important for my research as the discourse in which the agreement is embedded. 
To put it differently, even though this agreement deals with a particular problem 
i.e. the relationship between the two institutions, a discourse analysis of the 
document reveals how it is articulated as part of the greater civilizational 
discourse, of the idea of “returning back home.”  
“Georgia has restored its historical place in the civilized world as a demo-
cratic and independent state” (“Constitutional Agreement…,” 2002), claims the 
opening passage of the document.  
A closer reading of the text reveals it as a good case of the chain of 
equivalence constructed around orthodox Christianity as a nodal point. “Ortho-
dox Christianity, one of Europe’s traditional faiths, historically was the state 
religion in Georgia, which formed Georgia’s centuries-old culture, national 
worldview and values” (ibid).  
From this perspective, orthodox Christianity is constructed as something 
which naturally belongs to the European civilization, it is one of the “traditional 
faiths” of Europe and therefore, Georgia as a historically orthodox Christian 
country qualifies as belonging to this world.  
Examining the empirical data revealed an interesting trend of how the dis-
course is evolving over time and how the intensity and extent of the discourse 
responds to domestic political developments.  
A genealogical analysis of the civilizational discourse during Saakashvili’s 
presidency, shows the emergence, development, and intensity of othering 
Russia over time. To put it differently, despite Saakashvili being notorious for 
his radically hard line on Russia, this narrative had been slowly emerging and 
developing during his two terms as the head of the state. For instance, his very 
first official visit after being elected in 2004, was to Moscow. While in his 
annual address to the parliament from the same year, he declared:  
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For us our relationship with Russia is very important is and vital, what we have 
achieved is that we should not pose the questions: either America or Russia, 
either Europe or America. We want everything that is good for us. We want 
America, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East, if it serves Georgian interests. … 
Artificially annoying Russia was the previous government’s approach to 
compensate for internal weaknesses through aggressive rhetoric towards Russia. 
It ended very badly for us, and for our relations with Russia (Saakashvili, 2004).  
 
However, in contrast to such statements, from the very beginning of his presi-
dency, he made it quite clear the future for the country that he envisioned. His 
inaugural ceremony with lots of symbolism and references to the European 
Union hinted at the direction, which official identity/foreign policy narratives 
would take under his rule. In the speech delivered during the ceremony, he 
claimed that 
 
We are not only old Europeans, but we are also the very first Europeans, and 
therefore Georgia holds a special place in European civilization. … Georgia will 
be a stable ally for all friendly states. Georgia should be formed as a state 
assuming international responsibility, as a dignified member of the international 
community, as a state, which regardless of the highly complicated geopolitical 
situation and location, has equally benign relations with all its neighbours, and at 
the same time does not forget to take its own place in the European family, in 
European civilization, the place which was lost several centuries ago. As an 
ancient Christian state, we should take this place again (Saakashvili, 2004d).  
 
This way of constructing civilizational discourse gains its momentum in the 
early years after the-Rose Revolution as the political elite launched extensive 
state modernization reforms and “returning back home” or “back to Europe,” 
were serving as the cornerstones for the discursive framework to make such 
social transformations possible. Even though this might sound similar to the 
transformation narrative introduced in the first subchapter, there is one key 
characteristic which makes these two different and hence, the subject of 
separate analyses. While the discourse on transformation focuses on the idea of 
“becoming,” of “colonizing oneself” vis-à-vis the superior West, the latter, 
examined in this subchapter, develops around the idea that Georgia is part of 
European civilization and it is all about “returning back home.” However, these 
two are not heterogeneous, separate and isolated narratives, but are comple-
menting and overlapping with each other.  
As I have already mentioned, the 2004 inauguration ceremony was loaded 
with symbols. In addition to the Georgian flag, in front of the parliament 
building, president Saakashvili raised the flag of the European Union as well as 
playing the Ode to Joy.  
 
Today, we have not raised the European flag by accident – this flag is a Georgian 
flag as well, as far as it embodies our civilization, our culture, the essence of our 
history and perspective, and the vision of our future (ibid) claimed the president.  
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Such a narrative of “returning back to Europe,” implies that there is someone or 
some historical event, injustice, etc. responsible for cutting off the historic 
roots. In the case of Georgian official discourse, this role is attributed to the 
Russian empire, the USSR and to the Russian Federation as a successor of the 
two. In his 2005 address to the parliament, such a portrayal and Russia and 
Georgia’s juxtaposition on the broader West/East nexus is evident.  
 
We do not deserve interest from others just because the Georgian leader demo-
lished something somewhere [hinting at president Shevardnadze who was 
serving as a foreign minister of the USSR during the fall of the Berlin Wall] … 
not because we are in the corridor, … – no, we are an interesting country. … We 
have to agree on principle. This is Georgia’s European orientation; no foreign 
military bases should be stationed in Georgia. Any other party which will declare 
that Georgia should not have European orientation, that foreign bases should be 
in our country and that foreigners should be involved illegally in our country’s 
matters, should be outlawed. In Lithuania, all the parties, which were arguing 
with each other before, united and won elections. … since the independence of 
Lithuania was more important to them. … For the sake of independence, we 
should learn how to work like that. (Saakashvili, 2005).  
 
An interesting aspect in this passage is that the declaration that no foreign 
troops would be stationed in Georgia and that Georgia’s foreign policy goals 
should be integration in the European Union and NATO might seem contra-
dictory. But if we examine it as a transition, as the process of becoming of the 
liminal subject, this ambiguity becomes clearer. The term “foreign” is directed 
against Russian military bases stationed in Georgia at time, and they are projected 
as leftovers from the Soviet occupation, which was imposed by force on Georgia. 
Now, as Georgia is embarking on the “journey of becoming” and “returning back 
home,” soldiers of NATO member states are not “foreign troops” and therefore, 
do not fall under this limitation. This is precisely an example of how foreign 
policy discourse reproduces the Foucauldian “regime of truth” i.e. it naturalizes or 
makes it look like something natural and given, the country’s belongingness to a 
certain civilization. Furthermore, it serves the purpose of legitimizing and 
justifying concrete foreign policy agenda, while making the thinking outside of it 
irrational and illogical. An instance of such reproduction can be found in the 
introduction of the National Security Concept (2005, p. 1)  
 
Georgia, as an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural 
area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and 
traditions, aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe’s political, 
economic and security systems. Georgia aspires to return to its European tradi-
tion and remain an integral part of Europe. 
  
Values and objectives shared by the EU are common to Georgia, which con-
siders EU membership an important guarantee for its economic and political 
development. Georgia’s accession to the EU will strengthen Europe by restoring 
the Black Sea region as a European trade and stability zone (ibid, p. 8).  
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From the perspective of poststructuralist discourse analysis, texts which fall 
under the empirics are not understood in a literal sense. Symbols, monuments, 
events, and institutions fall within the larger definition of material to be studied. 
Hence, it is important to go beyond the speeches of the president and look at 
some major developments, which were meant to strengthen and further repro-
duce the dominant discourse. I am arguing in this study that in the time period 
of 2003–2008, with the aggressive push for drastic reforms, the need for the 
constitutive Other became even more acute. The political elite engaged in the 
process of creating new myths and national heroes, as well as in going back to 
history, especially to the First Republic of 1918–1921 and constructing the 
continuity with the contemporary Georgian state. Within this context should be 
placed the return from France to Georgia in 2005 of the remains of Kakutsa 
Cholokashvili. He was a military officer during the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia and in charge of organizing guerrilla warfare against the Reds after the 
Soviet invasion, before fleeing to France. His reburial ceremony in Tbilisi was 
attended by hundreds of people, including representatives of the political elite. 
Furthermore, a new banknote of 200 Georgian Lari, depicting Cholokashvili, 
was designed. These developments should not be perceived as a simple act of 
returning home the body of a hero but should be examined from the perspective 
of making up for what has been lost due to the Soviet Occupation and should be 
viewed as (re)discovering new national heroes and allegiance to them. This was 
an instance of reproducing the image of continuity with the past, which is vital 
for every national identity. Furthermore, it was not just one isolated case, in 
2006, discussions started about partial rehabilitation and return of the body of 
president Gamsakhurdia. He served briefly as the first president of the second 
republic between 1991–1992, before being brought down by a military coup 
and forced into an exile. He tried to return and win his post back, but was 
unsuccessful and had to flee again, resulting in his death in mysterious 
circumstances in 1993. In 2007, the body of the first president was removed 
from Chechnya, where it was originally buried and reburied in the pantheon in 
Tbilisi. This event was an important part of the discourse on othering the Soviet 
past, as Gamsakhurdia was the leader of the country which declared the 
restoration of independence from the USSR. 
Furthermore, under Saakashvili’s presidency, in order to increase the aware-
ness of and support for NATO and EU membership among the population, the 
Information Center on NATO and the EU was founded. “More NATO in 
Georgia and more Georgia in NATO,” “more Europe in Georgia and more 
Georgia in Europe,” as well as “may NATO be here” mottos were coined and 
widely promoted. In 2004, the Georgian parliament adopted a bill on broad-
casting which took the promotion of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy to a whole 
new level. It required Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) to devote certain 
airtime to the popularization of integration into NATO and the European Union. 
In 2006, the state commission on integration in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization approved the “Public Information Strategy on Georgia’s inte-
gration into NATO.” According to the Office of the State Minister of Georgia 
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on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, the goal of the strategy was to assist 
the country’s path to join the organization through informing the public about 
the institution, its structures, objectives, etc. Public mobilization is named by 
the office as the key to supporting Euro-Atlantic foreign policy.  
The civilizational discourse in many ways differs from the transformation 
narrative I have analyzed in the first subchapter of this chapter. It does not 
appeal to the idea of Georgia’s membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
through self-colonization or normalcy, but presents it as an uncontested fact, 
historical justice, which should be restored. For instance, in his parliamentary 
address in 2007, President Mikhail Saakashvili spoke of his country as “the 
homeland of the oldest Europeans, which strives to become a full member of 
the European family” (Saakashvili, 2007). However, for such a narrative to 
develop, it is important to give it a certain meaning, to interpret the Soviet past 
in a certain way. In this case it implies engagement with othering the USSR as a 
stranger to European civilization and therefore to the Georgian Self and 
establish continuity with the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
other words, “inventing traditions” which would make up for the “lost years” 
and re-establish Georgia’s place in Europe. As Saakashvili (ibid) put it “Europe 
comes to Georgia again, and Georgia becomes familiar with Europe all over 
again.”  
An emphasis on restoration is vital for such a narrative as it contributes to 
the legitimization of a mutually reproducing relationship between identity and 
foreign policy. It is not about simply becoming familiar but becoming familiar 
“all over again.” What is more important from this line of articulation is that the 
discourse establishes connection with and to a certain degree refers to what I 
have described in this thesis as self-colonization and stigmatization. Arguments 
developed by these theoretical approaches suggest that societies engaged in 
such tactics are going back into the past and trying to look for historical 
evidence in order to find justification for their Europeanness.  
The year 2007 was politically rather challenging and difficult for Saakash-
vili’s administration. Weeks of peaceful demonstrations organized by the 
opposition ended in the clashes with the police forces. One of the biggest TV 
channels, Imedi TV, was raided by law enforcement and shut down. On 8th of 
November, the president declared a 15-day state of emergency prohibiting all 
the private TV/Radio stations apart from the public broadcaster from 
transmitting the news. In order to resolve the political crisis, president 
Saakashvili resigned and declared snap elections to be held in January 2008. 
Despite the elections generally being regarded as competitive, the OSCE 
Observation Mission in their report outlined certain problems connected with 
vote counting and usage of administrative resources by the ruling party 
(“Georgia. Extraordinary Presidential…”, 2008). Hence, the 54% of votes 
gained by the incumbent president gave a reason for the opposition to doubt 
whether his victory in the first round was legitimate. Texts from this time-
period have illustrated the intensification of the civilizational narrative and I 
argue that this interplay between identity/foreign policy also serves domestic 
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purposes and legitimizes certain governmental actions. It happens through 
presenting all the major rivals as working for the Kremlin i.e. for the Other 
while projecting itself as the sole defender and guarantor of pro-Western 
foreign policy i.e. Georgia’s “true” identity. In his inaugural speech, in 2008, 
for instance, president Saakashvili claimed that “Georgia is forever yoked to 
Europe” joined by a common and unbreakable bond, which was based on 
culture, “shared history and identity and a common set of values” (Saakashvili, 
2008). 
From a poststructuralist understanding, national identity should be viewed as 
the “regime of truth” manufactured and achieved through the manipulation of 
discourses by the elite. This is the context from which the fact that 2008’s snap 
presidential elections were accompanied by a referendum, should be analyzed. 
Along with voting for the president, voters were asked whether they supported 
NATO membership or not. About 77 percent of voters responded positively to 
this question, which became one of the cornerstones in the legitimization of 
foreign policy. Both pro-European and anti-Western texts on foreign policy 
produced after 2008 intensively refer to the referendum, either for the legiti-
mation of their claims or to call for a new referendum, arguing that situation has 
changed. Already in his 2008 inaugural speech president Saakashvili described 
the results of the referendum as people of Georgia demonstrating  
 
their clear and unequivocal sentiments about Georgia’s Euro Atlantic destiny.… 
We have made these contributions and sacrifices not for short term benefit, but 
rather, because we share the same values – values that we treasure and that we 
must help defend. I have heard the voice of the Georgian people when they 
expressed their overwhelming desire to enter NATO and so too has the com-
munity of shared values that makes up this great organization (Saakasvhili, 
2008). 
 
A discourse analysis of the Foreign Policy strategy adopted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for the years 2006–2009 offers a better illustration on how the 
enlargement of Euro Atlantic institutions to the East and deeper engagement 
with the region facilitates the identity discourse/security relationship with the 
emphasis on “returning back home”.  
 
As a result of recent EU enlargement, European stability and security have 
become directly linked to those of the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus, 
which is duly reflected in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Strategy 
Paper (Foreign Policy Strategy 2006 – 2009, 2005, p. 19) states the document.  
 
The civilizational discourse of Georgia being articulated disseminates and 
penetrates spheres of everyday life, seemingly unrelated to national identity or 
politics. For instance, during the presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili, as the 
motto for the touristic promotion of the country, “Georgia – Europe Started 
Here” (Ó Beacháin and Coene, 2014, p. 923) was adopted. Interestingly, this 
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motto did not last long, and very soon it was replaced with “where east meets 
west.”  
In 2014, Georgia, followed by Moldova, signed the Association Agreement 
(AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the 
European Union, which became a milestone for Georgia’s national identity 
discourse. It was celebrated as an important achievement, as the confirmation of 
belonging to the west by the West itself. Although the signing of any of these 
documents does not in any way guarantee or open up membership prospects, 
the Georgian political elite’s celebration of the event left the opposite 
impression. Soon after the AA was signed, a long-awaited agreement on visa-
free travel between Georgia and Schengen countries was reached. I examine 
these documents in my research, not in terms of the content and agenda, but I 
focus instead on the processes of how discursive articulations give meaning to 
these events through the chains of signifiers. Below are two more empirical 
examples which help to illustrate the arguments made in this study. Figure 7 is a 
photo of the passport control counter from Tbilisi International Airport. This 
image, which was widely circulated in social media, reveals the difference or 
mismatch of expectations between the elites in Brussels and Tbilisi. While for 
the European Union it is just another policy tool of engagement with its 
neighbours, the Georgian dominant discourse treats this event as the validation 





Figure 7. Passport Control Desk in Tbilisi International Airport 
 
 
In 2015 as the visa-free agreement with Georgia was approved by the European 
Union, the government of Georgia aired a video which depicted the town halls 
and various attractions all around the country illuminated with the colours of the 
EU flag, while the Ode to Joy played in the background. Prime minister at the 
time, Irakli Garibashvili, addressed the nation with the following words:  
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On the road to European Integration Georgia made a step which largely deter-
mines our future in the European family … The European Union, in fact, recog-
nized our steady loyalty to European values … Today, we have made it true, the 
dream of the current and many generations. … Europe is not just a rational 
choice; it is our historic home. This word – Europe – encompasses everything 
our people aspire to. This is the freedom of each citizen, rule of law, welfare, this 
is a strong economy and equality among human beings (Gharibashvili, 2015).  
 
This short passage reveals how new elements (AA, DCFTA and visa-free 
travel) are given meaning through the expansion of the chain of signifiers. The 
nodal point of European civilization as the historic home of Georgia explains 
how it is possible that there is such a mismatch between what these events mean 
for the two sides. Poststructuralist discourse analysis reveals the mechanisms, 
practices and linguistic games making the Association Agreement or DCFTA 
more than just mere tools of engagement with the EU’s eastern neighbours.  
The three dimensions of articulation which have been analyzed so far can be 
regarded as general, overarching narratives which guide certain genealogical 
readings of particular foreign policy moves and texts. In the following 
subchapters, I will focus on three policy areas and analyze them through this 
specific discursive constitution of identity. I will illustrate how certain policies 
and practices are made possible through the specific articulation of identity. 
These areas are participations in international military missions led by NATO; 
relationships with other former Soviet states; and addressing the legacy of 
communism. To explain each of the spheres further, by participation in 
international military missions, I am examining discourse in which financial, 
and first of all, cost in human lives such contributions is embedded and 
justified. The empirical analysis revealed that it refers not only to rational 
calculations and arguments, that such participation provides training for the 
Georgian army, closer cooperation, and partnership with NATO or the US, etc. 
and as a result provides security protection for Georgia itself. But also, such 
moves are made possible through constructing the discourse on a national 
identity belonging to the Western world, to the “civilized” world vis-à-vis the 
“uncivilized” East, where the missions are taking place. I expand this in more 
detail in subchapter 4.4, while in the next empirical chapter I examine what is 
an alternative articulation of this issue and how it is juxtaposed to the former. 
Regarding the second field i.e. relations with other former Soviet states, this is 
an important dimension to be examined, as it represents examples of how the 
reproduction of its own East takes place on the practical and popular level. By 
constructing and framing neighbours and other CIS countries as less European, 
less modern and developed, and less civilized, Georgia reinforces its own 
Western identity. This nesting orientalism gives a push to a very particular way 
of dealing with recent history. Finally, re-evaluation and reinterpretation of the 
Communist past and the Soviet legacy represents the temporal instance of 
stigma correction and normalcy. This discursive construction alienates and 
others the Communist rule and constructs it as the constitutive other. In the 
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second empirical chapter, I examine populist interpretations of the Soviet 
legacy and the difference between these interpretations. More specifically, how 
the different and competing conceptions of national identity define and give 
meaning to historical events.  
To briefly summarize, I have identified three basic narratives liberal dis-
course articulates around liminal positioning: transformation, the bridge 
between Asia and Europe and civilizational belonging. The first puts emphasis 
on Georgia’s backwardness and the need to “catch up” with the West through 
rapid and extensive reforms. In such articulations, agreements and treaties with 
the European Union are seen not only as tools to access the European market 
but also as guidelines on how to transform the Self. The discourse on the bridge 
between two continents reinforces Georgia’s Europeaness with the construction 
of the Self as the most eastern outpost of Europe. However, such positioning 
also serves the purpose of attracting large infrastructural projects such as a 
transportation corridor and the delivery of goods from Asia to Europe. The final 
one emphasizes belonging to European civilization despite the vague future of 
EU membership. In this mismatch of expectations between the policymakers in 
Brussels and Tbilisi, the Association Agreement or DCFTA are articulated 
differently. For the former they are just practical tools for modernization and 
democratization of the immediate neighborhood, while for the latter they serve 
as proof of belonging to Europe. In search of justification, the dominant 
discourse exaggerates these agreements to the point of displaying the poster 
which says “EU Associated State” to greet foreigners in the airport.  
In the following subchapters I will describe concrete policy moves which are 
constituted by the national identity narratives outlined above. More specifically, 
what are the implications and how are contributions to military missions or 
decommunization legislation made possible through foreign policy/national 
identity discourse.  
 
 
4.5 Contributions to International Military Missions  
Contributions to, and participation in international military missions led by 
NATO have been on the agenda of the political elite since the mid-1990s. These 
had several purposes: firstly, they were aimed at modernization and improve-
ment of the quality of the Georgian armed forces; secondly, they helped to 
increase cooperation with the West; and finally, contribution to the missions 
strengthened arguments for the country’s NATO membership. By sending 1500 
soldiers to Afghanistan, Georgia has been the largest net contributor to the 
ISAF mission. Furthermore, officially Tbilisi sent one of the largest contingents 
to Iraq and has also been contributing to the European Union’s civil military 
missions on the African continent (Kakachia et al, 2019, p. 6).  
In this discourse, NATO is perceived as not just a security alliance, but the 
guarantor of the Western civilization (O’Hagan, 2007, p. 24). Reference to the 
Western civilization does not only invoke certain ʻset of images,ʼ i.e. liberal 
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democracy, welfare etc. but it “also provides us with a way of drawing boun-
daries, establishing differences, and demarcating political and social spaces” 
(Herborth and Hellmann, 2017, p. 3). In a similar manner Mälksoo (2010, pp. 
123–124) argues that the division between so-called new and old Europe over 
the war in Iraq is a case of ritual role reversal allowing liminal actorsʼ self-
empowerment vis-à-vis the traditional Western European ʻcore.ʼ Their new self-
representation becomes that of teachers, of reminders to the members of NATO 
and the EU of their special duty and responsibilities, rather than that of novices.  
Weber (2017, p. 182) draws parallels with the construction of the West 
during the “Cold War” period. Referring to ʻthe Westʼ “as the common ground 
for political action” facilitated the integration of different actors in Western 
Europe and North America despite their differences. The chain of equivalence 
linking democracy, freedom, human rights, etc. was constructed around the 
“Western civilization” and juxtaposed to the “threat” coming from “the East.”  
 
Such chains of equivalence derived their strength and plausibility through the 
construction of the Soviet Union and its allies as standing for the exact oppo- 
site – totalitarianism instead of democracy, repression instead of freedom, and so 
on. In this sense, securitization of the Soviet Union after World War II and the 
ensuing relations of enmity were constitutive for the formation of ʻthe Westʼ as a 
political project (ibid).  
 
An important element is that this construction does not necessarily have to be 
antagonistic and threatening. For instance, Georgia’s articulation in opposition 
to its neighbours (Armenia and Azerbaijan) is not antagonistic per se, but the 
differences are enough for a boundary to be drawn.  
In this context, the starting point or in poststructuralist terms, the striking 
event7 for the discourse is the “Georgia Train and Equip Program” launched by 
the US in 2002. As the Second Chechen War consumed the North Caucasus, 
neighbouring Georgia’s mountainous territories were vulnerable to being used 
as shelter by the Chechen rebels and terrorist groups. The situation reached the 
stage where reports appeared of Russian military bombing Georgian territories 
(“Russia Denies Georgia Attack Report”, 2002). Officially, Tbilisi faced a 
difficult choice, to either allow the Russian army to conduct military operations 
freely in Georgia or to seek help from other countries. A headline from The 
Guardian from September 2002 claimed, “Putin threatens to invade Georgia” 
(Traynor, 2002). As the article continues, president Shevardnadze was given a 
one-month ultimatum by Putin, to deal with the Chechen rebels, and if he failed 
to do so, Moscow would have moved on with the operation. That is when the 
Americans appeared on the horizon to rescue (him/Georgia). The Georgia Train 
and Equip Program (GTEP) which lasted for 18 months, had a budget of 64 
million US dollars and was aimed at training and equipping the Georgian armed 
                                                 
7  The moment which has striking character and is the subject of intense political concern 
(Hansen, 2006, p. 69)  
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forces, to the extent that they would have been able to handle the regions 
bordering Chechnya without Russian intervention. In the long run, though, this 
program laid the foundation for increased cooperation between the US and 
Georgian armed forces and gave a push to further inclusion of Georgia in 
missions to Iraq or Afghanistan.  
Modernization and building a strong state, which was the key narrative of 
the post-Rose Revolution government, naturally, incorporated reforms in the 
army in this broader theme and furthermore, translated it into national identity/ 
foreign policy discourse. This was already obvious in president Saakashvili’s 
presidential address to the parliament in 2005 when he claimed the following:  
 
This is very important for bringing together the nation and for national pride … 
Nobody should ask the question of why we are there [meaning international 
military missions]. Georgia should be part of these processes since our country 
has to restore its territorial integrity with peaceful means. … We are a country 
which, as never before, needs international support and respect, to carry out 
peaceful processes (Saakashvili, 2005).  
 
Here, it is constructed as having a twofold benefit. In addition to the moderni-
zation and training of the armed forces, it is projected as having the aim of rein-
forcing Georgia’s European national identity. For instance, the security strategy 
published in 2005, very clearly states that the participation in, and contribution 
to international peace support missions as well as “the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and the ongoing Strategic Defence Review are 
fundamental for the implementation and sustainability of these reforms” 
(National Security Concept, 2005, p. 6). 
To translate it into the context of national identity discourse introduced in 
the first part of this chapter, the on-going process of NATO integration is 
important not only as a practical and rational defence move against the military 
threat coming from Russia, but also it serves the purpose of legitimation and 
justification for reforms, implementation of which might be politically painful 
and costly for the ruling elites. Contribution to international peace-keeping 
missions is important in the East/West discourse, as it aligns Georgia with the 
“civilized” West and puts the country in their camp vis-à-vis the “less civilized” 
East. This narrative of “being in the same camp” with the “civilized” West is 
actively used as an argument for Georgia’s prospects of NATO membership. 
This is achieved through the articulation of the country as being not only a 
consumer and beneficiary but also as ae contributor to international security and 
stability itself. This discursive move can already be seen in the late 1990s and a 
strategy document from the year 2000.  
 
Georgia seeks to build a stronger relationship with the Alliance [NATO]. 
Georgia sees participation in such activities as PfP and the EAPC as an essential 
step toward the realization of its long-term goal of NATO membership. Georgia 
strongly supports the retention of the transatlantic link as a vital element of 
security and stability in Europe. Georgia strongly supported the efforts of NATO 
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and other partner countries to put an end to the violence and mass violation of 
human rights in South-Eastern Europe. As part of its strong commitment to the 
international community efforts to restore peace and stability in the Balkans, the 
Government of Georgia has sent troops to Kosovo in order to contribute to 
international peacekeeping operations there (“Georgia and the World: A Vision 
and Strategy for the Future for Georgia”, 2000, p. 7).  
 
The National Security Concept for Georgia from 2005 makes it even more 
explicit:  
 
By participating in multinational anti-terrorism, peacekeeping, search and 
rescue, and humanitarian operations, Georgia acquires valuable experience, but 
more importantly, contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. Georgia, as a member 
of the international anti-terrorist coalition, contributes to the establishment of 
peace and stability in different parts of the world. Georgian troops participated 
in the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan; currently, they are involved in 
NATO’s operations in Kosovo, as well as in the stabilization mission in Iraq 
(National Security Concept, 2005, p. 6).  
 
Alternatively, as Saakashvili stated in his 2006 presidential address:  
 
Very soon Georgia will become full and equal with others, as a member of the 
civilized, democratic world. … Today, I can bravely say what I could not say 
one year ago – Georgia is one step away from NATO. If everything continues as 
it is today, … in 2008 [Georgia and Ukraine] can become full members of 
NATO … Georgian borders will be defended by a couple of thousand Western 
airplanes, the best armies, and, most importantly, a security alliance of the most 
democratic values (Saakashvili, 2006).  
 
This part is illustrative in two ways. It offers a classical security dimension i.e. 
borders being protected by Western airplanes, “the best armies” etc. but at the 
same time, this narrative brings into the debate a value-based approach and goes 
beyond rational calculations. It is about joining the “alliance of the most 
democratic values,” to which the country naturally belongs.  
In 2010, Saakashvili claimed that “Our course is the protection of human 
civilizational and democratic values be it either in Iraq or Afghanistan” 
(Saakashvili, 2010). Therefore, the sacrifice of the lives of soldiers is justified 
with the representations. To put it differently, these costly and painful policy 
moves are made possible through the combination of civilizational, transforma-
tive and geographical discourse described in the first part of this chapter.  
How membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is considered to 
contribute to something more than just physical security and is seen as the 
driving force behind the transformation can be observed in this extract from one 




The partnership with NATO is contributing to strengthening democratic values, 
implementation of democratic reforms in the country and establishment of over-
all stability. These factors are instrumental for the transformation of Georgia into 
a reliable ally (Foreign Policy Strategy 2006 – 2009, 2005, p. 19)  
 
Analysis of this identity-based discourse on NATO membership and of how 
specific policy moves are made possible through the constructions of certain 
representations are analytically useful in two ways. Most importantly though, it 
helps to explore how national identity can have multiple meanings, by chains of 
equivalence and difference, which are turned into binaries. In the (next?) part of 
this thesis, the populist construction of national identity is examined, and 
comparison is drawn vis-à-vis the dominant discourse. To explain it more in 
discourse theory terms, the issue of participation in international military 
missions is just another example of how by linking it to specific signifiers (in 
this case the civilized world, the West, Europe, etc.) a certain understanding is 
formed. How the cognitive worldview i.e. the place of the national Self on the 
East/West nexus is constructed through such practices and what their impli-
cations are for liminal entitiesʼ ontological insecurity. In the second part of this 
thesis I illustrate how the linkage of these events with different signifiers pro-
duces alternative meaning.  
 
 
4.6 Relations with Other Post-Soviet States  
Representational practices of the Self as Western, for the dominant discourse 
articulated around the master signifier of Europe, defines the relationship with 
the neighbours and other post-Soviet states accordingly. One of the very clear 
examples of such articulation is president Saakashvili’s comparison of Georgian 
universities with other post-Soviet higher education institutions, which is 
quoted in the introduction of this chapter. The following pages elaborate more 
on this discourse and trace its emergence and development over time.  
At the beginning of the 2000s, Georgia was economically and politically 
weak and largely dependent on Russia. Hence, the role of the Kremlin in the 
narrative from this period is of inclusion and exclusion at the same time. The 
West is projected as the role model for development and the reference point for 
Georgia’s Self, but unlike the post-Rose Revolution articulation, instead of 
putting the countries of the CIS among the constitutive others, it portrays them 
as liminal like itself. To provide an example of such articulation, in 2002, at his 
parliamentary address, president Shevardnadze stated that:  
 
Russia was and will always be one of Georgia’s largest trading partners. The 
Russian factor will mostly be a decisive factor for conditions of the Georgian 
economy. No less important is the factor that it is impossible to find a nation 
around the world which religiously, culturally or even linguistically, has so much 
in common. It is natural, for two centuries Georgia has been part of Russia. 
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On the other hand, there are a lot of economic, as well as political and 
cultural perspectives that bind us together with the members of the Common-
wealth. Hence, as of now, leaving the Commonwealth of Independent States 
would not be understandable for the other member states (Shevardnadze, 2002).  
 
These passages are important in two ways. Firstly, it illustrates that although 
Georgia by 2002 was already a member of the Council of Europe and the 
political elitesʼ discourse was imbedded in transformation and self-colonization, 
Russia was still projected as the country of having the closest cultural, linguistic 
or religious ties with Georgia. Although Euro-Atlantic integration was declared 
as a foreign policy goal under his presidency, the division between “uncivi-
lized” and “eastern” Russia/post-Soviet versus the developed West is not the 
cornerstone of identity discourse. Secondly, as is examined below, these 
extracts, when placed against post-Rose Revolution discourse on Russia, helps 
to see in a comparative perspective the evolution of the constitutive Other and 
the role of the external developments.  
 
 
4.7 Tackling Communist Legacy 
As a key argument of discourse theory states, when the hegemonic articulation 
weakens, organic crisis occurs which itself results in an increased number of 
floating signifiers or social elements that are open for definition (Doty, 1996, p. 
106). In the case of Georgian national identity, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was such an organic crisis. With the disappearance of communism as the nodal 
point, national identities started being articulated around competing nodal 
points. 
This narrative is largely driven by self-colonizing tactics outlined in the 
theoretical section of this thesis. Traditional meanings of international organi-
zations start to lose their meaning and alternative definitions start to appear. To 
be more concrete, there are important differences between NATO and the Euro-
pean Union on many levels, not only in terms of geographical area, but aims 
and mission, structure, etc. Pro-Western discourse on national identity with the 
very specific articulations of the chains of equivalence and difference manages 
to overlook these differences and define these two using the same point of 
reference. Both the EU and NATO are constructed as an alternative to the 
Soviet Union and post-Soviet legacy, and in order to complete the transition and 
“correct” the stigma of the communist legacy, membership must be achieved. In 
2002, president Shevardnadze while addressing the parliament claimed  
 
Georgia’s safety will be fully provided only when the country becomes a 
member of NATO and the European Union. It is not a coincidence, that all the 
former members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the Baltic states, have associated 
their future with these unions … I think that the time has finally come for 
Georgia to express its Euro-Atlantic desire. I do not even rule out that after the 
Prague Summit of NATO, our country will officially declare a wish to join the 
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North Atlantic alliance. … (This is) Even more important (in terms of economic 
as well as security developments) than Georgia’s membership of the European 
Union (Shevardnadze, 2002).  
 
There are several points in this small extract to be analyzed. Firstly, one can 
clearly see the gradation of the Orient, the transfer of the East. The Baltic States 
are mentioned as an example of how they managed to associate their future with 
these unions and the frontier had moved further to the East. Secondly, it is 
important to understand the practices and specific policies which hint at how 
“correcting the stigma” is possible through the implementation of a reformʼ 
agenda coming from Euro-Atlantic institutions. This is projected as a step-by-
step process which involves the transformation of internal legal or political 
institutions to make them more harmonized with the European ones, and hence, 
more “civilized,” more “normal.”  
 
Georgia’s movement towards the European Union, is step-by-step, but continues 
being goal oriented. The key sign of such a relationship was the signature of the 
“Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” between the European Union and 
Georgia and ratification of the document in the parliaments of the member states. 
… The process of harmonization of Georgian internal legislation with European.  
… 
While the existing conditions of Georgian society as articulated by the head of 
the state are described as having “old, out-of-date attitudes towards the 
phenomenon of government, as if it is or should be acting separately from the 
societal processes. It can be said with full assurance that such an approach is one 
of the legacies of the totalitarian system (ibid).  
 
The legacy of communist rule is blamed for such backwardness of the society 
and thus, the articulation takes the self-colonizing direction vis-à-vis the West, 
in order to tackle these leftovers from the USSR period. In 2011, the Georgian 
parliament adopted the “Liberty Charter” which represents a good example of 
transformative discourse in relation to the Soviet past and memory. The main 
aim of the bill is to limit the employment of people associated with the Soviet 
secret services in governmental and elective offices as well as eradicating street 
names, symbols, monuments, etc. representing the totalitarian regime. The 
opening passage of the legislative piece claims:  
 
The aim of this law is … effective administration of Georgian legislative norms 
and strengthening national security, carrying out preventive measures against the 
promotion of the foundations of totalitarian communist and fascist ideologies, 
eradication of communist totalitarian and fascist symbols, iconic buildings, 
statues, monuments, bas-reliefs, inscriptions, names of streets, squares, villages 
and towns, as well as a ban of propaganda tools carrying totalitarian communist 




Such details as the legal definition of propaganda, totalitarian regimes or the 
actual tools used to enforce the law are not relevant for the scope of this 
research. Instead, it focuses on the language play accompanying the bill. For 
instance, according to Radio Liberty, one MP from the ruling party is quoted as 
saying: “the extent of practical implementation, obviously, will not be big. It is 
even more difficult since most of the archives have been taken to Russia. 
Hence, it has greater political and symbolic importance” (Kharadze, 2011).  
He described it as the farewell to the Soviet past. It should be seen from this 
perspective, as an articulatory practice rather than directed against any practical 
problem to be solved. The same context is what explains the discussion about 
the name of the country in foreign languages. In 2011 Radio Liberty 
(Rekhviashvili, 2011) covered the story about the Foreign Ministry of Georgia 
calling some countries to change the name of the country from Gruzia to 
Georgia. My aim is not to investigate the real origin of the word Gruzia and 
whether it has really something to do with the Russian language or not. Instead, 
what I would like to focus on is why this matter has been raised and why this is 
an important example of unfolding civilizational discourse. As Georgian 
kingdoms were annexed by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, the 
name of the country in some languages has a Russian basis, and instead of 
Georgia or Sakartvelo, Gruzia became the basis for Georgia in Estonian – 
Gruusia, in Latvian – Gruzija, in Polish – Gruzja, in Czech – Gruzie and so on. 
As Nugzar Tsiklauri, MP from the then-ruling United National Movement 
(UNM) told Radio Liberty:  
 
In the western world, Georgia is established as “Georgia,” while “Gruzia” is 
spread only in parts of Eastern Europe and is somehow associated with 
Georgia’s life in the Russian empire for 200 years. Precisely, it is from Russia, 
that the name “Gruzia” for Georgia became widespread in these countries 
 
In other words, what this narrative suggests is that the change of name also 
means transformation, the transition from the periphery of the former Soviet 
Union to a “European” state. Changing the name in a foreign language is a 
performative act of leaving the Soviet/Russian past behind and rejoicing its 
“true” civilizational identity. Lithuania presents an interesting case, as it 
replaced “Gruzija” in 2018 with a word deriving not from “Georgia” but instead 
from “Sakartvelo” i.e. the authentic name in the Georgian language and intro-
duced the term “Sakartvelas”. 
This is also the context in which one could look at the importance of the 
museum of the Soviet Occupation, which was founded in 2006, and why it 
caused so much discussion. It should be regarded as part of othering the 
Communist past and constructing the Self in this juxtaposition. While studying 
the Soviet legacy in Georgia, it is impossible to avoid the contested meaning of 
Stalin. As he was Georgian, he is an important part of public discourse in 
Georgia. For analytical purposes, I treat Stalin as a signifier which lost its 
traditional meaning after the organic crisis i.e. the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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and contestation between populist and liberal conceptions of national identity 
over its new meaning take place. The latter defines him as a bloodthirsty tyrant 
and serial killer and hence calls to remove his monuments, museum, streets, and 
avenues named after him, etc. In contrast, for the populist discourse on national 
identity which focuses on the religious (orthodox Christian) and ethnic para-
meters of what it means to be Georgian, Stalin is articulated as a symbol of 
national pride. He is juxtaposed with liberal Europe and represented as the 
defender of so-called traditional values. I discuss this matter in a separate 
subchapter in the second empirical chapter dedicated to the populist narrative, 
as his image is more important to those actors who engage in counter-
stigmatization, than to the political elite which opts for normalcy and stigma 
correction.  
More examples of contested meanings between the parallel constructions of 
national identity can be found while examining the discourse on certain holi-
days or commemoration days. More specifically the celebrations of Christmas 
and Victory Day. The Georgian Orthodox Church follows the Julian calendar, 
according to which Christmas coincides with 7th of January in the Gregorian 
calendar, which is officially used by the state. The Gregorian calendar is used 
by the Catholic Church as well as by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, while the Russian Orthodox Church retains the Julian calendar. 
As the articulation of national identity relies on symbols, which day Christmas 
is celebrated, illustrates whether Georgia is European or not. Philosopher and 
one of the rectors of Ilia State University, Gigi Tevzadze, for instance, in a 
public Facebook post compared the celebration of Christmas on 7th of January 
to paying homage to the occupants i.e. Russians. (“Celebrating Christmas in 
Georgia …,” 2016). Occasionally this discussion resurfaces in public and the 
celebration date for Christmas becomes a matter of discussion about civili-
zational belonging. In a similar manner, and more related to the Soviet past is 
the discussion on celebrating Victory Day on 8th of May instead of 9th. In 2011 
foreign minister of Georgia at the time, Grigol Vashadze proposed that the 
commemoration of victory over Nazi Germany should take place the day before 
i.e. on 8th of May (“What is Georgia Celebrating…”, 2012). His line of argu-
ment followed the logic that that is the date when most of the “civilized” world 
celebrates, while 9th of May juxtaposes and puts Georgia in line with Russia 




Before proceeding to the second empirical chapter, I would like to briefly 
summarize some key arguments made in this chapter. The discourse which I 
examined above is what could be called the dominant conception of national 
identity. This narrative articulates around three nodal points: transformation or 
correction of not being European enough; Being located at the crossroad of 
Europe and Asia, and Georgia as historically part of the European civilization.  
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These three elements constitute the overarching grand identity narrative 
which makes certain foreign policy trajectories possible. The constitutive 
relationship between national identity/foreign policy is visible in various 
instances of public discourse. I have identified several of those dimensions and 
examined how the articulation is formed. The dominant discourse on national 
identity constitutes and gives meaning to participation in military missions, 
Russia and other post-Soviet states or the Communist legacy. 
If we return to the graph on page 25, the key findings of this empirical 
chapter illustrated the norms of membership articulated by the liberal discourse 
as inclusive and non-ethnic based. The social purpose is the implementation of 
European norms and standards implied in the Association Agreement or similar 
documents on cooperation signed with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. When it 
comes to the relational construction of the meaning, as the examples illustrate, 
alienation of Russia, the Soviet past and other post-Soviet states (with the 
exception of the Baltics) serves the purpose of articulating the Self as part of the 
West. Furthermore, the subchapter on contributions to the military missions 
represents an example of a cognitive worldview. This policy has not only 
practical purposes (training and modernizing the military with the help of 
NATO or strengthening the membership argument) but also serves the purpose 
of dealing with the ontological insecurity of the liminal actors. The reproduction 
of belonging addresses insecurity derived from being in and out at the same 
time.  
The dominant discourse is composed of texts coming from the political elite. 
In this chapter, I examined how pro-western foreign policy is constituted and 
constitutes national identity and subsequently fixes the meaning of elements in 
the field of discursivity. However, as the meaning remains constantly contested 
and full fixation cannot be achieved, there is an alternative articulation of the 
Communist legacy or military missions abroad. This contestation is amplified 
by the liminal positioning of Georgia on the East/West nexus and subsequent 










CHAPTER 5. POPULIST DISCOURSE ON  
NATIONAL IDENTITY8  
  
“Nations are new things that refer to old things” 
(Timothy Snyder, 2018, p. 112). 
 
According to the poststructuralist reading of social reality, total, full fixation of 
meanings is impossible. In other words, what it means to be Georgian, Euro-
pean, Christian, a patriot, etc. is open for constant interpretations, struggles and 
conflicts over its definition between parallel discursive constructions. Discourse 
or articulation happens around a master signifier, which subsequently expands 
into the field of discursivity (all the possible meanings that social elements 
could have) and attempts to define/give meaning to them.  
The first part of the empirical chapter of this thesis introduced one of the 
many possible meanings Georgian national identity takes, and subsequently 
shows how specific policy moves are made possible through such (re)produc-
tion processes. Chapter 4 was focused on the articulation of Georgian national 
identity as European and, as a result, the whole set of institutional-legal frame-
works that were thus made possible. This chapter, in turn, focuses on the regime 
of truth which takes shape as the result of articulation around different Georgian 
= Orthodox Christian, traditional values, “neither Europe nor Asia.” These 
nodal points guide articulation of what I have called populist discourse on natio-
nal identity and which constitutes its own policy agenda vis-à-vis the European 
Union, NATO, international military missions or addressing the communist 
legacy, and goes against established discourse.  
In this part of the thesis, I analyze empirical data collected mostly from 
newspapers along with party policies and other texts which actively engage in 
the reproduction of anti-Western texts, consciously or unconsciously spreading 
misinformation and fake news coming from Russian sources. As I have ex-
plained in the theoretical framework section of this thesis, there are two core 
elements that make these narratives populist: creating a dichotomy of the elites 
vs. the people (limited to dominant ethnic/religious group within the commu-
nity) and demand for popular democracy which “had been taken away” by those 
elites. These attitudes naturally lead to a fascination with conspiracy theories, 
so-called cultural Marxism, the global plot of liberalism against “traditional 
values,” against orthodox Christianity or nation-states. As populism is not 
necessarily limited to one specific political or ideological view, any articulation 
is populist, as long as it meets those two core elements. 
                                                 
8  Some parts from this chapter have been published as a separate study Kakabadze, S. 
(2019). Poststructuralist Study of “Christian Stalin” in Contemporary Georgian Public 
Discourse. In Makarychev & Kruessman (eds) Europe in the Caucasus, Caucasus in Euro-
pe. Perspectives on the Construction of a Region. European Studies in the Caucasus. Vol. 1. 
Ibidem.  
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Populism is a very culture- and context-specific concept. For instance, in 
Europe it often refers to anti-immigration and xenophobia, whereas in Latin 
America it hints at economic mismanagement and corruption (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). If we regard populism as a skeleton of sort, around 
which various articulations are constructed, we understand why for instance 
despite different stands on Russia or LGBTQ issues, both Estonian Conserva-
tive People’s party (EKRE) and French National Rally (RN) are lumped 
together as populists. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser it is a “thin-centered 
ideology” containing “the pure people” versus “corrupt elite” dichotomy, and 
the call for politics to be the expression of the people’s general will. Populism 
should thus be understood as “a kind of mental map through which individuals 
analyze and comprehend political reality” rather than any coherent ideological 
tradition (ibid, p. 6).  
The ideational definition of populism is based on the combination of three 
main elements: a) a Manichean and moral view of the world; b) “the people” as 
the virtuous community; and c) distrust of “the corrupted elites” (Hawkins & 
Kaltwasser, 2019, p. 3). In other words, populism is a combination of these 
three elements and not just anti-establishment rhetoric or solely a depiction of 
“the people” as a morally superior political body. “This means that populism is 
a moral discourse that not only exalts popular sovereignty but understands the 
political field as a cosmic struggle between “the people” and “the elite” (ibid).  
 This ideational approach to the definition of populism has several advan-
tages. Firstly, it explains why populism is so flexible and easily attached to 
other ideologies. Secondly, this allows to the accommodation of various types 
of political actors and organizations under this term. Thirdly, it provides a more 
comprehensive answer to the question regarding the relationship between popu-
lism and democracy, and finally, the ideational conceptualization of populism 
takes into account both the supply and demand of populist politics. The former 
refers to the scholarship’s focus on style or strategy use by the political elites, 
whereas the ideational approach on the other hand, “enables us to also look at 
the populist demand, i.e., the support for populist ideas at the mass level” 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 20).  
What makes Georgian discourse structured around this “skeleton” of popu-
lism is very strong opposition to multiculturalism, especially to LGBTQ rights, 
alongside the promotion of anti-Western sentiments. The latter is the result of 
the construction of the global liberal elite vs. “the people” dichotomy. “Fo-
reign” and “stranger” values “imposed” by the minority are being juxtaposed 
against the orthodox Christianity and conservative values adhered by the majo-
rity. In this binary opposition, through the chains of equivalence and difference, 
the European Union is constructed together with the United States as the main 
driving forces behind the conspiracy, while Europe, in general, is constituted as 
the victim of “cultural Marxism.” This itself leads to a fascination with anti-
establishment political groups and European leaders, and also with president 
Donald Trump due to his appeal to the masses in opposition to elites. These 
types of politicians and their rhetoric are admired because of their more 
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isolationist and “taking control back” approach. For parallel constructions of 
Georgian national identity, they represent an example of and reference to 
breaking away from “liberal totalitarianism” imposed by the western elites. My 
purpose is not to investigate whether or how much, in fact, any of those leaders 
are “men or women of the people.” Instead, I focus on the level of discourses 
and how it resonates through the broader public. What are the main traits that 
make them populist and how do they differ from inclusive discourse in their 
conception of what a Georgian is?  
In a similar manner a Georgian businessman associated with Russia, Levan 
Vasadze called for a policy of “selective Westernization.” In an interview with 
American news agency CBN, he said the following:  
 
We are not saying that we are against the West … I always say Iʼm a big 
enthusiast of selective Westernization of Georgia. 
Weʼll take all the productive, progressive things from you (America, the West in 
general), but weʼll throw out all the garbage, all the nonsense and unfortunately, 
in this particular case, your current pseudo-moral standards need to stay outside 
of Georgia if we want to maintain the family institute as it always has been in 
Georgia (Thomas, 2016).  
 
This is a good example of populist articulation as it implies clear anti-elitist 
undertone hinting at “pseudo-moral standards” being imposed by the West 
through the political elite and demand for popular sovereignty (maintaining the 
family institute in Georgia). However, whether Vasadze or the Alliance of 
Patriots are indeed supporters of NATO and EU membership or they are simply 
unable to go against popular opinion in public while slowly spreading Western-
sceptic attitudes is not the subject of this study. Furthermore, it is not neces-
sarily ontological anti-elitism, but rather a rhetorical tool aimed at becoming 
part of the elite. Therefore, what I am examining is how the articulation takes 
place rather than what the real intentions of the actors are.  
Furthermore, there are two important points which I need to mention before 
proceeding with empirics. Firstly, this populist articulation in many respects 
both directly repeats and consonantly reproduces narratives offered by far-right 
parties and groups from Europe. It constructs immigrants as existential threats, 
repeats fake stories of crimes committed by refugees, etc. while accusing the 
political establishment of Brussels of unilaterally imposing policies on member 
states. Secondly, despite sharing similar ambivalence towards Brussels or 
LGBTQ rights, there are some important differences within populist groups in 
Georgia. The articulation I am examining differs from Georgian alt-right wing 
nationalist groups modelled after their European counterparts on matters of 
foreign policy and interpretation of the Soviet past. While the former stands out 
for its anti-Kremlin attitudes and glorifies the first Democratic Republic of 
Georgia, the latter calls for Russia-friendly foreign policy and positively 
reminisces about the years under Communist rule.  
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According to Kincha (2017), grouping conservatives and ultra-conservatives 
together as ʻpro-Russiaʼ or ʻneo-Naziʼ is misleading.  
 
What most conservative and ultra-conservative groups in Georgia have in 
common is their dislike for state-supported, top-down liberalism and its suc-
cesses (e.g. the anti-discrimination law). Beyond that, their actual positions on 
issues, their alternatives, and their strategies all vary substantially. Even during 
the ʻperfect stormʼ of the 2017 xenophobic march, some such groups refused to 
rally. 
 
What he argues is that the reasons why these groups appeal and resonate to the 
Georgian population could be explained by the legacy of neoliberal economic 
policies after the Rose Revolution. However, this is not the main focus of this 
particular research, and the purpose of these introductory paragraphs is to 
clarify that when I speak of populists, I mean only one particular articulation 
from amongst the various groups which can be united under the umbrella of 
populism. One important reason why I decided to look at this particular populist 
discourse is that they are relatively well established, in comparison to the small 
alt-right groups. One of the largest newspapers “Asaval-Dasavali” along with 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio,” “Sakinformi” and many others, very clearly repro-
duces their narrative. At the same time, one of the proponents of this discourse, 
the owner of the TV channel “Obiectivi”, Irma Inashvili founded a political 
party, The Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Although it was founded in 2012, it 
is the only openly pro-Russian political force (meeting with Russian counter-
parts in Moscow despite no formal diplomatic relations between the two 
countries) in recent years that managed to cross the electoral threshold and 
secure seven seats in the 150-seat parliament tin 2016. In their vision and pro-
gram, the Alliance describes patriotism as “thinking and pondering, speaking 
and discussing, acting and behaving in conformity with the national spirit, 
which in our case is the Georgian spirit” (“Our Vision and Program,” n.d.).  
The Georgian spirit itself, according to the same text, is a dedication to the 
homeland, God, love for everything Georgian and native language. Further 
reading of the text reveals how discursive constructions can distort certain 
established meanings and provide new interpretations. As an example of this, I 
want to discuss the concept of tolerance. Vision and Program of the Alliance of 
Patriots of Georgia claims:  
 
Georgian values donʼt comprise envy, hostility, and hatred. Georgian values 
reject xenophobia. This is why we never hate other nations surrounding us, and 
this is the reason why Georgia used to be the center of the Caucasus. This is why 
Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Chechens, and others used to find shelter in 
Georgia. We have always been far from any ethnic or religious hatred, … (ibid).  
 
On the other hand, the Alliance is one of the leading actors behind xenophobic 
protests and demands for stronger immigration policies as well as expressing 
admiration for the rise of nationalists across Europe or for Donald Trump.  
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Online media platform Coda which was founded by a team of international 
journalists and has offices in Tbilisi and New York, published 3 short series in 
2017 titled “Clash of Narratives: A Tale of Two Georgias.” It juxtaposes two 
women: leader of the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia Irma Inashvili with the 
editor in chief of the magazine Tabula, Tamar Chergoleishivli and presented 
this as the struggle between conservative and liberal narratives. In the first 
episode, titled “‘Freedomʼ vs. ʻTradition,’” which already shows the binary 
division this juxtaposing takes, Irma Inashvili says the following: “The contem-
porary world is throwing away what I call pseudo-liberal values. It got tired, 
threw it away and itʼs moving toward something new. And what is this new? In 
reality, it is a return to the past” (“Clash of Narratives”, 2017). She resonates 
with conservative voters by reproducing the idea that there are certain values 
being “imposed” by the West, which contradict Georgian traditions or cultures.  
 
We are open to useful initiatives from Europe, but I will not support same-sex 
marriage. Because it is unacceptable for my traditions and culture. And for most 
of my nation, it is unacceptable. Just for the sake of being liked by West? They 
do not have to like me! (ibid). 
 
This passage shows the line of thinking this discourse tries to develop – strange, 
alien Europe imposing values that threaten Georgian culture and traditions 
whatever they may be, while the political elite, in order to gain the support of 
the former, willingly imports those values. This line of reasoning leads me to 
qualify this political group and subsequent narrative as populist. After 
introducing Inashvili, the episode switches to Chergoleishvili driving a BMW, 
with loud music on full blast, speaking about growing up in a family of anti-
Soviets who dreamt of independent Georgia with rock music, freedom of 
expression, etc. One more interesting aspect is that while Inashvili speaks in 
Georgian during the interview, her “antagonist” is speaking in English.  
In the second episode of the series, Inashvili further elaborates on her stand 
on the west and shows similarities with the views of European alt-right groups 
of Europe: “There was a time when the French were proud to be French! … 
That is not the case anymore. Now everybody is saying I am a European and 
that is all” (“Clash of Narratives”, 2017b…).  
The leader of Alliance of Patriots of Georgia did not oppose membership of 
the European Union, but still, argued that they need to be careful not to lose 
national identity. While in the third and final episode, her comment on NATO, I 
think nicely summarizes how Georgian populist discourse constitutes this 
organization: “I was 21 when I first visited Brussels, and the door was opening 
to NATO and we had high hopes. But today I am 46 years old NATO is still 
telling us the door is open, but also gently telling us that it will not accept us” 
(“Clash of Narratives”, 2017c). 
Another actor which is part of this large network of interlinked media 
outlets, NGOs, political parties and research institutions, is the “Institute of 
Eurasia” (Evraziis Instituti). The organization itself was founded soon after the 
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2008 Russo-Georgian war and as the name suggests, it advocates Eurasian 
identity of the Georgian nation and juxtaposes the latter to Euro-Atlantic 
foreign policy. Representatives of the Institute of Eurasia actively participate in 
forums and discussions organized by Russian political elites, as well as try to 
replicate the Russian style of honouring the Soviet legacy and holidays. For 
instance, the so-called “Immortal Regiment” i.e. celebrating Victory Day with a 
parade of citizens holding pictures of their ancestors who fought during the war. 
The Russian leadership tried to export this style of commemoration to the post-
Soviet space and the Institute of Eurasia was behind organizing it in Georgia. 
Although, unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, such marches never managed to 
become mainstream in Georgia and this has a lot to do with the contested legacy 
of communism and liberal discourse discussed in the previous chapter. 
Activities of the institute also include the screening of the movie about NATO’s 
operations in Yugoslavia in major cities of Georgia and presenting it as 
American aggression against Serbia, or publications criticizing the west and the 
Georgian government’s foreign policy (see the text from Rtskhiladze, 2014 as 
an example). The emergence of these institutions cannot be understood without 
taking into consideration the background context of Russian foreign policy. 
With Putin’s return as a president in 2012, the Kremlin tried to occupy the niche 
of the defender and guarantor of “traditional values.” Russian state media is 
presenting the EU and Europe as “Gayropa” where children are taken away 
from parents by force and given to same-sex couples, or families are forced to 
host jihadist Muslim immigrants in their homes (Galeotti, 2019, p. 37). In 
addition to serving domestic purposes, it opened new opportunities and 
perspectives for Russian foreign policy (Sharafutdinova, 2014, pp. 615–616). I 
discuss one such publication, which presents the Ukrainian “Revolution of 
Dignity” as another instance of a NATO plot against orthodox Christianity later 
in this chapter.  
When it comes to nodal points, the first one is the West in general, which 
implies the United States, NATO, and the European Union. The Chain of signi-
fications constructs these organizations as equals and in opposition to Georgia’s 
true self. Another nodal point around which articulation takes shape is 
Georgian=orthodox Christian. As the empirical analysis developed in this 
chapter illustrates religious differences between the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches are referred to as a way of constituting the ontological Self as 
different from Western Europe. This opposite positioning is constructed around 
the common branch of Christianity and shares the Soviet past with neighboring 
Russia. Unlike the liberal narrative examined in the previous chapter, this 
articulation does not construct the Soviet past as negative. As the analysis 
reveals, the Soviet Union and especially Stalin’s Georgian background is 
referred to as a matter of national pride, and some of the texts go as far as to 
suggest that the current status of Georgia vis-à-vis the west is one of more 
servitude that it was under the Soviet system. I will provide some concrete 
examples of this articulation later in this chapter. Due to the analytical 
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usefulness and importance of this signifier, I discuss the articulations of the 
Soviet legacy and Orthodox Christianity in separate subchapters. 
The last signifier to be noted here is “neither Europe nor Asia.” This one 
directly stems from the liminal positioning and argues for a more “nationalist” 
foreign policy. It also claims that the participation in NATO or the EU-led 
military missions and operations goes against the national interests of the 
country. I discuss this discourse in the final subchapter of this empirical chapter. 
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of how those discursive articulations 
of identity reproduce a foreign policy agenda, which calls for neutrality and the 
halting of Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
 
5.1. Georgian = Orthodox Christian  
While doing discourse analysis on populist texts, orthodox Christianity re-
peatedly appeared as the key nodal point in defining what it means to be Geor-
gian. Being Georgian is tantamount to being orthodox Christian. As a result of 
such a chain of significations, specific foreign or domestic policies are consti-
tuted and interpreted through this prism. In the next subchapter (5.2), I demon-
strate how the soviet legacy is addressed through this chain of equivalence. 
Before that, it is important to further elaborate on the formula Georgian equals 
orthodox Christian and demonstrate how the construction takes place. I call this 
type of national identity conception an exclusive national identity and I argue 
that it stands in contrast to the liberal version which I call inclusive. The key 
difference lies in whether a non-orthodox Christian could be a Georgian 
(inclusive) or is excluded from the conception of national identity (exclusive).  
Before moving any further, there is one important issue which needs to be 
addressed. Namely, one should be aware of the dangers of interpreting the 
arguments made in this study as the binary opposition between the orthodox 
Christian and liberal national identities. As a matter of fact, with the help of 
discourse theory, I aim to do exactly the opposite. What I label as am exclusive 
conception of national identity i.e. one cannot be Georgian unless he/she is 
orthodox Christian, is just one more example of many parallel attempts to 
achieve partial fixation of meaning. While it is true that discourse theory 
provides the idea of a transcendental center, “the result is not total chaos and 
flux, but the playful determination of social meanings and identities within a 
relational system” with the nodal point playing the role of the anchor (Torfing, 
2005, p. 13). Orthodox Christianity here is the empty signifier in relation to 
which other floating signifiers, including national identity, acquire meanings. 
What follows is that Christianity for the exclusive national identity discourse 
should be viewed as an empty signifier, which can be roughly defined as a 
signifier, which has lost its specific meaning and gained autonomy “in order to 
become the embodiment of fullness” (Wullweder, 2015, p.81). A very 
important feature of such a signifier is that it is not simply just another 
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expression of the chains of equivalence and difference, but it constitutes the 
system of significations itself.  
Research on collective memory and identity among Georgians (Gugushvili 
et al., 2015) has revealed that while it is very important to speak fluent 
Georgian or to be born in Georgia to be considered Georgian, the most 
important thing, according to the participantsʼ responses, is to be orthodox 
Christian. Approximately 44.2% think of religion as the most important marker 
of identity, in contrast to 33.4% for language, 23.4% for citizenship or 19.3% 
for being born in Georgia. This link or, in discourse theory terms, the chain of 
equivalence, can be widely observed in the contemporary populist discourse. 
One recent study conducted by the Human Rights Education and Monitoring 
Centre (Ghvinianidze & Barkaia, 2014) illustrated that among schoolteachers 
there is a widely held belief that being Georgian and being orthodox Christian 
are identical, equal concepts. One of the teachers who participated in the study 
claimed that while a Georgian was fighting for his/her own country, he or she 
was protecting Christianity. According to another teacher, it is unacceptable for 
a Georgian to be a Jehovah’s Witness. This belief is so deeply embedded in 
discourses that, for instance, in July 2017, at the opening ceremony of a hotel in 
the village where the current patriarch of the GOC was born, the Prime Minister 
was quoted as having said, that the GOC and the Georgian state are “inter-
woven”, and “secularism in its classical sense” is misplaced in Georgia. Also, 
he claimed that the relationship between the Church and the state currently 
present in Georgia is a "unique model” (“CSOs: PM Kvirikashvili’s Church 
Statements…”, 2017).  
As Orthodox Christianity is the nodal point for the articulation of Georgian 
national identity, populist discourse is reproducing the image of this identity as 
facing a constant threat from liberalism, globalization or freemasonry. State 
institutions which work to promote and protect liberal-democratic values are 
portrayed as allies or agents of this global conspiracy. The Office of the Public 
Defender (Ombudsmen) of Georgia, which is the key state institution working 
on human rights, is naturally one of the main targets for attacks coming from 
these groups.  
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” at the beginning of April 2009 published an opinion 
piece “Sozar Subari – Archenemy of Orthodox Christianity!” (Muashvili, 
2009). Sozar Subari served as Public Defender at the time and hence, was 
responsible for presenting reports and recommendations on the state of human 
rights in Georgia. Since reports tend to be critical of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church’s dominant position in society, which they say leads to discrimination 
against religious or sexual minorities in different ways, they are interpreted by 
these groups as an attack on national identity. As the opinion piece suggests:  
 
Some part of society thinks that it will be difficult to maintain the national self in 
conditions of globalization, but the negative consequences of globalization can 
be averted if the state correctly approaches the reforms to be implemented. 
Unfortunately, we encounter rough and subjective intervention of various insti-
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tutions and public figures in the spheres, which directly imply maintaining the 
national self. One such issue is the juridical status of the Orthodox Church in the 
state (ibid).  
 
This passage is illustrating at least two core points on which this discourse 
focuses: firstly, the Georgian national Self is being constituted in relation to 
Orthodox Christianity. Secondly, this Self is constituted vis-à-vis the global 
conspiracy coming from the West.  
Discourse constructed around Orthodox Christianity as master signifier 
articulates Russia as a part of the Self rather than a constitutive other. This is 
mostly due to both countries sharing orthodox Christianity and hence, being 
different from the western Christian religious traditions. For instance, 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an interview with the head of NGO “Istoriuli 
Memkvidreoba” (Historical Legacy), Tariel Gagnidze. While speaking about 
the importance of restoring friendly relations with Russia he draws a historical 
parallel with the annexation of Georgian kingdoms by the Russian empire in the 
19th century. According to this narrative 
 
the relationship between Russian and Georgian people was not just the unity of 
interests, political pragmatism. This fact [Georgians occupying important places 
in the Russian military and political establishment] reveals that that Georgian 
aristocracy from the very beginning accepted Russia as their own, Russia also 
accepted Orthodox Christian Georgia as a brother-in-arms and her own. This is 
mostly the same even today (“Tariel Gagnidze: …”, 2009).  
 
The appeal to orthodox Christianity also serves to link Georgian national 
identity with the Soviet legacy. For instance, in May 2009, in relation to Victory 
Day, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published a Georgian translation of an opinion 
piece by the Russian Archimandrite Peter called “The Day which Changed 
Future in the Present!” (Archimandrite Petre, 2009). This publication deserves 
the attention of this thesis for many reasons. Firstly, it heavily relies on 
religious symbols, and paradoxically, puts the Soviets on the side of Orthodox 
Christianity. “God did not forgive Fascist killings by the torture of millions of 
people in Eastern Europe. … In order to punish them, God sent legendary 
submarine Capitan Alexander Marinesko” (ibid). 
Soviet force is articulated as serving Christianity and God in opposition to 
the Nazis who are projected as Satanists. “It was not Marinesko, but God who 
punished the enemies of mankind and sadists. Today, it is proven that they were 
Satanists and Masons” (ibid).  
The United States or the West is articulated not just as the other, but as a 
threat to national identity and thus to orthodox Christianity (constitutive of 
Georgian Self). The Western normative agenda is constructed as deliberately 
targeting conservative and “traditional” values. Some quotes from the opinion 
piece published in “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” “Why Orthodox Christianity is the 
Main Enemy of America” (Saneblidze, 2009) illustrate this point.  
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Your country, which got rid of communism, became the slave of something 
worse than communism – a slave of the American Revolution; The revolution, 
which started in the 60s and turned out to be the biggest mistake. We, the 
Americans, still try to sell it to the rest of the world. 
 
What should be noted, as the author of text claims, is that these words are by the 
American journalist Paul Lauer about Russians, but it fits Georgia as well. In 
this text, Orthodox Christianity is described as “like a bone stuck in the throat 
of ideologues of “new moral”” (ibid). That is because, as the text argues, those 
“ideologues” are working on undermining traditional marriages, family values, 
etc. In contrast to the western understanding of freedom,  
 
the Church understands freedom as the freedom from sins, evil when no external 
force can make a human do something which opposes his/her consciousness, 
his/her ideals, and beliefs… That is why it [the Church] is being attacked. 
 
Finally, the publication ends with the Balkan Wars in the 1990s as an example 
of such a war against Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, this difference from 
Lutheran and Catholic branches of Christianity is often referred to as the main 
reason why Georgia is a stranger to the west, and hence, alone.  
This exclusive conception of national identity also echoes what I discussed 
in the first subchapter of this empirical chapter. As being Georgian implies 
being exclusively orthodox Christian and this branch is not so widely spread 
across Europe, this articulation represents the Georgian nation as alone and as 
having no relatives around the globe. And hence, the argument continues, the 
political elite needs to advance national interests first. In 2010, in “Sakartvelo 
da Msoflio,” Mkheidze argued the following:  
 
Georgian people realized the uselessness of yelling “NATO, NATO,” and also 
realized that we are orphans, a nation without relatives, and that nobody will 
bother, for one, examples of this have been numerous in our history and 
therefore, our great sympathy for the west, for the USA, has grown into apathy, 
and even worse, in most cases, into aggression and in the subconscious of the 
nation, pro-Russian feelings have grown (Mkheidze, 2010).  
 
And from this logic of an “orphan orthodox nation” in the world, Russia be-
comes the closest relative Georgia could have. Thus, the shared history with 
orthodox Russia, be it either in the Russian empire or the Soviet Union, 
becomes positive rather than a negative experience. In regard to 200 years of 
Russian occupation, the text claims the following: “While living in one state for 
two centuries, there could be good and bad, but if we compare good and bad, 
undoubtedly the good will outweigh it…” (ibid).  
And the good, which according to this text outweigh the bad parts of being 
connected to another state is the protection from “alien, foreign values.”  
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Whether it is independence or dependence, its benefits are measured according 
to whether first, the rights of the nation are protected and not so-called human 
rights, under the mask of which thousands of perversions are cultivated in 
society 
….  
“Let us compare Georgians who found themselves in Fereydan, in Turkey and 
Georgians who lived in the Russian empire. Who managed to better sustain 
traditions, language, religion? … I want to illustrate, that living in the Russian 
empire did almost nothing to Georgian self-identification and the reason for this 
is first of all our nation’s high culture and … common faith [with Russians]. In 
Stalin’s empire, all the people had written their nationality in the passport, which 
was abolished by this “zapadniks”… (ibid).  
 
This issue of nationality in the passport reoccurs very often in populist dis-
course. In 1999 following the recommendations of the European institutions, 
the section indicating ethnicity was removed from Georgian ID cards. From 
time to time nationalists and western-sceptic groups keep returning to this topic 
as an example of how Europe is “destroying” the unique Self of Georgia. Some 
groups go as far as demanding the inclusion of a religion section in the national 
identification card. Already in 1999 opponents of this decision suggested that 
with this move Georgia became “a testing-ground for cosmopolitanism” and 
there was a danger of Georgians becoming “tenants in their own country” 
(Reisner, 2010, p. 158). Dozens of Georgian writers and poets appealed to the 
President arguing that there were threats of the country losing its name and 
language.  
Populist discourse with its reliance on orthodox Christianity constructs the 
non-orthodox west not only as the constitutive Other but in addition, represents 
Russia as closely related to the Self. The whole foreign policy articulation 
constituted by this narrative, advocates for closer ties with the Kremlin and 
challenges pro-western political elites. Hence, it also relies on the positive 
image of the Russian Federation. Developments under Putin’s presidency are a 
reoccurring narrative in populist discourse as progressive and prosperous, in 
comparison to the “decaying” west.  
The Eurasian Institute initiated a project titled “Public Movement for Russo-
Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation.” As is claimed in the report of the 
institute, it is an answer from the Georgian public to those political powers, 
which, from inside or outside, have been artificially increasing tension in the 
relations between two nations. Besides the economic benefits, as people from 
the Eurasian Institute argue, Georgia and Russia are connected with the shared 
Orthodox faith (Eurasian Institute, 2014, p. 24). 
As negation is an important element in identity construction and making of 
the Self, such articulations of global threats to orthodox Christian civilization 
constitute a key pillar for populist narrative. The political elite in Georgia is 
presented as an ally of the “global elites” against the true people of Georgia.  
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5.2 Soviet Legacy 
As I discussed in the previous subchapter, as ae result of the formula 
Georgian=orthodox Christian, the Georgian nation is constructed as an orphan 
nation related only to Russia as a big orthodox brother. This logic requires 
definition and reinterpretation of recent history from this perspective.  
While addressing the legacy of the Soviet Union and trying to make sense of 
the country’s recent history, the populist discursive construction takes rather a 
paradoxical stand. On the one hand, it attributes a positive role to life under 
Communist rule and to Stalin (as ethnically Georgian), but at the same time, 
incorporates orthodox Christianity as an inevitable part of the Georgian Self. 
There are many different aspects of Soviet life one could analyze in order to 
examine how the populist discourse tackles the Communist legacy. Due to the 
limited scope of this research, I concentrate only on one of those aspects. I 
examine how the legacy of Stalinism is addressed.  
The Caucasus Barometer opinion survey results from 2012 illustrated an 
interesting trend. In response to the question regarding what best described their 
attitude towards Stalin, 3% chose admiration, 27% – respect, and 15% – sym-
pathy, which altogether makes 45% of the respondentsʼ feelings rather positive 
towards Stalin. In comparison, in Armenia, this number is 25% (3%, 16%, and 
6% respectively) and in the case of Azerbaijan, only 21% feel rather positively 
towards Stalin. In contrast, in response to the question of whether Stalin was a 
cruel tyrant who was responsible for the death of millions, 53% of Georgians 
either completely or mostly agree, in comparison to 24% who completely or 
mostly disagree. The percentage of those who agree with that statement in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan was 69% and 68%, respectively (Caucasus Barometer, 
2012). These figures are interesting, as, in addition to those who do not see the 
Soviet leader either in a negative light or as a brutal dictator, there are appro-
ximately 8% of Georgian respondents, who mostly agree that Stalin was a 
tyrant, who is responsible for the death of millions, but still either respect him 
or have sympathy for him. 
The reason for such an odd picture is not to be sought in those respondentsʼ 
admiration of murderers and brutal dictators, but instead, it has roots in the 
Georgian discourses on national identity. Stalin’s ethnic background is a source 
of pride and egotism for what I have labeled as the exclusive conception of 
national identity. As a contemporary Georgian philosopher nicely put it, Stalin’s 
heavy Georgian accent when he spoke Russian was a source of national pride. 
When a Georgian living in the era of Stalin would put the radio on and hear the 
leader speaking Russian with a Caucasian accent, he or she would realize that 
the “father” of all nations was of the same ethnic origin, which “gives such a 
power to the Georgian self-conscious, that any kind of humanitarian discussion 
of Stalin’s crimes sounds ridiculous” (Maisuradze, 2011, p. 73). Stalin being a 
symbol of national pride is the reason that the destalinization processes which 
started soon after his death in 1953 caused unrest and mass protests in Georgia. 
The events which shook the streets of Tbilisi in the spring of 1956, were not so 
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much about defending the name of Stalin or his legacy, but rather it was an 
expression of Georgian nationalism. Khrushchev’s famous speech at the 20th 
Congress of the C.P.S.U. in February of 1956 where he denounced the cult of 
Stalin, was perceived by Georgian youth as an attack on their national pride. At 
the beginning of March of the same year, around the anniversary of Stalin’s 
death and just a couple of days after the Congress, tens of thousands of students 
started protesting in the streets of Tbilisi, Gori, Kutaisi and other towns of 
Georgia. By the 9th of March, Soviet authorities were forced to use firearms to 
disperse the manifestations. The exact number of victims of the events, which 
are known in Georgian history as the tragedy of the 9th of March 1956, is still 
unknown. Historians estimate it to be somewhere between 100 and 800. 
Ironically, the processes which escalated in defense of the person who was 
responsible for the occupation of the first republic of Georgia by Soviet Russia, 
became the source of the birth of the new wave of Georgian nationalism. While 
some scholars look for the causes of the unrests in the status shift of the 
Georgian SSR (Blauvelt, 2009), the offspring of the tragedy of the 9th of March 
was the very first underground organization which started propagating for the 
independence and national self-determination of Georgia (Abdaladze et al., 
2008, pp. 184–185).  
Another very good example of the relationship between Stalin and national 
pride is the story widely circulated in social media about the meeting of the 
Soviet leader with the Shah of Iran. Even the newspaper “Kviris Palitra,” 
(Javakhishvili, 2017) which is one of the largest and relatively moderate in its 
views, reported the story claiming that the young Shah of Iran knelt in front of 
Stalin. As the Soviet leader helped him to get back on his knees, he turned 
towards other Georgians in the delegation and remarked in his native language, 
thatʼs it’s a pity Giorgi Saakadze, and King Erekle (Georgian historical figures 
involved in the battles against the Persian Empire) were not present to see the 
picture. Similarly, in 2016, the MP of the ruling coalition at the time, Gogi 
Topadze, is quoted as having said in one interview, that no Georgian patriot 
should use obscene language when speaking of Stalin (“Gogi Topadze – using 
obscene language…”, 2016).  
In the year 2013 Ilia II, patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), 
within the framework of his visit to Russia, where he met with his Russian 
counterpart and President Vladimir Putin, gave an interview to the journal 
Caucasus Politics. In his interview, he praised Stalin, calling him a prominent 
figure who was aware of Russia’s importance to the world. He also claimed that 
he thought Stalin was a believer, especially in his later years. In the same inter-
view, the head of the GOC claimed that Stalin, as a former student of the 
seminary himself, did a lot for the development of religious education in the 
Soviet Union. In addition, the Patriarch stated that he was crying after he heard 
the news of Stalin’s death (“Ilia the second: I love Russia very much…,” 2013).  
In the summer of 2010, when the monument of Stalin was taken down, the 
newspaper “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published a long opinion piece entitled 
“The Country of Slaves” (Berdzenishvili, 2010). Since the publication touches 
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upon key elements of the discourse, some parts should be cited at length. 
Firstly, the author claims that the removal of the statue is the biggest act of 
vandalism the world has ever seen: “In addition, every bastard and bitch, call a 
“bloodsucking tyrant” the person, who because he was following the way of 
Christ, was recognized as a saint by the Orthodox Church” (Berdzenishvili, 
2010, p. 13).  
The opinion piece goes on to argue how Stalin saved Georgia from extinc-
tion, and how the Soviet Union eradicated unemployment, provided free hou-
sing, healthcare, education, etc. The author also engages in reproducing the 
image of Stalin taking care of Georgian territories by claiming that “the truth 
was Stalin united Georgia with the Abkhazian SSR as SS Autonomy in 1931 … 
if America had not exploded an atomic bomb in 1945, Stalin would have been 
ready to return to Georgia those territories conquered by Turkey” (ibid).  
There are two basic themes in this article which are important to highlight 
within the framework of this study. Firstly, the image of an Orthodox Christian 
Stalin, who was a true believer and was recognized as such by the Church. And 
secondly, he is portrayed as a true patriot who cared about Georgia. As a 
combination of those two strands of thought, Orthodox Christianity and the 
notion of being Georgian form a chain of signification which fixes the meaning 
of Stalin in relation to other possible meanings he could have, such as dictator, 
tyrant, the enemy of Georgia, etc.  
Finally, orthodox Christian Stalin is the offspring of the discourses arti-
culated from the 1990s. The reason for this is straightforward, as only after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union did orthodox Christianity become the master 
signifier for the populist discourse on national identity. With the disappearance 
of the communist ideology, the traditional meaning of Stalin was lost, and the 
chain of equivalence with orthodox Christianity as the nodal point expanded in 
the field of discursivity and tried to invest ʻStalinʼ with new meaning.  
What is important to note here is that the roots of the image are not solely 
Georgian but go deep into the Russian religious discourse as well. However, it 
acquires a different level in the former case, as it is interlinked with the national 
identity narrative. Briefly discussing the origin of the myth of the Soviet leader 
believing in God might shed some light onto why such an idea managed to gain 
roots in some of the Orthodox Christian Churches. This image started to take 
shape during the Second World War. To be more precise, as Hitler’s army was 
marching deeper into the territory of the Soviet Union, the communist pro-
paganda machine started reproducing a more nationalist discourse to increase 
patriotic sentiments and support among the population. References to patriotic 
feelings were actively employed. World War II became the Great Patriotic War 
in Soviet Russia to associate it with the tsarist-era Patriotic War against Napo-
leon. Movies and novels started to appear based on the lives of historical 
heroes, battles, and events. In the year 1943, the Politburo decided to edit the 
national anthem of the USSR and replace the word “international” with Russia. 
The new anthem’s lyrics were:  
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“An indestructible union of free republics 
was bound together by Great Russ!” 
 
Invoking nationalist sentiments required references to be made to orthodox 
Christianity, as well as the abandonment of the war on religion. Stalin went as 
far as restoring the Russian Patriarchate which had been abolished since the tsa-
rist era. Churches were allowed to start functioning again, and priests were en-
couraged to perform prayers for the USSR. The Metropolitan of Moscow of that 
time is quoted as having called Stalin “our common father” (Sixsmith, 2011, p. 
345).  
There are two interesting legends which were born only at the beginning of 
the 1990s, but which actively contribute to the reproduction of the myth. One of 
them also became an inspiration for a controversial icon placed in the church of 
Saint Nikolas in Moscow. It was condemned by the officials from the Moscow 
Patriarchate and was quickly removed, however the story depicted on the icon 
is still reproduced as a fact in some of the discourses (Achmatova, 2010). The 
icon depicted Stalin meeting Matrona of Moscow, a saint living in his era. 
According to the legend, while Germans were advancing towards Moscow, 
Stalin paid a visit to Matrona. The blind saint predicted victory over Nazism, as 
long as Stalin remained in Moscow. The Soviet leader indeed stayed in the 
capital, and the USSR won the war, but there is no historical evidence of such a 
meeting ever taking place. 
Second, a similar story argues that in 1941, while Metropolitan Ilya of 
Antioch was praying to God, the Virgin Mary appeared to him and instructed 
him to tell Russians that they should carry the Icon of the Mother of God of 
Kazan in Stalingrad, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad. In the battle of 
Stalingrad, the icon was present, and the victory was attributed to it. The legend 
has it that the Virgin Mary was also present on the side of Soviets in the attack 
on Konigsberg in 1944 and that German soldiers saw the image of her in the 
sky while their weapons would not fire (Orthodoxy.ge, n.d.). This legend is so 
firmly embedded in the clerical discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church that 
references to it appear even in 2017. The most recent example being in Novem-
ber of the same year, as a minor incident took place in Georgia. Namely, one of 
the high clergymen came under fire from some members of society as he was 
accused of using a border police helicopter to fly over some towns in Eastern 
Georgia to bless the region. In his defense, metropolitan Sergi responded: “Our 
eparchy and borders of Georgia are blessed and flown over by icons sometimes 
… During the war, in the same manner, icons were taken around Moscow, and 
the enemy could not enter” (“mit’rop’olit’i sergi:…,” 2017).  
In 2015, one of the Georgian priests, father Ioane Chigogidze, filmed a 
documentary about Stalin, titled “Who Won the War” (Tskhoidze, 2015). In the 
movie it is argued that the breakout of the war between Germany and the USSR 
was a punishment from God for their struggle against the Christian faith. Later 
on, father Ioane suggests that the icon of Virgin Mary was leading the Soviet 
army in the battles against Nazi Germany (ibid). Returning to interdiscursivity 
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and intertextuality, which are vital concepts of discourse analysis, this movie 
serves as an example of those, as it refers to the legend already mentioned 
above about Metropolitan Ilya and his vision. It goes even further, by claiming 
that after the news of the vision reached Stalin, he asked Metropolitan Sergi if 
the Church was in need of anything else, to which he got the response that there 
was a lack of qualified clergymen.  
Sputnik-Georgia quotes father Ioane from the movie, where he argues that  
 
after the war, Stalin, as promised, built 22,000 churches and monasteries. Cleri-
cal seminaries and academies were opened in the country. The age of rising faith 
began in the Soviet Union because all the prophecies came true and Stalin kept 
his promises (ibid).  
 
The key strength of discourse theory lies in helping to understand the origin of 
the orthodox Christian Stalin from the perspective of identity as something that 
is never entirely fixed but in constant flux. It is always constituted and renego-
tiated according to the circumstances. Hence, despite the national identity dis-
course which uses orthodox Christianity as its nodal point being the product of 
the post-USSR epoch, it redefines and reproduces the image of Stalin by 
investing meaning through the expansion of the chain of signification. It ex-
cludes all the other meanings this sign could have and tries to fix it within the 
discourse. From this perspective, the fact that approximately 41% of Georgian 
respondents thought that Stalin believed in God, in contrast to 22.6% who said 
the opposite (Gugushvili et al., 2015), does not seem so paradoxical anymore. 
Especially if one takes into consideration that 77% of them mentioned Georgian 
as his nationality (ibid). These figures show that there is a strong connection 
between Stalinʼs ethnic background and his alleged religious faith.  
2009’s issue of “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published the transcript of the con-
versation between Stalin, Eisenstein, and Cherkasov, titled: “Joseph Stalin: We 
are not Very Good Christians, but the Progressive Role of Christianity cannot 
be Denied” (2009).  
In the small introduction, the text argues that Stalin was falsely accused of 
fighting against orthodox Christianity. Hence, publishing the transcript of his 
conversation about the movie Ivan the Terrible aims at illustrating that this was 
not the case. Although, reading the actual text and the passage where Stalin 
talks of Christianity’s progressive role, reveals how discursive articulation 
reinterprets the facts. The passage is the following:  
 
We are not very good Christians, but the progressive role of Christianity at some 
stage, cannot be denied. This event was very important, as it was the turn of the 
Russian state towards the West and not being oriented to the East (ibid).  
 
Whether Stalin was promoting or fighting Christianity is not clear from this 
text. It is a matter of interpretation and it depends on large interdiscursive and 
intertextual constructions.  
128 
In addition to Stalin’s religious faith, the very consistent discourse which 
keeps reappearing in Georgia is the matter of Stalin’s monuments and symbols. 
As I have already discussed in the first empirical chapter, while talking about 
the so-called “Liberty Charter,” Georgia banned any use of Soviet symbols, 
monuments, street names, etc. This topic is especially sensitive in Gori, Stalin’s 
hometown, where, despite the law, as of writing this thesis, the main avenue is 
named after Stalin. Not to mention the grandiose vintage museum in the center 
of town. The Georgian government did manage to remove Stalin’s monument 
from the city center though, which to this day is a matter of dispute and argu-
ment in Gori.  
In 2010, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published a news article taken from the 
internet forum about erecting a Stalin monument in the USA. This text 
illustrates the relationship between the image of Stalin, Soviet legacy and the 
populist conception of national identity. More specifically, in contrast to the 
liberal narrative, Stalin is seen as a national hero who gets appreciation even in 
the west, while in his own motherland he had been demonized. 
 
The minds of Americans have opened up, but we cannot say the same about 
Georgian anti-Stalinists. Even if they make lots of noise, they will not be able to 
erase this man from history. He belongs to history and his monument will stand 
in Gori forever. Although, there is a second option as well. As Georgia is a 
country, which follows fashion, and since they erected the monument of Stalin in 
America, maybe it will be erected here as well (Kldiashvili, 2010).  
 
There are two interesting points in this small passage quoted above. It criticizes 
the liberal narrative’s articulation of Stalin as a bloodthirsty tyrant and feeling 
shame and guilt for his nationality. Secondly, and more importantly, this 
discourse claims that the Georgian political elite is not able to act independently 
or take its own independent decisions. Instead, they follow and imitate their 
western counterparts. Hence, the rather sarcastic comment of the author about 
the possibility of erecting a Stalin monument in Georgia in the future.  
While commenting on the Wikileaks case for “Sakartvelo da Msoflio”, 
Khidirbergisvhili (2010b) spoke of the figure of Stalin as the bridge between 
Russia and Georgia, as something which brings these two peoples closer.  
 
It is only thanks to Yosef Besarionovich Stalin that China and Russia are friends 
today and not enemies! They know it in the Russian government, and they 
appreciate this, and this is reflected in their loyalty towards Georgia and 
Georgians … If not for the factor of Stalin, Georgia would have suffered with an 
adequate response from its great neighbour a long time ago – much more than 
Chechnya! But Putin knows – in the whole of history Russians never had people 
closer to them than Georgians, who gifted them Stalin, who restored and 
strengthened the glory of the Russian empire. It is as tsilly as if the Kremlin 
wants to restore the USSR – Putin wants to restore the Russian empire and he 
will manage to do that! And also, the union of Russia and Georgia – a strong 
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tandem which scares a lot in the post-Soviet space, especially – the Caucasian 
neighbours (ibid).  
 
The Western-sceptic approach is highly embedded in the articulation of the 
current state of Georgia as subordinate to the EU and Washington. In some 
cases, this goes as far as suggesting that the country was more independent 
under Soviet rule.  
In March 2011, as Georgia celebrated the tenth anniversary since the refe-
rendum on secession from the USSR, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devoted two 
pages to an opinion piece entitled “Twenty Years without Independence” (Mo-
niava, 2011). The text argues that the Georgian state, in the last twenty years 
has departed from independence rather than the other way around. The author 
touches on the economic, social, demographic declines Georgia has experienced 
since the collapse of the USSR, and how such developments have limited the 
country’s freedom of action. Furthermore, it criticizes the privatization of the 
90s, accusing the United States of taking advantage of “greedy local political 
elites” who acted against the interests of their own motherland. In addition to 
economic and social problems, the texts also suggest that in 1991 Georgia left 
the security umbrella provided by Russia, while never receiving the same from 
the west. The rather lengthy opinion piece draws the following conclusion: 
“demonstrative departure from Russia does not raise the quality of indepen-
dence, but in the end, drastically decreases it. … This is just reality” (ibid).  
In the same issue, the newspaper published an interview with Akaki Asa-
tiani, former chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, the 
institution presiding over the declaration of independence from the Soviet 
Union (“Akaki Asatiani: Georgia…”, 2011). In an interview, the politician 
claims that during the Soviet era, Georgia was more independent and freer in 
taking decisions. He provides 31st of March referendum on independence as an 
example of this freedom. On the other hand, “for the last 20-year period we 
have not been independent for real, but in fact, the country has been the subject 
of manipulation from the west, to be more exact, the United States of America, 
and a bargaining chip with Russia” (ibid).  
He continues to say that Georgia was not an independent country anymore, 
the only independence was in deciding how to please the White House in ways 
even beyond what the latter was asking. In this particular interview, the former 
chairman also commented on the need for better relations with Russia, as there 
were mental and spiritual connections between the two.  
In 2015, clergyman Theodore Gignadze, who is famous for holding public 
meetings with students and discussing various topics, while speaking to one of 
the TV channels, made the following remark regarding Georgian political elite:  
 
I remember the Soviet Union very well, … and now, when I look at them, they 
are not free. If back then they were being ruled from the Kremlin, now, they are 
being ruled from the west, Washington. But with the only difference that we 
were part of the republic of the common country, with equal rights, while today 
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you are not even a state [meaning Georgia has lower status than any state in the 
USA] (Gignadze, 2015). 
 
Stalin’s monument in the center of Gori became the main element of discord 
between the narratives, and the issue keeps resurfacing from time to time, 
especially around Stalin’s birthday, the anniversary of his death or Victory Day. 
As I have already mentioned, while doing discourse analysis, I focused not on 
the details of Stalinist or communist sentiments, but rather on how the master 
signifier – orthodox Christianity – redefines and reproduces the meaning of 
Stalin as a floating signifier. To illustrate this point, I will quote a passage from 
an open letter published in “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” signed by notable Georgian 
Stalinists and communists and calling the government to restore his monument 
in Gori. “Stalinist teachings are being regarded as building a socialist state, the 
foundation of which is orthodox Christianity” (Makharadze et al, 2013).  
In this one sentence, we can read how the whole articulation project takes 
shape. How the meanings are contested and differently articulated through the 
master signifier. If, for the liberal narrative, Stalin is a tyrant and bloodthirsty 
dictator who executed hundreds of priests and destroyed churches, for the narra-
tive with orthodox Christianity as the master signifier, Stalinist teachings are 
interlinked with religious faithas the latter itself is the source of national identi-
fication for populist discourse.  
As World War II represents one of the key sacred themes in the post-Soviet 
memory, it is natural to expect that it will remain highly contested between the 
parallel articulations of national identities. Timothy Snyder in his book “The 
Road to Unfreedom” (2018, p. 146) claims that despite claims in official Soviet 
propaganda that fascism arose from capitalism, Stalin’s celebration of the 
victory not so much of the USSR, but of Russia, generalized the image of the 
“fascist” enemy as the outsider rather than the capitalist. Brezhnev took this one 
step further, by changing the meaning of word “fascism.” “It no longer sug-
gested a state of capitalism that might be overcome, … “Fascism” meant the 
eternal threat from the West, of which the Second World War was an example” 
(ibid).  
As a result of this shift, for the current Russian political elite educated in the 
70s, “fascist” came to mean “anti-Russian.” Snyder (ibid) argues that in the 
Russian language it is practically a grammatical error to think of a Russian as a 
fascist. A similar line of logic could be extended to the exclusive i.e. populist 
conception of national identity. The texts which I analyzed revealed how this 
articulation, in a similar manner, constructs the dichotomy of “fascist” vs. 
orthodox Christian. By the former, it is understood as not only fascist according 
to the literal meaning of this word, but also any other group, which is re-
presented as a constitutive other. In several instances I encountered depictions 
of the Second World War as the orthodox Christian Stalin’s battle against 
globalization, freemasonry, LGBTQ ideology, etc. They all fall under one term 
“fascism” which, then, becomes a type of an umbrella term for everything, 
which is constructed as a threat. In addition to Stalin, another dimension where 
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this competition over the representation of the Soviet past occurs is the celebra-
tion of Victory Day. Despite Georgia celebrating victory over Nazi Germany on 
9th May, similar to Russia, there are increased calls from the political elite do it 
on 8th instead. Victory Day is celebrated on 8th in almost all the western 
European countries, while its holiday is the day after in Russia and most of the 
former Soviet Union. In the previous empirical chapter, where I examined the 
liberal narrative on national identity, I tried to outline some basic elements and 
arguments in support of this move. Here, however I would like to touch upon 
how the celebration on 9th May is defended, and how this becomes a matter of 
civilizational belonging for the populist narrative. Furthermore, I believe this 
should be seen in the broader context of opposition to de-Communization 
attempts actively initiated by the post-Rose Revolution government of Georgia.  
In an interview with “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” in 2013, one of the intellectual 
masterminds behind this narrative and a regular contributor of the newspaper, 
Alexander Ch’ach’ia made similar claims. He suggested that Hitler was 
interested in giving maximum individual freedoms to the conquered nations. 
The German dictator, according to Ch’ach’ia, believed that by promoting sexual 
freedom or allowing all the religious sects to act with no constraints, would 
make it easier to control nations and take their statehood away. “Now, compare 
those freedoms, which Hitler wanted to give us for our degradation, with free-
doms, that the liberal part of our society and their western curators are asking 
from us. Are they not the same?” (“I Think, We Still…”, 2013).  
This narrative falls in line with the Russian narrative of a global western 
conspiracy against traditional families and conservative values9. The source of 
this eternal threat is the fascist west, understood not as a concrete ideology or 
isolated historical event, but rather as the constitutive other of the (post)Soviet 
Self.  
Recent history is contested between parallel articulations not only on the 
textual level but also on the level of symbols, institutions, etc. Immediately after 
the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government intensified implementing 
policies and practices of imprinting the image of the Soviet Union and Russia as 
an occupant and oppressor. In 2006, the occupation museum was founded, 
despite serious irritation expressed by the authorities in the Kremlin. The 
discursive articulation of the meaning attached to the museum by the liberal 
narrative on national identity I have largely covered in the first empirical 
chapter of the thesis. Here I would like to concentrate on a competing, alterna-
tive interpretation of the museum, and the general meaning of occupation by the 
Soviet Union. I must repeat here again that populist far-right groups are not 
homogenous when it comes to their attitudes towards the USSR and Russia as 
its successor. Despite being western-sceptic, that does not automatically make 
                                                 
9  See for instance Russian foreign minister Lavrov’s statement in 2014 that the reason why 
the West had distanced itself from Russia was because of the latter’s return to orthodox 
Christianity. He argued that the USA and the West did so in an attempt to maintain domi-
nance and impose its system of values on the rest of the world (“The West has…”, 2014).  
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all the anti-liberal and nationalist groups supporters of a Russia-friendly foreign 
policy agenda. I am not going to engage with all the possible meanings which 
are given to recent history, but rather I will be guided by the intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity of the texts I chose to analyze. These texts together juxtapose 
Russia/USSR with the west and attach positive meaning to the former. “Sakart-
velo da Msoflio” in 2013 devoted two pages to criticizing the occupation 
museum (Kordzadze, 2013). The text is relatively long, and it engages in criti-
cism from several angles. I will briefly introduce the key points around which 
this articulation takes place, in order to illustrate the relationship between 
articulation of the Self and meaning given to historical facts. First, the text tried 
to draw a parallel between the Georgian government of 1918–1921 and post-
Rose Revolution government of president Saakashvili and their activities during 
the military conflict.  
 
The country was collapsing on the heads of both of them, and yet they were busy 
with festivities; both were aspiring towards Europe, swearing Europeanness, but 
Europeans themselves thought otherwise. Both were sold like goats by the 
“western partners”: first – on 25th of February 1921, second – in August 2008 
(ibid).  
 
These lines express not just criticism of the ruling elites but try to spread western-
sceptic feelings. “What can you demand from those, who … today divide people 
as the “occupier” and the “occupied” and with such provocations are planting 
discord, the enmity between the two orthodox Christian nations!” (ibid).  
This passage highlights the importance of religion as a master signifier 
around which Georgian and Russian identity is constructed and is juxtaposed 
against the non-orthodox Christian Other i.e. the west. This is further elaborated 
in the next paragraph, which was printed in bold in order to emphasize the 
point.  
 
In 2006, marionette Saakashvili, of course by the order of his western partners, was 
planning largescale provocations against Russia. And this morally, the politically 
damaging pseudo-historical museum was one of the important links in the chain of 
great provocations planned in the State Department of the USA! (ibid).  
 
In other words, it is presented in such discourse, not as ae natural part of Geor-
gian identity, but rather as being forced artificially by the “colonial” west. The 
text argues that “serious” states do not establish such museums; it is done only 
by “failed states.” A reading of the Soviet military invasion in 1921 as an act of 
occupation is articulated as being enforced by the West.  
The third direction, in which the argument in this text proceeds, is a 
discourse consistently reappears in the populist narrative – life was better under 
the Soviet rule, while the difficulties of current times are largely to be blamed 
on the west.  
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I do not know of any other examples in history, when in the occupied country 
fundamental scientific schools are established, higher educational institutions, 
research institutions; a backward agrarian country is developed into an 
industrial-agrarian one. Art is blossoming, music, filmography, theater! (ibid).  
 
This paragraph nicely summarizes how the memory of the Soviet past is inter-
preted by the populist discourse. Articulation of the recent past as an occupation 
which had prevented Georgia’s integration into the European family i.e. the 
narrative of liberal political elites is rejected by appealing to modernization, 
developments in science, education, art, etc. under the Soviet rule. 
An important element which I must emphasize is that Russia, as the legal 
successor of the USSR and as an orthodox nation is seen as the continuation of 
those “good years” of the Communist times. In April 2000, “Asaval-Dasavali” 
published an interview with professor Vakhtang Goguadze titled “Give Me 
Back My Russia” (2000). In an interview, the respondent suggests that the 
confrontational relations between the two neighbors are a crime. He goes as far 
as arguing that even the tragedy of 9thApril 1989 (the massacre of Georgian 
protesters by Soviet troops) was caused by the Americans. “They should look 
towards Washington, which is the source of all the tragedies befallen on us. 9th 
of April was also part of the plan of the destruction of the Soviet Union, made 
from across the ocean” (ibid).  
The text continues further, arguing that the first Republic of Georgia would 
not have survived if not for the Soviet occupation. “Soviet Georgia was a 
country of incomplete independence, yet it had strong borders and territorial 
integrity. Our country was ours” (ibid). 
This directly echoes the narrative that Georgia was more independent as part 
of the USSR than it is now. It develops the argument that the current political 
elite of Georgia is being ruled from the United States and does not really serve 
the interests of the country.  
 
 
5.3 The West (EU and NATO)  
One of the advantages of discourse theory as a methodological framework is its 
ability to examine the ways in which differences between social elements are 
cancelled out through the chains of equivalence or difference. In other words, 
although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are 
substantially different organizations when it comes to the members, geo-
graphical area or goals, Georgian national identity discourse articulates them 
either equally distant from or close to the Self.  
The empirical analysis revealed an important detail which marks a sub-
stantial difference between the populist and liberal narratives. It is the role that 
the United States of America is attributed in this articulation, and how much 
similar it is to conspiracy theories. In this case, there is a global conspiracy 
against orthodox Christian Georgia and the political elite is portrayed as part of 
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the secret plot. An opinion piece by Dimitri Moniava published in “Sakartvelo 
da Msoflio” in 2009 titled “Who is Fighting the Patriarch and Why?” argues 
that there are at least nine different groups working against the head of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). For the purpose of this thesis, the discursive 
construction of one group out of this nine is important. More specifically, this 
group is, what the opinion piece calls a secularist group guided by liberal 
values, which through the state-controlled media presented events as natural 
conflicts between “the progressive society and the retrograde patriarchate” 
(Moniava, 2009, p. 4). The publication goes even further by suggesting that the 
restoration of the monarchy (an idea proposed by the Patriarchate) would bring 
“real independence” while “our politicians, in order to come to power, required 
informal, but still decisive, permission from Moscow, later from Washington, 
the King is independent of this, he is not dependent on foreign forces” (ibid, p. 
5).  
The restoration of the monarchy as such is not the main focus of this re-
search, but rather how the discourse articulates it in relation to this proposal. To 
be more exact, it is constructed as a challenge to the existing establishment in 
order to achieve the “real” independence and “decolonization.” While the West, 
and more specifically Washington, is constructed as the center of this colonial 
power. 
In the same issue, Arno Khidirbegishvili (2009, p. 21) published an article 
titled “Why did the Russian Forces not Enter Tbilisi?” In addition to criticizing 
the post-Rose revolution government for being too young to remember the 
“Russian-Georgian friendship,” this publication is interesting for the way the 
United States is constructed. To quote the passage at length:  
 
But our “bad taste” revealed itself in our choice of new friends: America, the 
center of world globalization, was always a stranger in the East, “strange body,” 
geopolitically a non-regional player, and because of that, finally, despite the 
sympathies towards the new president of the United States of America, he will 
always remain isolated, and rejected in the Caucasus! Poland, the Baltic 
countries, the United States of America – none of them care about Georgia, they 
just use it as a painful spot to press on which can cause pain to Russia (ibid).  
 
Breaking down the text reveals how the articulation takes shape. Firstly, the em-
phasis is placed on the US as the center of the West with the Caucasus being the 
East and thus, the stranger, the Other, to the former. Secondly, if for the dis-
cursive construction of the pro-Western foreign policy, the case of Central and 
Eastern Europe represents an example to follow, the chain of significations for 
populist narrative goes the opposite way. The Baltics along with Poland are pro-
jected as strangers to the Caucasus. Instead of role models and the closest allies, 
they are constructed as strangers. Finally, there is an attempt to articulate the 
dichotomy between Russia and the West, with both being in conflict with each 
other.  
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Furthermore, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devotes pages to the translation and 
publication of articles from various Russian news outlets. For instance, in the 
same issue from 2009, there is a translation of an article by Ekaterina Murom-
ceva for RIA Novosty titled “Saakashvili – Yushchenko: Duet on Bandura” 
(ibid, 2009, p. 30). Analyzing the content of the article, especially last two para-
graphs, sheds some light on how these discursively constructed narratives 
coming from Russia are integrated. Usually, a parallel is drawn between the 
Ukrainian and Georgian governments at the time, as both came into power 
through color revolutions and pursued clear pro-Western foreign policies. Both 
presidentsʼ policies are blamed for “dead-ends” and the solution is described as 
“at the expense of the Western loaners.”  
 
Synchrony between the behaviors of Saakashvili – Yushchenko lead us to 
believe that plans for their actions are made in the same center on the other side 
of the ocean.  
What should Moscow do? Russia does not intervene in its domestic business. 
Now it has a chance to support forces in the neighborhood, oriented on real 
nationalism (ibid).  
 
This line of discourse is further expanded in the following week’s issue. 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an article titled “Yushchenko is preparing 
Crimea for Turkey” (2009, p. 3). According to the text, the Ukrainian govern-
ment is step-by-step sacrificing lands of their own country for NATO member-
ship. More specifically, while commenting on the case of maritime delamina-
tion in the black sea between Romania and Ukraine, the newspaper cites one of 
the politicians from the opposition who claimed that “they [Yushchenko and his 
cabinet] will continue giving away Ukrainian territories to members of NATO. 
… I do not exclude the possibility that they will do everything so that Turkey 
can get Crimea as a gift.”  
What is even more interesting, is that this is portrayed as a grand plan, a 
conspiracy, designed in Washington, while the post-Orange Revolution govern-
ment helps to make this plot come true. In such populist articulations, the West 
is generalized into the European Union and NATO with the United States being 
the mastermind behind the conspiracy.  
Liminal discourses, both from liberal and populist texts share similar charac-
teristics in attributing to Georgia a second-class status vis-à-vis the West. On 
the other hand, there are major differences between the two. As I have demon-
strated in the first empirical chapter of this research, the dominant narrative opts 
for what can be defined as self-colonization, while the texts covered in this 
chapter reveal another direction that the discourse on liminality can take. More 
specifically, it is critical of the West as the global dominant force and calls for 
more autonomous, nationalist policies. In stigma theory terms, we could say 
that the populist narrative instead of normalcy, takes pride in this inferiority vis-
à-vis liberal-democratic Europe and engages in tactics of counter-stigmati-
zation.  
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Another opinion piece by Dimitri Moniava (2009a) “Once in a Banana 
Republic” published by “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” illustrates how this different 
articulation takes shape. The text discusses the potential role of the United 
States in the political crisis, which took place in Georgia in the spring of 2009. 
What is interesting is that, the author from the very beginning dismisses the 
possibility of Washington staying away from intervening in the political crisis. 
The text argues that as the US allocated 242 million dollars to Georgia, “this 
amount of money, especially in the conditions of economic crisis, will not be 
allocated by anybody unless they are not sure that Georgia will have a govern-
ment, which will provide protection for the interests of the USA” (ibid).  
In other words, Georgia is constructed as a “banana republic”, a second-class 
state, whose political landscape is fully dependent on decisions taken in the 
White House.  
In the same issue of the newspaper was an interview with Gogi Topadze 
titled “Why Did Gogi Topadze Argue with Matthew Bryza?!” (“Why Did Gogi 
Topadze…”, 2009). The latter was serving at the time as deputy assistant 
secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs and was responsible for 
policy oversight and management of relations with countries in the Caucasus 
and Southern Europe, while Gogi Topadze is a Georgian politician who was a 
parliament member from the ruling coalition in the years 2012–2016. The MP 
argues that social and economic policies are disastrous due to directives coming 
from the West. “You cannot provide any example from history of when the 
country was ruled by foreigners and it revived or became stronger” (ibid).  
Hinting at American dominance and arguing that institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund or Soros Foundation serve the interests of US 
foreign policy and have destroyed economies of various countries. “Therefore, 
unless political activities of citizens in Georgia increase so that we ourselves 
can choose our political leader, we will be in this difficult position forever” 
(ibid).  
In other words, the Georgian political elite is accused of serving foreign 
interests and of not being able to stand up to those who give directions from 
over the ocean. Another term used by the MP is not being able to defend the 
“national position.”  
In May “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published a letter by Bondo Mdzinarashvili, 
the director of another conservative media channel “Obiektivi” which is closely 
associated with the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. The letter heavily criticizes 
government’s pro-NATO foreign policy, which he calls not pro-Western but 
pro-American. Furthermore, he claims that pro-US sentiments in the country 
were dying out as Georgia was “turning back to traditional values” (Mdzinara-
shvili, 2009).  
It is interesting to note that traditional values are projected as something 
which stands in opposition to being used as a “blind instrument” in the interests 
of Washington, while the latter itself is different and a stranger to Georgia’s real 
Self. “Turning back to traditional values is a very important moment, and if we 
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defend our Self as well, we will not become a blind weapon for serving othersʼ 
goals” (ibid).  
In June 2009, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an article titled “Oh 
Brother, The Fate of the Aborigine is Difficult” (Moniava, 2009b). There is one 
passage from this rather long opinion piece which is interesting for the argu-
ment developed in this research. More specifically, the Georgian government’s 
policies in regard to foreign investments are compared to “cargo cults” i.e. a 
belief system which developed among a relatively underdeveloped society. It 
implies practicing certain rituals and believing that they would help bring 
modern goods, which were originally provided by the Western imperial powers. 
Drawing such parallels is an example of an articulatory practice, which aims at 
not just recognizing inferiority or the second-class status vis-à-vis the West 
(The EU and the USA) but in stigma theory terms, wearing it as a “badge of 
honor.” It is an example of a counter stigmatization strategy.  
Another text highlights on famous phrase uttered by late PM Zurab Zhvania 
“I am Georgian, therefore, I am European” and sarcastically extends it to 
NATO. Furthermore, it compares the Georgian political elite’s commitment to 
send troops to Afghanistan or willingness to host military bases in Georgia to 
Matrosov’s story, the latter being known in the Soviet Union as a soldier who 
blocked German machine gun fire using his own body. As the article argues, the 
Georgian government is ready to sacrifice its own population while NATO in 
contrast does not keep its promises (Giorgidze, 2009).  
What is interesting is that this text also plays linguistically with the motto 
coined by the supporters of Euro-Atlantic integration “may NATO be here” 
changing it into “may the cross be here.” Additionally, this comparison is used 
to illustrate the contradiction between Orthodox Christianity and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
What is more telling, at the end of the article, is that “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” 
provides the results of a survey conducted among its readers regarding approval 
of the government’s foreign policy trajectories. 87,43 percent disapprove of a 
pro-NATO approach, in contrast to 9,14% who support it. These numbers are 
telling of a vicious circle of foreign policy and identity discourses mutually re-
producing each other.  
Although populist discourse is critical of the European Union as well, the 
United States of America is constructed as the main actor behind the western 
agenda. Most of the texts which were examined, while speaking of globaliza-
tion, the East/West confrontation or Georgian foreign policy refer to Washing-
ton as the main villain. To provide an example, at the end of October 2009, 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an interview with the professor of political 
science Jalashvili, some parts of which should be quoted at length. While com-





This is the process of globalization, the purpose of which is change of values, so 
that the whole world, and especially small nations, are identical to western, to be 
more exact, American civilization, not only from a military perspective, but in 
terms of culture, mentality, legislation, lifestyle and the other basic parameters 
(“Jimi Jalashvili: …”, 2009).  
 
This is an example of the discursive construction of globalization as an Ameri-
can conspiracy against traditional values, authentic culture, etc. while Orthodox 
Christian Russia is articulated as the opposition to this trend.  
 
Russia is way closer to Orthodox Christianity than we and our government are. 
Even more, there, people’s and the government’s attitude towards religious 
issues are absolutely identical, unlike us, where the ruling force almost openly 
opposes faith. Therefore, the fact that there exists opinion that suggests the 
source of globalization and the main enemy of Orthodox Christianity is Russia, 
makes me believe that we were not able to identify the essence of the problem 
and, hence, will not be able to find a solution… (ibid).  
 
The othering of the West takes shape in the articulation of traditional vs. liberal 
value systems. Homophobia is one vital element of this discursive construction. 
In its first issue for the year 2010, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devoted two pages 
to the text, which according to the author is based on a review of the foreign 
press (Saneblidze, 2010). The article is titled “Give Way to Homosexuals! How 
the World Religion is being Created.” The text claims that organizations 
working in Georgia for the Soros Foundation or British Council, serve globali-
zation by promoting gay rights, sex education, enhancing the influx of migrants, 
etc. While orthodox Christianity is projected as the only force opposing the 
“attack of global sodomites.” This is described as an attack on all the traditional 
religions. For instance, the text touches upon the issue of so-called liberal Islam 
and argues that: ““Euroislam” allows lust, alcoholism, drug use, and sodomy, 
meaning itis destroying all the positive features regular Islam has” (ibid).  
In other words, the liberal value system connected with Euro-Atlantic 
foreign policy is connected with everything deviant and perverted. What is even 
more interesting is that this article argues that the West is responsible for 
creating the image of backward religious fundamentalists to portray itself as 
modern and progressive. Wahhabism is blamed on the former for instance, and 
the author claims, western intelligence services are actually controlling Wah-
habi groups.  
 
It is interesting that where Wahhabis are winning, very quickly they are replaced 
with “liberal Islamists”, who act in the rules and manners of sodomite Europe… 
For instance, self-recognized Kosovo’s parliament already adopted a “consti-
tution,” according to which “discrimination” against gays and lesbians is un-
acceptable. The neighboring, seemingly Muslim, Albania is planning to recog-
nize homosexual marriage (ibid).  
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This “world” religion is blamed for conspiring together with religious sects 
against orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. “All the sects supported the pro-
American coup, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Christian Church was catego-
rically against it” (ibid).  
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devoted a couple of issues in the spring of 2010 to a 
discussion on why the western value system was incompatible with the Geor-
gian one. These publications were based on the thoughts of professor A. 
Ch’ach’ia, who was awarded by President Putin with the medal of honor for his 
contribution to strengthening the friendship with the Russian Federation 
(Pataridze, 2019, p. 19) and is known for rather a negative attitude towards pro-
western foreign policy in his publications. This particular text “That, What Was 
Said 13 Years Ago” is written by a regular contributor of Saneblidze and it is a 
review of Ch’ach’ia’s works. Some parts of the publication are illustrative of 
how the West is constructed as the stranger to Georgia’s Self and subsequently, 
foreign policy orientation promoted by the political elites is rejected. In the 
article, the American family is described as based on egoism, and unacceptable 
for Georgian society, not because it is either good or bad, but simply because 
they are different. 
  
The western society is the society of independent individuals. Georgian society 
on the other hand was historically formed on the principles of family, the 
members of which are people closely connected and filled with mutual respon-
sibilities (Saneblidze, 2010b).  
 
Another passage from the text emphasizes that imitating western societies is 
dangerous for Georgia, as it is not natural for this culture.  
 
Georgia should follow its own historical trajectory of development, taking into 
consideration its own sociocultural characteristics and should keep and develop 
its own national specificity, traditions developed through the history of many 
centuries, and moral norms (ibid).  
 
The text argues that a pro-western orientation is unfortunately understood as 
coming at the expense of national culture, traditions, lifestyle, etc. and imple-
ments everything perverted and negative. Imitation and mimicry are described 
as instruments in the hands of “the other, who aspire for world dominance” to 
destroy other nations.  
The text is concluded with the following passage:  
 
With the blind and artificial implementation of the principles of western 
societiesʼ existence, with the imitation of stranger orientations and values to us, 
we still will not become Americans, but we will lose Georgianess (ibid).  
 
This civilizational discourse of the difference between the Georgian and Euro-
pean civilizations is not strictly limited to foreign policy discussion but is 
revealed in everyday debates, which are seemingly unrelated to foreign policy. 
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For instance, one TV show, which briefly appeared in Georgian media, caused 
lots of worries among conservative groups. It was called “Ghame Shorenastan 
Ertad” or night with Shorena in translation. The show addressed the topics of 
sex, lovemaking, and intimacy. AFP reported this development and even inter-
viewed the anchor of the show. This coverage was echoed by the editorial of 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” in March 2010. The very brief text is very critical of 
French media coverage and of the seemingly condescending tone.  
 
They [French] are mostly surprised by the conservatism of Georgians. Maybe, 
from “therefore European” we will become “true Europeans” with the help of 
“Ghame Shorenastan Ertad”, the Georgian population becomes “more civilized” 
and 9 out of 10 young people among us will welcome sex before marriage as 
well. It's good, that at least 90 percent still negatively think of homosexuality, 
and we do not have a catastrophic picture here (“Sex-Show Worries...”, 2010).  
 
This passage is illustrative in a couple of ways. It reinforces the narrative that 
the agenda coming from the European Union or the USA is aimed at sexual 
perversion and degradation. Secondly, this small editorial provides a good 
example of how unlike the liberal discursive conception of the Self, populism is 
skeptical of the patronizing and condescending tone of the west. Putting “more 
civilized” and “true European” in quotation marks further reinforces the 
negative context attached to Europe.  
In 2010, the Georgian government launched a program aimed at improving 
English language skills among school students. This involved hosting 10 000 
teachers from all around the globe to assist pedagogues in public schools. 
Naturally, the prospect of such an influx of foreigners raised worries among the 
conservative forces. The political elite was criticized and accused of forcing the 
English language on Georgians and deliberately suppressing Georgian. 
 
This should be accessed as an expression of Georgia’s wish to bind themselves 
to the Anglo-American universe, but it seems, those who plan such activities, are 
not familiar with the country they rule (for now) that well (Moniava, 2010).  
 
As the author of publication argues, Georgians tend to do exactly the opposite 
of what they are forced to. The result of such forceful spread of the English 
language, according to the text, would be the rise of anti-Americanism and 
rejection of everything American.  
A similar argument is elaborated upon further in the same issue of “Sakart-
velo da Msoflio” by a well-known pro-Russian public figure, Arno Khidir-
begishvili (2010). According to his contribution to the newspaper, the invitation 
of English language teachers represents deliberate tactics of the political elite 
turning the Georgian nation into service providers for foreigners. 
 
President Saakashvili is quite consistent here – he wants the USA and does not 
want the Russian Federation. If it had been up to him, he would have moved 
Georgia to the American continent. The USA, which knows that it lost the war 
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for Georgia and the Caucasus, is preparing for revenge when English-speaking 
teenagers grow up, come out to the streets from “McDonalds” and say their 
words (Khidirbegishvili, 2010).  
 
Another passage also refers to globalization and argues that 
 
In its [globalization] mother tongue (English) distributes around hamburgers, 
cheeseburgers, and promises of easy life, which give thousands of random illu-
sions to Georgian youth about our European ancestry, joining the European 
family quickly, and about the security provided by the North Atlantic alliance… 
(ibid).  
 
There is a lot to unpack here. Firstly, there is a clear dichotomy between the US 
and the Russian Federation, while the Georgian Self is constructed as having to 
choose between the two. Furthermore, the European perspective is constructed 
as illusionary, along with the NATO security umbrella. 
Finally, the English language teaching program is regarded by this narrative 
as an instrument or tool in the hands of the global elites to turn the Georgian 
nation into servants.  
 
Indeed, Saakashvili has turned Georgia into one big hotel, into a country of 
servants, where tourists will come to rest … But there will be no single factory 
or fabric so that they would breathe clean air! We, Georgians, on the other hand, 
both men and women, will be serving them, as our pockets will not be able to 
afford the expenses of living in this hotel (ibid).  
 
The issues of inviting thousands of English language teachers and making 
English language examinations compulsory for those who wish to graduate 
from university dominated discourse and did not limit itself to one issue. For 
instance, in texts from the week after, parallels with the Soviet Union are drawn 
and it is argued that even Russian did not have such privileges at that time. 
“Such privileges were not attributed even to Russian in the Soviet period. That 
period is being condemned, called shameful, and is not this shameful?” 
(Tabatadze, 2010). 
In an interview, a Georgian language teacher argues that the purpose of all 
this is to “fully get rid of, remove Georgian language and declare English as the 
second state language” (ibid).  
In addition to othering, the western-skeptical articulation of national identity 
heavily relies on the projection of the European Union or Washington as an 
oppressive force in the quest for world domination, which threats small nations 
and their culture. Furthermore, such juxtaposing blames the political elite for 
voluntarily ascribing second-class status to oneself vis-à-vis the west. This 
narrative is apparent while examining the response to the article published by 
“The Independent”. It was dedicated to the developments in the mountainous 
Svaneti region, titled: “Georgia’s mountain wilderness opens up to the world”. 
Due to the arguments made in this section of this study, this article is not 
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discussed, but instead, a critical response published in “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” 
is analyzed.  
A regular contributor to this newspaper, Armaz Saneblidze (2010c) focuses 
on the term wilderness and interprets these words by suggesting that the former 
called the Svaneti region wild, not in terms of nature, but in terms of under-
development and backwardness. What is of particular importance, is that this 
text argues that such reasoning represents president Saakashvili’s narrative i.e. 
the political elite of the country willingly presents its own region as wild and 
backward, and still to be developed. The text suggests that the Georgian govern-
ment is purposefully downplaying and not giving enough credit to the Soviet 
past, as between 1973–79 Svaneti experienced an increase of infrastructural 
projects. 
Another interesting aspect of Western articulation inverting widely es-
tablished meanings and narratives. A very prominent example is a democracy, 
or whether the West is indeed interested in promoting reforms in this direction. 
It is a recurring narrative that the West and especially the Unites States support 
political elites, which promote a global liberal agenda by undemocratic means. 
This articulation is especially apparent when examining texts from the period 
2007–2012 when Saakashvili’s government suppressed and, on numerous 
occasions, raided opposition political groups and media. For instance, in one of 
the opinion pieces about Eurasian Economic Unity, a regular contributor of 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” argues that the Georgian political elite would use this 
as proof that president Putin wanted to restore the Soviet Union. This would be 
a message for external actors “there is no time for democracy, Russia is 
planning to swallow us and maybe you could accept us in NATO without 
democracy” (Mkheidze, 2011).  
This text is interesting due to some other aspects as well. The title of the 
publication “I am Georgian, therefore – Eurasian” plays with a famous speech 
by late PM called “I am Georgian therefore I am European”. The author reaches 
this conclusion by arguing that Georgians geographically, culturally and 
mentally are both Asians and Europeans at the same time. “Historically, we 
have equally acquired the best from Asian-eastern and western-European 
cultures and have not leaned too much towards one or another” (ibid).  
The text suggests that for Georgians, Asian despotism, as well as perversions 
coming from the west, were equally unacceptable. Furthermore, the texts argue 
that Georgian’s natural place is in the post-Soviet space, as they are being 
expected with open arms over there.  
In this articulation, there is a similarity between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. When the relationship between the political elite of Georgia and 
Washington is criticized, it is projected as a similar subjection to that of the 
USSR. In 2012, when America was entering its presidential election campaign, 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an article “Mitt Romney Is Not Going to 
Give Himself a Headache Because of Georgia” (Moniava, 2012). The full 
discussion of Georgia’s role in US presidential election campaigns is not 
important for this thesis. Rather what is of interest for this research is the 
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opening passage of the text. “The Georgian political elite is observing American 
elections even more closely than changes in the SUCP CC’s politburo 
membership. It wants to foresee what changes happen in Washington, in order 
to be prepared” (ibid). The interplay between the United States and the USSR is 
illustrative of the difference between the parallel narrativesʼ perceptions of the 
west.  
With the othering of the West, Russian civilizational discourse becomes the 
alternative which populist articulation refers to. To 2013’s Valdai Discussion 
Club’s meeting “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devoted four pages to Putin’s address 
to the participants.10  
The newspaper argues that Putin came across as “old kind Putin” who has 
captured the audience with interest and attention. Joking and at the same time 
“punching” Europeans (“Sovereign Democracy…,” 2013). I do not intend to 
analyze the full speech of President Putin, but instead what I want to illustrate is 
that publishing the whole speech without any criticism, as it was delivered by 
“kind” Putin, indicates that this discursive construction fully shares sentiments 
with the Russian political elite’s narrative about the “morally degraded and 
decaying” west, a global gay conspiracy against conservative values, etc.  
For the liberal discourse on national identity on the other hand, the As-
sociation Agreement with the European Union represents one of the milestones 
on the nation’s long journey of returning back to the “family.” The populist 
narratives attempt to construct this document as another agreement which does 
not give anything particular and concrete, while continuing to keep Georgian 
society on the hook. What the populist narrative attempts to achieve is 
integrating the Association Agreement in the discourse on global western con-
spiracy under the American leadership against the orthodox Christian nations. A 
parallel is drawn between Brussels and Washington, both of which, according 
to this narrative, pose threats to Georgian traditions and the national Self. The 
government, which negotiated and signed the AA, is constructed as a servant of 
the west, betraying “national interests.” The political elite is accused of not even 
trying to negotiate for the deal, but obediently accepting all the conditions in the 
agreement, hence, getting the least bonuses from the EU in comparison to other 
post-Soviet states (Mkheidze, 2013; Moniava, 2013).  
In 2014, the situation in Ukraine became tense and led to what later came to 
be known as the Revolution of Dignity and the subsequent annexation of 
Crimea by the Russian Federation. In their assessment and interpretation of 
those developments, competing narratives in Georgia have clashed. In contrast 
to the liberal narrative which aligned with what had already been established in 
most of the political or media discourse, populists shared the Russian side of the 
story – reproducing the image of the west as a colonial power and imperial 
                                                 
10  The Valdai Discussion Club itself was established in 2004 and is named after the lake 
located in Russia where the club’s first meeting took place. It is a think-tank closely 
associated with the Russian political elite and Vladimir Putin personally, who has met with 
the participants every year since its founding.  
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force vis-à-vis the subordinated and subjected members of Eastern Partnership. 
In an issue from February2014, “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” devoted several 
articles to the developments in Ukraine. One of them was titled “Colonization 
of Ukraine – A Movie that Georgians Have Already Seen” (Moniava, 2014). 
This text suggests that the clashes taking place in Ukraine were directed and 
guided by the United States of America. Furthermore, the text draws a parallel 
with the August War of 2008, by arguing that there was a Summer Olympics 
taking place, as the Georgian dissolution started, and in a similar manner, in 
2014, the Sochi Winter Olympics were happening, Americans were behind 
whatever was happening in Kyiv. In the same issue, the newspaper published 
collected extracts from Russian website gazetta.ru and presented them under the 
title “Until When Will the USA Feed Hungry Ukraine?” (2014). The title of the 
collage itself indicates what the general idea the text tries to conceive is. 
Furthermore, as some high-profile politicians from the post-Rose Revolution 
government, including the former president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili 
joined the ranks of the new Ukrainian government, populist discourse tried to 
link criticism of the local political elite with the criticism of the new authorities 
in Kyiv. In January 2015 “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an opinion piece, 
which argued that Ukraine was ruled from overseas, hinting at the Americans, 
and as an example of this ruling, mentioned the political elite, which came into 
power in Georgia after 2003, and ended up being transferred to Ukraine 
(Davtuliani, 2015). What is especially interesting for the argument I am trying 
to develop in this chapter is another extract from the same text, which is the 
following: “Today Ukraine is way less sovereign than it was in Soviet times – 
back then only the second secretary was appointed by Moscow, while 
Washington has imposed barely deposed from Georgia “sons of bitches” on 45-
million country!” (ibid).  
This passage illustrates several important points: firstly, it established a link 
between the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the so-called Revolution of Dignity 
of 2015. Secondly, both political elites, which came into power through these 
revolutions, are connected to the United States or the West in general and are 
projected as a stranger, externally enforced on the societies in post-Soviet 
space. Lastly, the language in which the post-revolution political elites are 
framed, clearly indicates negative attitudes toward them.  
Similar articulation is apparent in one publication of the Institute of Eurasia 
“Ukraine: Western Crusade against Orthodox Civilization Continues” (“Ukrai-
na: Dasavletis Lashqroba Martmadidebeli Civilizaciis Tsinaamghdeg Grdzel-
deba”) (Rtskhiladze, 2014). As the title already suggests, the “Revolution of 
Dignity” is constructed as just another instance of the long crusade against 
orthodox Christianity. The 40-page publication starts with the NATO air-
bombing campaign in Serbia as the start of this civilizational battle with the 
final goal of ““democratization” – the subjection of Russia” (Rtskhiladze, 2014, 
p. 4). Democratization and the liberalization agenda coming from the European 
Union and NATO, in other words, are constructed as weapons against orthodox 
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civilization, which, after the collapse of the USSR, remains the sole opposing 
force to the United States. 
 
The loyalty of Serbs, Russians, Georgians and other nations to orthodox Chris-
tianity means their independence from and “disobedience” of, the western insti-
tutions. Orthodox Christianity unites the people of Eastern Europe inside the 
boundaries of one civilization (cultural-political area), the center of which, due 
to its geographical scale, population, military, and economic might and other 
basic parameters, is Russia (ibid, p. 4). 
 
This passage illustrates how this articulation transforms foreign policy into 
civilizational dichotomy and juxtaposes the EU and the USA with orthodox 
Christianity. Furthermore, Russia is constructed as the center of the civilization, 
which the west is crusading against. Such a dichotomy makes it possible for this 
discourse to construct a pro-European foreign policy, which requires extensive 
reforms in many fields, as strange and alien to orthodox civilization. “The 
“Color Revolutions” turned out to be alien, carriers of pseudo values which are 
far from orthodox Christianity” (ibid).  
This narrative constructs the Association Agreement as another instance of 
Brussels subjugating Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova, while the annexation of 
Crimea and military conflict in eastern parts of Ukraine is projected as a 
rebellion against this alien agenda imposed by the West. “The developments in 
Ukraine are neither separation nor annexation of one state’s territory by another, 
but rather, all these represent part of global civilizational struggles” (ibid,  
p. 40).  
This narrative subverts the dominant discourse and offers its own “regime of 
truth,” subsequently, supporting alternative foreign policy goals.  
As the political crisis and subsequent developments in Ukraine were linked 
with president at the time Yanukovych’s refusal to proceed with the signature of 
the Association Agreement with the European Union, it was echoed in debates 
in Georgia as well. Euro-sceptic political or societal groups construct these 
documents as giving an unfair advantage to Brussels and not actually delivering 
any of those benefits, the liberal narrative speaks about. For instance, Nana 
Devdariani, who served as a Human Rightsʼ Ombudsman between the years 
2000–2003 and briefly as the head of the Central Election Commission of 
Georgia in 2003. Devdariani She has her own column in “Sakartvelo da 
Msoflio” where she heavily criticizes the political elite’s pro-European aspira-
tions. In connection with the Association Agreement, her article was titled “The 
Truth about the Association Agreement with the EU” (Devdariani, 2014). There 
are several overarching points, which run in the background of the whole text 
and the general narrative. One is that the agreement is giving an unfair 
advantage to the European Union. Secondly, European standards are too expen-
sive and difficult for Georgian producers to meet. In contrast to that, the 
Russian market is presented as an alternative. This construction revolves around 
the idea that as the former is unfamiliar with Georgian products, demand is too 
146 
low. While among Russians, who have been familiar with the goods produced 
in this region since the Soviet times, demand is really high. The purpose of my 
study is not to engage in detailed analysis to verify the numbers provided in 
these texts. Instead, I am focusing on how the arguments are constructed on the 
linguistic level. Thirdly, in this Self, the Soviet Union/Russia juxtaposition with 
the European Union as the Other, is extended to almost every other policy. In 
regard to the prospect of visa-free travel, Devdariani’s text argues that rich 
people had no problem with traveling to Schengen countries regardless, while 
most Georgians would not be able to afford it, even if there was no visa 
requirement. In other words, there are no real, substantial benefits for Georgia 
from the Association Agreement, while Brussels gets all the advantages.  
One important pattern that was apparent while conducting this analysis is 
that this articulation does not reject the West altogether, but instead diffe-
rentiates between “true Europe” and “perverted” Europe which “abandoned true 
Christian values.” This is especially the case with media texts, where I en-
countered many instances of references to political groups which are skeptical 
of the European Union, NATO, and liberal values. 
The Georgian Orthodox Church is heavily involved in the reproduction of 
identity discourse. Especially conservative groups within the religious 
institution who are notorious for their Euro-skeptic narrative and criticism of 
liberal values. One such group which especially stands out is “Martmadidebel 
Mshobelta Kavshiri” (MMK) which in translation means the Union of Orthodox 
Parents, and I will be using the English translation of the name of the organi-
zation in this research. Priests and secular figures associated with the Union are 
known for their heavy criticism of the European Union and the United States, 
accusing them of conspiring against “traditional values” and the GOC as the 
defender of those values. At the same time, while the West is portrayed as 
perverted and Godless, Russia is juxtaposed as the opposite. The Orthodox 
Christian northern neighbor is articulated as closer to Georgia’s Self, sharing 
history, certain canonical elements and most importantly, mutual aversion 
towards the value-system coming from the west. Davit Kvlividze is one such 
conservative hardliner clergyman associated with the Union of Orthodox 
Parents and an outspoken critic of pro-western foreign policy. In 2016, in an 
interview with “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” (“What Kind of Historical…”, 2016) he 
made several remarks that illustrate the logic behind the articulation.  
 
The European Union is dismantling and where are they [Georgian government] 
going? Or what kind of historical choice are we talking about, which Georgian 
king was called the king of Europe? … let us move later, to the nineteenth 
century, when Georgia joined Russia and Georgians got the European look, from 
where did they get? – from Petersburg. … Today, talking about this is con-
sidered shameful, you say something, somebody will appear and call you a 
Russian spy, it is interesting to know whose spies they are themselves…  
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There is a lot to unpack in this extract. Firstly, the EU, according to this 
discourse, is struggling itself. “Godless and perverted” Brussels is losing its 
popularity, while “defenders of true family values” i.e. radical-right political 
groups are becoming increasingly popular. Secondly, it is deliberately faking 
history, as if there was such a title as the “king of Europe” Georgian monarchs 
could have carried if they were truly Europeans. Thirdly, in contrast to the 
dominant and widely accepted historical narrative in Georgian society that 
Georgian kingdoms were annexed by the Russian empire in the 19th century, he 
uses the term “joining” which turns this into a voluntary action from the 
Georgian side, exonerating Russia. Fourthly, it does not deny that Europe was 
the source of progress but argues that only through incorporation into the 
empire, this progress came to South Caucasus. And finally, this articulation is 
turning the label of “Russian spy” in stigma theory terms, into a “badge of 
honor” while at the same time, turning the table on them. The last sentence in 
this extract from the interview hints at the political elite acting as spies for the 
European Union or the West in general.  
The Conclusion of the visa-free travel agreement with the European Union 
for Georgia took a bit longer than expected. The reason was mostly due to the 
prolonged work among the member states on putting a suspension mechanism 
in place. Logically the delay served as good material for populist discourse to 
further advance anti-EU sentiment. An article published by “Sakartvelo da 
Msoflio” in December 2016 argued that contemporary Europe where the 
“LGBT Sodomite flag is flying” is not the same as the Europe Georgia was 
seeking protection from, as the latter was based on “Christian values” and 
“crusadersʼ flag was flying in that Europe” (Zhvania, 2016). Furthermore, the 
text argues that the true reason why the Georgian political elite is so worried 
about the delayed conclusion of visa-free travel negotiations is that 
  
today, in the society, anti-western sentiments are growing with geometric pro-
gression. Day by day more people understand that modern Europe, is not our 
choice, neither culturally nor mentally, and even if we were invited to the 
European Union, a Georgian man has nothing to do there (ibid).  
 
In other words, what this text tries to conceive is that modern Europe is not 
culturally or mentally close to the Georgian Self and the political establishment 
is trying to promote this foreign policy despite the increased alienation in the 
society.  
When visa-free travel with the European Union finally became a reality in 
2017, in contrast to the liberal narrative which constructed it as one more 
fundamental step on the long journey of “returning home,” populist discourse 
tried to downplay it. Bakur Svanidze, another regular contributor to the news-
paper “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” characterized the celebration of visa libera-
lization as fake and a deliberate deception from the government (Svanidze, 
2017). In order to illustrate the point, the text draws a parallel with the work of 
Akaki Tsereteli (a Georgian poet from the 19th century). To be more exact, 
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Tsereteli wrote a poem titled “A Bat.” It is a fictional story about the origin of 
bats and revolves around one arrogant mouse who is jealous of birds and asks 
God for wings. Despite his wish being granted, birds refuse to accept it as one 
of their kind and other mice refuse to take the transformed mouse back. Bakur 
Svanidze in his column compares those Georgians who express the excitement 
of the visa-free travel to this mouse who got wings but was never accepted by 
birds and nor could go back to its true form. The text argues that it concerns 
those Georgians who “with a happy cry run towards Europe, and even more, 
reject Georgianness! – as if, I am not like my fellow t Georgians, I am a 
different Georgian to other Georgians, to be more precise, with a European 
spirit…”  
Furthermore, the text argues that the political establishment is promoting 
fake Europeans by focusing on things like littering in the streets or stopping a 
car at the pedestrian zebra crossing and not on the European level of pensions or 
workersʼ rights and safety. Svanidze relates this to the poem about the bat by 
comparing it to those Georgians who look down at most Georgians as 
uncivilized and barbaric i.e. un-European. The second aspect which is used to 
downplay the importance of the agreement is that it is not really a visa-free trip 
since you are required to have insurance, a return ticket and other similar 
documents in order to travel.  
This column of Svanidze was met with criticism and discussed on social 
media. As a response, he published a follow-up article in the next week 
(2017b). This time in his column he criticizes overly excited Facebook posts 
devoted to the experiences of Georgian citizens crossing the Schengen border 
without thea need to present a visa. He labels them as “new Georgians” and 
accuses them of “provincial” behavior towards Europe. “Those who are 
“attracted to Europe” call us to be proud, not of our nation, our culture, our 
Georgianness, but of the fact that European border guards treat us as humans 
and are smiling to us” (ibid).  
As I have mentioned many times already, an analysis of the texts revealed a 
juxtaposition between LGBTQ rights and conservative values in the West vs. 
Russia dichotomy. A 2017 opinion piece by its regular contributor Mkheidze 
(2017) in “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” argues that this is a conspiracy of the 
“neoliberal ruling elites of the West” who failed to impose their “agenda of 
same-sex marriages” on Muslim and orthodox Christian countries. “There is no 
talk about same-sex marriages so far and will not be (?) until there exists 
orthodox Russia’s greatest and richest Church, the uncontested leader of the 
Orthodox world” (ibid).  
The Russian Orthodox Church is just one part of what this text is articulating 
as the defense mechanism against the “same-sex marriage threat”. This opinion 
piece speaks positively of “sovereign democracy,” the concept, which is used to 
describe Putin’s Russia, especially the first period of his presidency. In this 
article, it is described as the tool, which lets the Russian political elite oppose 
the western value-system, especially since the latter is so alien to orthodox 
Christian countries.  
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The European Court dared to tell big Russia – you are limiting freedom of 
expression and discriminating and to us, small Georgia, cannot it do whatever it 
wishes?! … In order for this not to happen, we should go back into orthodox 
Russia’s orbit, and if not, let somebody else show me another way… (ibid).  
 
In other words, what this text suggests is that orthodox Christianity is in oppo-
sition to neoliberal value systems and even more importantly, aligning with 
Russia represents a defense against this “threat” to national identity.  
One interesting detail is that despite the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia being 
closely associated with this network of media and NGO groups, as well as the 
texts very often interdiscursively and intertextually being connected to each 
other, the official party program’s take on NATO and the European Union is 
not that radical. The text “Our Vision and Program” published on the website of 
the party, argues that they do not necessarily oppose membership in any of the 
organizations:  
 
However, according to the statements of NATO member countries, there are 
several reasons why NATO is not able to accept us today. It is painful to 
acknowledge this fact, but when NATO member countries state that we are far 
from joining its membership ranks at this time because Georgia doesn’t meet 
certain political, economic and other requirements for integration into NATO, 
we understand this reality. Unlike other political parties though, we will neither 
deceive ourselves nor mislead Georgian society. This is because we consider the 
creation and promotion of unrealistic and false expectations among our popu-
lation to be wrong and dishonest (“Our Vision and Program,” n.d.).  
 
And because of this “reality”, the Alliance argues for more “patriotic” policies, 
which imply putting Georgia’s interests as a priority.  
 
However, when more than 30,000 Turks are provided with Georgian citizenship, 
this is not the usual chatter, but the protection of Turkish geopolitical interests 
and an indication of a conflict against our state. 
When the Kodori Gorge is declared to be part of Upper Abkhazia, this is not 
the usual chatter, but the protection of Russian geopolitical interests and conflict 
with Georgia. When Georgia is forced to support Palestine at the United Nations 
(UN), that’s the protection of Western interests, and not of Georgian interests. 
Therefore, to the contrary, we should protect Georgian interests everywhere! 
(ibid).  
 
The Vision and Program of the party speaks with other texts I have covered in 
this chapter by repeating the key theme that the Georgian political elite serves 
the interests of the West and not of Georgia. It also repeats the narrative that 
same-sex marriages and LGBTQ rights are strangers to Georgian culture and 
are being imposed externally by the West. Georgian political elite meantime is 
sidelining “true national interests” and serve the agenda of globalization.  
This narrative also resonates with the self-colonization discourse I discussed 
in the first empirical chapter.  
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In 2013 “Asaval-Dasavali” published an interview with opposition politician 
Kakha Kukava, where he argued that NATO, would not in fact, provide any real 
democratic boost for Georgia. 
 
Georgian people have to know well, that NATO is not a guarantor of democracy 
in Georgia. On the contrary, membership in NATO for Georgia means becoming 
a satellite dependent on the empire and it is impossible to build democracy in a 
non-independent and non-sovereign country! (Kukava, 2013).  
 
This passage also demonstrates how discourse changes the meanings of such 
words as democracy or sovereignty since true democracy is defined differently 
by pro- and anti-NATO discourses.  
 
 5.4 The Baltics  
In the theoretical part of this thesis, I introduced the concept of nesting 
orientalism, which in the literature describes gradation, the spectrum of the East 
at Europe’s eastern border. In the first empirical chapter, I touched upon the 
importance of the Central and Eastern European countries for the Georgian 
political elite – as an example, the model of transformation to aspire to. Trans-
formation not only in purely technical terms, but in the sense of “becoming 
European,” “coming back home” and hence, moving Europe even closer and 
deeper into the territories of what used to be the Soviet Union. Especially 
important in this regard are the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia) for no other reason than they were actually part of the USSR, not just 
satellite states. This makes the case of the Baltics especially compelling for the 
dominant discourse to make their case stronger. By referring to the fact that 
despite the history of the Soviet occupation Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
managed to return back to Europe, the hegemonic conception of Georgian 
national identity sets it as an example to aspire to.  
Similarly, the Baltics is an important reference point for populist discourse, 
as it is an example of the Euro-Atlantic integration in the neighborhood. But 
there is the key difference between the liberal and populist articulations. 
Empirical data collected for the study of populist discourse reveals that the 
current state of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania is described as worse rather than 
better, reporting a decrease in population, mass emigration, etc. It tries to 
project the message that EU and NATO membership brought worse than good 
to those countries.  
This is an important dimension, which I believe needs to be explored in 
detail. Therefore, I decided to devote this small subchapter only to the 
construction of the Baltics in the populist discourse. For instance, in June 2009, 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published the article “What Happened to the Baltics 
under NATO” (2009). The text claims that although most of the negative 
expectations of Russians did not come true, there is a danger of the Baltics 
becoming a store of illegal armaments, as they have not signed the Treaty on 
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Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Furthermore, the publication suggests 
that the purpose of the membership was to help those republics better integrate 
ethnic Russian minorities as well as reduce aggressive rhetoric, however 
 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia could not betray old complexes and continued 
claiming that the unconsidered politics of the Kremlin is still a threat, while 
NATO membership provides the only guarantee of safety since in case of 
conflict with Russia they hope for the alliance’s help (ibid).  
 
Dissecting this passage reveals some important points. Firstly, attitudes of the 
Baltics towards Russia are described as “old complexes” while NATO assis-
tance in case of an attack is not portrayed as something certain, but rather as 
something that the Baltics would hope for.  
As the publication continues discussing the Baltics “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” 
heavily relies on Russian sources and publishes unchecked information bor-
rowed from those online or printed media sources. For instance, in 2013, an 
article was published, taken from the Russian website nakanune.ru which 
argues that the Baltics represent banana republics of Europe (“Banana 
Republics…”, 2013). The text discusses the case of Lithuania and suggests that 
the leadership of the country takes direct orders from the White House. The 
relationship between the Baltic country and the United States is presented as if 
it were a metropole/colony dependency.  
In 2015 “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an interview with the author of 
the book “Europe’s Backyard: Why the Baltic States are Dying Out” (2015). 
Nosovich, i.e. the author of the book is a Russian political scientist who heavily 
criticizes the policies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and reproduces Russian 
state narratives. In an interview with the Georgian newspaper, he painted a 
rather a gloomy picture of the Baltics. He describes them as some of the poorest 
countries, which are experiencing extremely high levels of depopulation. The 
Baltics, according to Nosovich, can be said to be characterized with ideological 
radicalism i.e. rejecting the Soviet past as occupation and equating Communist 
crimes with those of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, what one needs to pay 
attention to is how the meanings of certain well-established concepts are 
changed and redefined. He suggests that freedom of speech, democracy or a 
multiparty parliament are illusionary in the case of the Baltic republics, as every 
third inhabitant is deprived of his or her basic constitutional rights. (meaning 
holders of grey passports, or Russian citizens living in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). Finally, he suggests that the aim of his publication is to give a 
certain “warning” to others i.e. to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine that “the 
Baltic way – is only an attempt to create a certain European façade” (ibid).  
This one sentence I believe very nicely summarizes how the whole narrative 
is constructed – promises of the good life in the European Union are just a 
myth, while in reality, they get depopulation, economic and social problems, 
and a lower quality of life, than during the Soviet Union (ibid).  
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In November 2012, opposition politicians, economists and experts from the 
Baltic countries were invited to Tbilisi to attend a conference hosted by the 
Institute of Eurasia. The aim of the event was to provide Georgian society with 
the “real” information about how membership in NATO and the EU has 
“limited their sovereignty,” and that it is not too different from Soviet times. As 
the report on the activities of the Institute claims, in order to show to Georgians 
that “not only provocateurs live in the Baltics, but objective and well-wishers to 
Georgia as well” (Eurasian Institute, 2014, p. 9).  
So there are two separate Baltics, the one which is “true” and is committed 
to its true identity and the one which has been misled by the European Union 
and NATO and hence, is facing “terrible consequences” be it either increased 
migration, dependency on the west or “loss of sovereignty.” After being 
constituted this way, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are set as an example and 




5.5 Neutral Georgia  
As participation in the various NATO and the EU-led military or civilian mis-
sions around the globe is an important reference point for the liberal narrative, it 
is logical to expect that the counter-narrative engages in discrediting this 
process and constructing it as simply Georgian soldiers being sacrificed for the 
interests of the West and not Georgia’s. Support from the United States or 
Brussels, as illustrated in this small extract from an opinion piece published in 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio,” is regarded by populist discourse as “nothing but 
certain gratefulness for sending 2000 Georgian soldiers to Afghanistan. Only 
that we send our soldiers there and so they will call us not just a beacon of 
democracy, but a shining star” (Giorgidze, 2010).  
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” published an interview with expert on security 
politics Irakli Sesiashvili, titled “Irakli Sesiashvili Names Three Reasons Why 
NATO would not Dare to Accept Georgia Among Its Members” (2012). He 
lists as those reasons that there are two conflict zones in Georgia, that NATO 
would not go to war with Russia over Georgia and that the latter participates 
and contributes to NATO missions anyway. The last point is of special interest 
in this thesis, as it is one of the examples of how the narrative against parti-
cipating in missions in Afghanistan or Iraq is articulated. More specifically, it is 
projected as not serving the country’s national interests but rather as trying to 
please the West. “Many soldiers agree on going to Afghanistan not because as 
Saakashvili says [president at the time] they are protecting Georgia, but because 
of financial interests” (ibid) – hinting at the difficult economic situation in the 
country.  
In an interview, he emphasized that even the NATO officials are surprised 
by such devotion and commitment from such a small country as Georgia and 
argues that the government should be serving national interests rather than a 
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narrow political one i.e. pleasing western allies. An interesting detail should be 
noted here. Interestingly, Irakli Sesiashvili became an MP for the ruling party 
Georgian Dream after the 2012 parliamentary elections and, at the time of 
writing this thesis, still holds this position. While in the government, his 
narrative about contributing to NATO missions has drastically changed and is 
more in line with the dominant discourse.  
The whole premise of the neutral Georgia narrative is constructed on the 
belief that the west and especially the United States of America is not willing to 
risk its own safety and welfare for the sake of Georgia. It attempts to establish a 
regime of truth in which the South Caucasus is constructed as different and a 
stranger to the west, while Russia is the true protector of the region. Any 
military or political tensions Georgia might have with its northern neighbor, 
according to this narrative, is to be blamed on the former’s melding with North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization i.e. the Other. To providea an example, “Sakart-
velo da Msoflio” published a letter of historian Givi Gureshidze “Oh, This 
Dreamy NATO!...” (2012) where the author argues that “As a result of objecti-
vely formed geopolitical laws, NATO is not suitable for the Caucasus. If 
Armenians and Azeris understood these laws, what has happened to us?” (ibid).  
The demand for neutrality is made to sound more legitimate by referring to 
the Orthodox Church and the patriarch himself, who, as the text suggests, in 
2001 claimed that neutrality is the most desired position / status for a small 
country like Georgia.  
Finally, the letter suggests that: “Will the USA, which dissolved Yugoslavia 
into seven states, unite Georgia? Do not hope that the USA and its NATO will 
wrestle Russia for this reason” (ibid).  
An interesting detail in this passage is that NATO is presented as belonging 
to the United States, as a US organization rather than an alliance of sovereign 
states.  
Opposition to NATO membership is not articulated only through the 
references to the death toll among soldiers and civilization. It also relied on 
turning existing breakaway regions into a false dilemma i.e. an either/or 
situation. Membership into Euro-Atlantic institutions is constructed as a threat 
to territorial integrity and proceeding with this policy would result in the loss of 
those territories for good. This thesis reappears in several texts under 
examination. In April 2013’s issue of “Sakartvelo da Msoflio” an interview 
with the chairman of “Rightsʼ Defenders Union,” Nikoloz Mzhavanadze was 
published. This is another interesting example of how the meaning changes 
according to articulation – the notion of a human right’s activist. People 
publicly promoting xenophobia, or homophobia on behalf of saving traditional 
family values, project themselves as human rightsʼ activists. In other words, 
meanings change according to articulations, and words like democracy or 
freedom of expression are redefined within the discursive constructions. This 
narrative argues that pro-western foreign policy endangers the territorial 
integrity of the country, while what Georgia receives in return is not enough. 
“Our alliance with NATO is limited only in that we are sending the biggest 
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number of troops to the hot spots. While we do not receive any offer from 
NATO in return” (“Nikoloz Mzhavanadze: …”, 2013), argues the so-called 
human rightsʼ activist and claims that the political elite endangers the territorial 
integrity of Georgia for nothing in return. This dichotomy of either NATO or 
territorial integrity is very heavily employed by the actors behind this discourse. 
This discourse constructs neutral Georgia as the only solution to the questions 




The aim of this chapter was to illustrate how the populist narrative articulates 
national identity. I label it as an exclusive conception of national identity. It is 
exclusive, as it stems from the formula Georgian = orthodox Christian and 
excludes representatives of other religious or ethnic groups despite their 
citizenship. This equation constitutes a nodal point which defines how populism 
interprets the Soviet legacy, Stalin, foreign policy or the current state of the 
Baltic republics. The nodal point of orthodox Christianity constitutes the 
European Union, the United States, NATO, and the West in general as the 
constitutive Other, and as the enforcers and imposers of alien, foreign values. 
Orthodox Christian Russia on the other hand, is constituted as closer to 
Georgia’s Self. Norms of membership based on religious and ethnic elements 
constructs a dichotomy of “the people” vs. other members of the same state 
(non-orthodox Georgians, Azeri and Armenian ethnic minorities, etc.) thus 
making this discourse populist. The social purpose of such a national identity 
conception, as the empirics have illustrated, is the spread of conservative and 
“traditional values” in opposition to dominant foreign policy discourse. Rela-
tional meaning is constructed as “true Christian values” vis-à-vis the “per-
verted” and “godless” West. Finally, a cognitive worldview or the image of 
national identity in space and time belongs to the civilizational model led by the 
Russian Orthodox Church. This became especially apparent after Putin’s return 
to the presidency in 2012 and the discourse of the political elite took a distinctly 
conservative turn. 
This possibility of constructing alternative/parallel conceptions of national 
identity on this nexus is facilitated by the liminal positioning of Georgia. As 
Europe’s eastern border remains under constant making, there is no clear 
answer as to whether Georgian society belongs to the West or to the East. This 
in-betweenness implies that the country could be in and out of what is 
understood to be Europe, and the status depends on the articulation. While in 
the previous chapter I focused on studying how pro-EU and NATO foreign 
policies are in a mutually constitutive relationship with the liberal articulation 
of national identity, this chapter was devoted to the alternative positioning of 
liminality, which I labeled as populist. I chose the term as this particular 
discourse is clearly anti-establishment and anti-elitist. It appeals to the masses 
and to the people while openly opposing immigration and the protection of 
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minority rights. Additionally, these groups engage in the reproduction of conspi-
racy theories. Liberals, Soros, Freemasons, LGBTQ lobby, etc. are plotting 
against the orthodox Christian civilization and so-called “traditional” values.  
The empirical data mostly comprised of two, widely distributed newspapers 
“Sakartvelo da Msoflio” and “Asaval-Dasavali”, texts by Alliance of Patriots of 
Georgia and the Institute of Eurasia. These actors are intertextually and inter-
discursively related to each other and make up the large network behind the 
articulation.  
The findings can be summarized into key five categories: a) orthodox 
Christian = Georgian equation is the nodal point, which fixes the meaning of 
other floating signifiers and (re)produces identity/foreign policy relationship. b) 
The second aspect of the findings illustrated how the legacy of Communism is 
interpreted and tackled from this chain of significations. The result is a very 
positive portrayal of the Soviet rule and the paradoxical image of Stalin as an 
orthodox Christian. c) This equation, as western Europe is predominantly non-
orthodox Christian, populist articulation represents the former as strange and 
alien to Georgia. Reform agendas coming from Brussels are seen as externally 
imposed and alien. d)The fourth aspect which became apparent in my analysis 
is that the Baltics are referred to as an example of the EU and NATO’s 
“destructive” policies. They are portrayed as less sovereign and independent 
than when they were under Soviet rule. e) Finally, the texts also illustrated that 
populist articulations views on contributing to international military missions 
are very negative and constructed as being a sacrifice for nothing.  
These five aspects are just some of many major themes which combine 
together to form the populist articulation of the foreign policy/identity 
constitutive relationship. Thus, we can summarize it in the following manner:  
 
 
 Identity narratives Implications  
Liberal (inclusive) Transformation; Bridge 
between Europe and Asia; 
Belonging to the West;  
Participation in international 
military missions; decommuni-
zation; The Baltics as examples to 
aspire to; Other post-Soviet 
countries as more backward; Russia 
as the constitutive other.  
Populist (exclusive) Georgian = Orthodox 
Christian; Neither Europe 
nor Asia;  
The West as the constitutive other; 
The Baltics as a negative example; 
Orthodox Russia as “big brother”; 
Neutral Georgia; Threats posed by 
multiculturalism and globalization.  
 




The starting point of my research was the societies in between the European 
Union and Russia and the subsequent insecurity on the broader east/west nexus. 
What are the possible identity/foreign policy trajectories that are constituted 
with such positionings? How do these discursive struggles play out in daily 
practices? What are the meanings attached to the dates on which Christmas or 
Victory Day are celebrated? How is it possible that a controversial depiction of 
the European Union as the march of progress (Fig. 5) could become the winner 
of the competition and be shared publicly on the Facebook page of a govern-
mental institution? How could Stalin become the key symbol of the populist 
narrative articulated around orthodox Christianity and be juxtaposed against 
liberal democracy? How could we explain such discrepancy between the elites 
in Brussels and Georgia on what to expect from the Eastern Partnership and the 
meanings attached to the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement? What is the West as reproduced in the peripheries 
vis-à-vis the constructed in the “center”?  
In order to go beyond traditional positivist thinking while trying to answer 
these questions, I have applied to the case study of Georgia a theoretical and 
methodological framework combining liminality, self-colonization and dis-
course theory. The concept of liminality comes from cultural anthropology in 
order to conceptualize Georgia as a society in-between. In contrast to either-or, 
being torn between the two is the state itself. The position of going through the 
transition – abandoning the old Self but yet, not having completed the process 
of transformation/of becoming ʻfully European’.  
The case study of Georgia contributes to the application of liminality in 
International Relations in several important ways. The prospect of EU enlarge-
ment in the region is relatively low, political elites in Brussels do not expect to 
integrate Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova anytime soon. However, as I have 
illustrated in my empirical analysis, Euro-Atlantic integration remains the 
cornerstone of the dominant foreign policy/national identity constitution un-
folding in the Caucasus. The resulting cultural and political context requires 
deeper engagement through the application of liminality, self-colonization and 
stigma theory. Focus on one single case reveals important differences within the 
countries and societies located between the two civilizational poles as well as a 
retrospective understanding of the evolution of discursive constructions.  
The poststructuralist school, in contrast to traditional approaches to Inter-
national Relations, which take the state as a unitary actor or conventional 
constructivists who accept the possibility of a state’s pre-social core identity, 
argues that the state’s identity is the outcome of exclusionary practices. As it 
involves boundary producing and reproduction of the “inside/outside” divide, 
foreign policy is central to the state’s identity (Campbell, 1992: 68). It provides 
a relational construction of identity and thus helps to uncover the discursive 
processes behind the concepts taken for granted by realists or constructivists. 
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Hence, the application of a postpositivist research design was more appropriate 
in addressing the goals that were set out in this study.  
Essentially, there is one Georgia – liminal, and different political actors 
articulate different, and in some cases, mutually exclusive Georgian national 
identities, based on the foreign policy they want to promote. Poststructuralism, 
unlike realism or conventional constructivism, allows a deeper analysis of 
meaning production processes and linguistic play behind the concepts taken as 
objective and natural facts.  
Furthermore, poststructuralist ontology treats the concept of discourse not as 
equivalent to ideas, but rather as incorporating both material and ideational 
factors (Hansen, 2006: 10). Discourse theory also does not distinguish between 
discursive and non-discursive phenomena (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 34). 
This allowed me to expand and enrich the empirical data and examine the 
meaning production behind instances seemingly unrelated to foreign policy. For 
example, discussions around celebrating Christmas on 25th December or Victory 
Day on 8th May, as the focus of my study was not only on the terms “pro-
Western foreign policy” or “pro-Russian”, but rather how they are linked to 
other signs and how competing articulations differ around the same terms. This 
further justifies the selection of discourse theory as the main guiding ontolo-
gical and epistemological toolkit. Such a research design allows the accommo-
dation of an examination of how the opposing discourse, which aims to bring 
forth a different policy, does so by rearticulating national identity.  
These variances in foreign policy narratives come into play as a result of the 
various actors acting differently based on this liminal positioning. For analytical 
purposes, I pin these multiple dimensions down to the two basic narratives: 
liberal and populist. Another way to conceptualize these two articulations could 
be inclusive and exclusive national identity discourses. The former does not 
limit the idea of what it means to be a Georgian to race, ethnicity or religion, 
but to citizenship. Exclusive articulation on the other hand, excludes all non-
orthodox Christians despite their ethnicity or mother tongue. It revolves around 
the formula Georgian = orthodox Christian and it cannot be any other way. As I 
have demonstrated in the second empirical chapter of this thesis, this chain of 
signifiers explains how paradoxical images such as Stalin the believer could 
emerge in public discourses. Articulations or discursive constructions them-
selves I have conceptualized as self-colonization, which is an academic concept 
applied to those societies, which have discovered themselves to be not as 
“backward” as the former colonies, but at the same time, are not part of the 
West. In order to “correct,” or “make up,” for this discrepancy, those societies 
engage in the tactics of voluntarily adopting and implementing western 
standards. These discursive processes imply recognition of western superiority 
and self-stigmatization. This relationship is postcolonial as it cannot be defined 
with any pre-given criteria. Postcolonial is rather situational and relational 
(Morozov, 2015, p. 9). Examining discourse on national identity from civiliza-
tional and self-colonization narratives allowed me to study not only the 
language which reforms are embedded in, but also “how perceptions of 
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civilizational identity are interwoven with local, regional, and global political 
discourses” (O’Hagan, 2007, pp. 21–22). How do the liminal actors locate 
themselves? How do they evaluate others and asses themselves as superior, 
inferior or the equal vis-à-vis the Other? Such civilizational discourse and 
belonging can illustrate that the Self can be constructed as both inferior and as 
identical to the pole of attraction. This was the case for the Central European 
countries after the collapse of the USSR, as Europe was constructed as superior 
to their Self, but simultaneously those discourses pointed to the instances of 
their own Europeaness making them at the same time both European and also 
not fully so (Hansen, 2006: 40).  
Both liberal and populist conceptions of the Self engage in such tactics. 
However, whether the pole of attraction lies in Moscow or in Brussels consti-
tutes the difference in articulations of national identity. Additionally, one more 
theoretical framework I have employed in order to study identity constructions 
in the countries of the EaP is discourse theory. The latter is especially important 
as it also guides the methodological framework of my research. I have used 
poststructuralist discourse theory’s key notions of nodal points, empty signi-
fiers, and chains of significations in order to examine how narratives are 
constructed and how discourses delimit what can be uttered and what counts as 
irrational.  
The data which I have examined while conducting this research can be 
divided into two groups. One so-called dominant, pro-European discourse was 
mostly composed of official documents, president’s annual addresses and bills, 
while the challenging populist articulation was mostly derived from widely read 
newspapers “Sakarvelo da Msoflio” and “Asaval-Dasavali,” as well as certain 
texts produced by the political groups and NGOs associated with this discourse.  
The findings of my study illustrate how various actors act upon liminal 
positioning and constitute foreign policy trajectories according to identity 
articulations and the other way around. Poststructuralist discourse analysis of 
texts (in the broader meaning of this word) revealed how certain policies and 
practices are made possible through such discursive constructions.  
The key findings can be summarized as the following: firstly, there is a 
discrepancy between the Georgian ruling political elites and Brussels on what to 
make of the AA and DCFTA with the European Union. While in the case of 
latter we can speak of institutional identity transfer, for officials in Tbilisi it is 
similar to “the journey” of the CEE countries. The end goal of the partnership 
should be membership. This idea of “returning back home” drives self-
colonization tactics. Reform agendas are guided by the idea of “becoming more 
civilized,” transforming oneself and “making up” for what had been lost due to 
the Soviet occupation. Contribution to NATO-led missions is articulated as 
Georgia being on the same side with the West i.e. where does the country 
naturally belong. In contrast, populist discourse articulates the pole of attraction 
as Moscow and as a result, opposes sending troops to Afghanistan, as it is the 
“war of strangers.” In a similar manner, if for liberal discourse the Baltics are 
constructed as the role model for Georgia to aspire to, the populist narrative 
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imagines the region as devastated by the EU and NATO membership. Further-
more, I have demonstrated in this thesis how this competition over the 
meanings extends to the interpretation of recent history, addressing the Soviet 
legacy. One key difference between liberal and populist discourses is that the 
latter constructs a conspiracy theory type of narrative with liberals, Free Masons 
or Zionists plotting against orthodox Christian Georgia. Some texts revealed 
that in such discursive constructions even McDonald’s or just a cheeseburger is 
perceived as a threat to the Self. 
Speaking of the populist articulation, it is important to emphasize that there 
is no single specific policy articulation that would qualify a certain discourse as 
a populist. There are two elements (anti-elitism and demand for popular 
sovereignty), that constitute a skeleton, so to speak, around which the populist 
articulation takes shape. This analytical framework helps to understand and 
explain why various actors with various foreign policy trajectories still fall 
under the umbrella of populism. Populist articulation of Georgian identity does 
not necessarily equal anti-Western sentiments, but as the political elite has been 
committed to the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy, skepticism of the former puts 
populists at odds with the dominant narrative.  
Based on the empirical findings I concluded that populism in Georgia con-
sists of three major trends:  
1.  “Pragmatic” pro-Western foreign policy (NATO and the European Union 
are good, but they are never going to accept Georgia while this puts relations 
with Russia in jeopardy);  
2.  “Perverted West” vs. “the real West” i.e. liberalism and multiculturalism 
juxtaposed with conservatism and so-called traditional values.  
3.  Pro-Russian foreign policy (the EU and NATO are strangers to Georgia’s 
Self while orthodox Russia is closer). Furthermore, what I discovered is that 
they are not exclusive, and, in many instances, these three trends intersect. 
This explains why the Alliance of Patriots on the one hand calls for neutra-
lity and Georgia’s rejection of NATO, but at the same time, on their party 
program they put the membership in the latter as a foreign policy goal.  
 
The focus of my research was intentionally on populist narrative and thus the 
three elements listed above are derived from concrete empirics analyzed within 
this dissertation. However, these findings do not exclude the existence of 
Eurosceptic or conservative discourses on national identity/foreign policy which 
neither qualify as liberals and nor as populist. 
The empirical findings of this study are useful for future research in several 
ways. I believe that while studying the common neighborhood, we need to 
further expand our analytical focus from Brussels to the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership themselves. According to Freedom House (2018), for the second 
year in a row, the nations in transit have experienced a decline of democracy 
scores. Instead of the “ring of friends,” the European Union envisioned, 
countries in the immediate neighborhood remain stuck in political instabilities 
and military conflicts, as is the case for Ukraine or Georgia. Examining the 
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narratives taking shape in public discourses of those societies helps to better 
understand the effects so-called institutional identity transfer has on the 
countries of Eastern Partnership. This shift of focus, furthermore, helps to ana-
lyze more deeply the ongoing tendencies and trends in the nations in transit.  
Focusing on national identity discourses and their mutual constitution of 
foreign policy of such ʻminorʼ actors in international politics contributes to 
broadening the research agenda of International Relations and helps to go 
beyond Eurocentric approaches. It assumes the centrality of Europe in human 
past and present, although ʻEuropeʼ is not fixed in a social, political, cultural or 
geographical sense (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006, pp. 331). Whether it is realism 
with its focus on great powers, liberalism’s interest in international institutions 
or constructivists trying to make sense of international politics in Kantian, 
Lockean or Hobbesian terms, they are guided by Eurocentric assumptions. In 
other words, the categories of analysis that are “derived from great power 
politics in the North” (ibid, p. 332). My study on the other hand, reveals the 
importance of ʻperipheralʼ actors for global security architecture by examining 
reflections of ʻgreat power politicsʼ in meaning-making articulations of the 
former. Whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, a cluster of countries were 
joining NATO and the European Union at the same time, the situation further to 
the east is far more complicated. It is hard to speak of the aligning foreign 
policy trajectories of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia resulting in the failure 
to form the South Caucasus as a region in anything but purely geographic terms. 
Thus, the single-case study of Georgia illustrates the ramifications of ʻgreat 
power politicsʼ and how it translates into national identity discourses of the 
states in-between. This study highlights how ontologically insecure states 
address their insecurity and position themselves at the East/West nexus, con-
sidering the existing ambiguity about the limits of the West.  
Another possible future implication of this study is researching the region of 
the South Caucasus and possibly conducting a comparative study between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. What are the different foreign policy dis-
courses and national identity conceptions each country has, despite having the 
same geographical location (liminal positioning)? Future research could take 
this further by studying to what extent, and how much, civilizational discourse 
is present in foreign policy discussions in these countries.  
Future studies could also address the limitations of this thesis. As I mostly 
focused on the dominant narrative on foreign policy, I did not cover other 
articulations that fall somewhere in-between the two poles. Some discourses 
articulate pro-Western foreign policy and at the same time reject fundamental 
rights for minorities that come along the membership in Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions, or libertarians who want the EU membership but oppose any regulation 
coming from the state. The vast empirical data examined within the framework 
of this dissertation illustrates that there are a lot of spaces that need to be 
addressed by future research. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
“Kaukaasia kriidiring”:  
Gruusia minapilt ida/lääne neksuses 
Selle uurimisprojekti lähtekohaks on ebaselgus, mis tuleneb liminaalsest posit-
sioneerumisest kahe tsivilisatsioonilise projekti vahel. See „vahepealsus” või-
maldab täiesti eriilmeliste, üksteisest sõltumatute pooluste üheaegset esinemist, 
nagu näiteks Stalin ja Euroopa Liit, vein ja kokteil või õlilamp ja elekter. Selles 
töös uuritakse, kuidas toimub rahvusliku identiteedi artikuleerimine skaala mõ-
lemas otsas; kuidas need artikulatsioonid mõjutavad välispoliitika trajektoore ja 
on omakorda nendest mõjutatud. Uurimus järgib identiteedi ja välispoliitika 
suhete kontseptualiseerimist Hopfi (2005), Hanseni (2006) ja Hintzi (2016) töö-
des, keskendudes sellele, kuidas liberaalsed ja populistlikud diskursiivsed 
konstruktsioonid aitavad mõtestada minapilti ida/lääne geopoliitilises neksuses. 
 
Väitekirja keskseks uurimisküsimuseks on: 
Kuidas on Gruusia liminaalne positsioneering artikuleeritud avalikus dis-
kursuses, geograafilistel, kultuurilistel, ajaloolistel ja sotsiaalsetel asja- 
oludel põhinevalt? 
  
Rida alaküsimusi aitab täiendavalt suunata selle uurimuse fookust välispoliitika 
ja identiteedi suhete osas: 
• Milline on liminaalse identiteedi roll vastastikku välistavate rahvusliku iden-
titeedi diskursuste (ehk liberaalse ja populistliku diskursuse) artikuleeri-
misel? Kuidas vastustab populistlik diskursus dominantset liberaalset dis-
kursust alternatiivse Gruusia rahvusliku identiteedi tootmise kaudu? 
• Kuidas on välispoliitilised eesmärgid ja julgeolekuteemad seotud identiteedi-
diskursustega ja kuidas toimub nende vastastikune (taas)tootmine? 
• Kuidas mõjutab Euroopa Liidu naabruspoliitika liminaalsustunde püsimist 
ELi idapiiri taha jäävates riikides? 
 
Doty (1993, 1996) eeskujul püstitatakse selles uurimuses „miks” küsimuste ase-
mel „kuidas võimalik” küsimusi, mis teeb välispoliitika analüüsi tuumakamaks. 
Erinevalt teatud sotsiaalset ja diskursiivset tausta probleemivabalt käsitlevatest 
„miks” küsimustest, uurivad „kuidas võimalik” küsimused tähenduse tootmise 
protsesse ja püüavad seeläbi selgitada mitte seda, miks teatud tulemusele jõuti, 
vaid pigem seda, kuidas teemade ja objektide sotsiaalsed konstruktsioonid muu-
davad teatud poliitikad ja praktikad võimalikuks. „Kuidas võimalik” küsimus-
test lähtuvad analüüsid aitavad selgitada mitte ainult seda, kuidas sotsiaalseid 
identiteete konstrueeritakse, vaid ka seda, millised praktikad ja poliitikad muu-
tuvad võimalikuks.  
Vaatamata sellele, et uurimisprojekti näol on tegemist ühe juhtumi uuringu-
ga, mis keskendub identiteedi konstrueerimise protsessidele Gruusias, on töösse 
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lisatud ka võrdluse element. Täpsemalt võimaldab valitud uurimisküsimuste 
kombinatsioon uurida kollektiivse identiteedi konstrueerimist erinevatest vaate-
nurkadest, läbi euroopalikkuse, kaukaasia, õigeusu või mõne muu prisma ja 
teha seda ajalisel teljel (perioodil 1999–2017). Säärane võrdlev disain ühe juh-
tumi uuringu raames võimaldab lahti harutada rahvusliku identiteedi pidevad 
muutused ja selle identiteedi ning välispoliitilise agenda omavahelised 
vastastikmõjud, mis neid muutusi juhivad. See uurimus panustab oluliste 
rahvusvaheliste suhete toimijate loodud välispoliitika instrumentide (nt Euroopa 
Liidu naabruspoliitika) mõju uurimisse väikestes perifeersetes riikides, mis on 
omakorda kahe erineva tsivilisatsioonilise pooluse mõjuväljas. Gruusia juhtumi-
uuring on oluline, sest see paljastab ebakõla mõlema poole poliitiliste eliitide 
nägemustes Idapartnerluse olulisuse osas või selles osas, milline võiks olla 
nende riikide ja Euroopa Liidu vaheliste suhete tulevik. See ebakõla muudabki 
nii Gruusia kui ka Moldova ja Ukraina – ehk riikide, mis on allkirjastanud 
assotsiatsioonilepingu Euroopa Liiduga – uurimise unikaalseks ja väärtuslikuks. 
Lisaks võrdlevale perspektiivile Gruusia üksikjuhtumi raames on selle uuri-
muse tulemused olulised ka liminaalsuse-alase teadustöö edendamisel. Konk-
reetsemalt pakub veel ühe liminaalse juhtumi uurimine võimaluse laiendada 
selle regiooni geograafilist ulatust, milles paiknevaid riike on juba varasemalt 
liminaalsuse kontseptsiooni alusel analüüsitud (nt Rumeenia, Türgi, Ukraina, 
Poola, Balti riigid).  
Kokkuvõtvalt on selle uurimuse panus kahetine. Ühelt poolt on eesmärgiks 
selliste kontseptsioonide nagu liminaalsus ja enesekolonisatsioon edasiarenda-
mine ja teooria täiendamine identiteedi-alases teadustöös. See uurimus arendab 
argumentatsiooni, et liminaalne positsioon või kahevahel olek jätab Gruusia 
ühiskonna pidevasse siirdeseisundisse ja seeläbi jääb ühiskond alatiseks „pool-
valmis” olekusse. Sellest tulenevalt on iga välispoliitika agenda, mille loomine 
põhineb idenditeedidiskursustel, omakorda artikuleeritud nende positsioneerin-
gute suhtes. Teiseks on selle töö eesmärgiks uurida Euroopa idee diskursiivset 
tootmist ja demonstreerida Gruusia „euroopastumise” varieeruvust aja jooksul. 
Selles uurimuses argumenteeritakse, et liminaalsete riikide poliitilistes diskur-
sustes sõltub lääne kujutise taastootmine konkreetsetest eesmärkidest, mida 
poliitiline eliit saavutada üritab. 
Seega on väitekirja põhiargument järgnev: Gruusia liminaalne positsio-
neering lääne suhtes (mille all mõistetakse alalist eurooplaseks saamise olekut/ 
protsessi) põhjustab sotsiaalset antagonismi, kuna subjekti (st Gruusia rahvus-
likku identiteeti) artikuleeritakse läbi erinevate diskursuste üksteist välistaval 
viisil. Liminaalsus või vahepealsuses olemise seisund muutub seeläbi tühjaks 
tähistajaks, mille ümber need omavahel võistlevad diskursused tekivad. Näiteks 
liberaalse diskursuse jaoks on Venemaa olemuslikult „väljaspool“. Nõukogude 
pärandit, mida Venemaaga seostatakse, kujutatakse kui midagi gruusia identi-
teedi jaoks võõrast, „Vene imperialismi” poolt pealesurutut. Samaaegselt omis-
tab rahvusliku identiteedi alternatiivne diskursus sama „välise” rolli hoopis 
Läänele. (Taas)tootes kujundit Euroopast kui millestki erinevast, kui kogust, 
mis ei aktsepteeri Gruusiat kunagi võrdväärsena, muutub Venemaa oma õigeusu 
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ja ühise nõukogude minevikuga võrdväärsuse ahelate võtmeelemendiks dis-
kursuses, mida selles uurimuses nimetatakse populistlikuks/välistavaks. Mina-
pildi (ehk mida tähendab olla Gruusialane) liberaalne käsitus on inklusiivne/ 
kaasav, kuna see ei ole piiritletud rahvuslike või religioossete elementidega 
ning põhineb kodakondsusel. Vastanduvalt on eksklusiivne/populistlik lähene-
mine rahvuslikule identiteedile välistav, sest tugineb olulisel määral võrdusele 
grusiin = õigeusklik, välistades igasugused muud etnilised või religioossed 
identiteedid. 
Järgides uurimistöö raamistiku osas Hintzi (2016) eeskuju, käiakse selles 
uurimuses välja Gruusia rahvusliku identiteedi kahe kontseptsiooni – liberaalse 
ja populistliku ehk inklusiivse ja eksklusiivse – dekonstrueerimine neljaks kom-
ponendiks. See võimaldab paremini mõista identiteedi konstrueerimise alusprot-
sesse, andes meile ka analüütiliselt kasuliku tööriista suure koguse empiiriliste 
andmete nüansseeritud uurimiseks. 
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Liminaalsuse kontseptsiooni juured on antropoloogias. Arnold Van Gennep 
(1908; 1960), järeldas erinevate hõimude tseremooniaid jälgides, et riitustes, 
mis on seotud raseduse, kihlumise või pühendamisega, mängib siirde kontsept-
sioon võtmerolli. Ta jagas kõik üleminekuriitused kolme etappi: eelliminaalne, 
liminaalne ja postliminaalne. Liminaalsust karakteriseerivad spetsiifilise oman-
di, staatuse, sekulaarse rõivastuse, hõimluse jms puudumine, kuid sel on ka 
positiivseid aspekte. Just üleminek on oluliseks protsessiks, mis viib seda läbiva 
subjekti transformeerumise ja uuestisünnini. Liminaalsed kogud on olekus, 
mida võib kirjeldada kui „ei siin ega seal; nad on vahepealsed ja seaduse, tava, 
juurdunud kommete ning tseremoniaalsuse poolt määratud ning esitletud posit-
sioonide vahel” (Turner, 1969: 95).  
Selle kontseptsiooni rakendamisel ühiskonnale kui tervikule on üks oluline 
aspekt. Kui antropoloogilises kasutuses on liminaalsuse sisu selgesti piiritletud, 
nagu ka see, kuidas liminaalsesse seisundisse jõutakse ja sellest väljutakse ning 
on olemas kogenud „tseremooniameistrid“, kelle ülesandeks on subjektide 
juhtimine läbi rituaalide, siis ühiskonnale rakendatuna need aspektid puuduvad.  
Selles väitekirjas argumenteeritakse, et erinevad huvigrupid ekspluateerivad 
seda liminaalset ruumi, milles Gruusia ühiskond paikneb, erineval moel. Libe-
raalne narratiiv, positsioneerides liminaalsust lääne suhtes, omistab Gruusiale 
teise klassi ühiskonna staatuse ning püüdleb enesekolonisatsiooni suunas. Selle 
all mõistetakse lääne kultuurilise jõu ülemuslikkuse tunnustamist ja sellele alis-
tumist, ilma et riiki tegelikult koloniseeritaks või muudetaks osaks koloniaal-
süsteemist. Samaaegselt organiseerub populistlik diskursus samuti Gruusia limi-
naalse positsiooni ümber, kuid kasutab seda kontseptsiooni läänevastaste poliiti-
kate edendamiseks. Väites, et Gruusiat ei nähta olulisemate lääneriikide hulgas 
võrdväärsena, pooldab populistlik diskursus hoopis riigi liitumist Venemaa 
poolt eest veetava Euraasia Majandusühendusega, kus Gruusia oleks võrd-
väärne teiste endiste nõukogude riikidega. Nende kahe võistleva diskursuse 
omavahelised vastuolud tuginevad seega ka suurel määral Gruusia nõukogude 
minevikule ja selle tõlgendustele. Liberaalid käsitlevad perioodi vahemikus 
1921 kuni 1991 okupatsiooniaastatena, mis takistasid Gruusia tagasipöördumist 
euroopalike juurte juurde, samas kui populistliku narratiivi kohaselt oli Gruusia 
ühiskond just nõukogude ajal – ja erinevalt tänapäevast – kõrgelt arenenud ning 
võrdne teiste NSVLi liikmesriikidega.  
Läbiviidud empiiriline analüüs illustreerib, et see lõputu siirdefaas, mille 
saatuseks on jääda alaliselt vaid pooleldi lõpetatuks, toodab teatud tüüpi tead-
mist minapildi kohta, mis on mõlema poole poolt enamjaolt aktsepteeritud. 
Samaaegselt säilitatakse hierarhiline diskursus, mille kohaselt lääs on ülimuslik. 
Selles tulenevalt võib jälgida kahte samaaegset, paralleelset protsessi: teatud 
normatiivsete standardite internaliseerimist, mis puudutavad moderniseerumist, 
demokratiseerumist jne, ning stigmatiseerimist, mis käib kaasas enesekolonisat-
siooni protsessiga.  
179 
Diskursusteooria rakendamine Euroopa Naabruspoliitika sihtriikide euroo-
pastumise taseme uurimiseks loob võimaluse distantseeruda essentsialistlikust 
lähenemisest ja vaadelda neid protsesse nende spetsiifilistest ajaloolistest kon-
tekstidest ja spetsiifilistest diskursustest lähtuvalt, mis aitab neid omakorda 
naturaliseerida. Diskursusteooria aitab määratleda Euroopa rolli Gruusia 
identiteedidiskursustes. Selline lähenemine on sobivaim, problematiseerimaks 
identiteedinarratiive liminaalsetes üksustes, sest poststrukturalistlikes lähene-
mistes ei ole eesmärgiks tõeliste identiteetide identifitseerimine, vaid pigem 
nende konstrueerimine.  
 
 
Uurimisdisain ja metodoloogiline raamistik 
Selle väitekirja puhul on tegemist ühe juhtumi uuringuga. Keskendumine vaid 
ühele juhtumile korraga võimaldab rahvusvahelistes suhetes luua „tihedaid 
kirjeldusi“, ehk teada rohkemat vähemast, selmet teada vähemat rohkemast, 
nagu on sageli tulemuseks võrdlevate juhtumiuuringute puhul. Uurimistöös 
rakendatakse diskursusteooria metodoloogilist raamistikku Gruusia juhtumile, 
vastav uurimisraamistik on esmalt välja arendatud selliste autorite nagu Laclau 
ja Mouffe töödes. Nende autorite fookuses on aga peamiselt teooria arenda-
mine, konkreetseid vahendeid metodoloogilise analüüsi läbiviimiseks tutvusta-
takse vähe, mistõttu on oluline täiendada nende metodoloogilist raamistikku 
poststrukturaalse diskursusanalüüsiga (Jørgensen ja Phillips, 2002: 24). 
Peamine empiiriline andmestik koosneb ametlikest dokumentidest, presiden-
tide ametisse astumise kõnedest ning mitmete laiatarbeajalehtede ja -meedia-




Liberaalne rahvusliku identiteedi diskursus 
Liberaalse narratiivi artikuleerimisel kerkib esile kolm sõlmpunkti: transformat-
sioon või „mittepiisava” euroopalikkuse parandamine; Euroopa ja Aasia risttee-
del paiknemine; Gruusia ajalooline kuulumine Euroopa tsivilisatsiooni. Need 
kolm elementi moodustavad üleüldise identiteedinarratiivi, mis muudab teatud 
välispoliitilised trajektoorid võimalikuks. Dominantne diskursus rahvuslikust 
identiteedist moodustab osa ja annab tähenduse sõjalistel missioonidel osale-
misele, Venemaale ja teistele endistele Nõukogude Liidu riikidele või kommu-
nistlikule pärandile. See kuuluvuse taastootmine aitab adresseerida ebakindlust, 
mis tuleneb ühekorraga nii sees kui väljas olemisest.  
Dominantne diskursus moodustub poliitilise eliidi poolt artikuleeritud teksti-
dest. Liberaalsele identiteedi diskursusele pühendatud peatükk analüüsib, 
kuidas välispoliitika on mõjutatud rahvuslikust identiteedist ja teisipidi mõjutab 
rahvuslikku identiteeti, selle vastastikmõju tagajärjel aga kinnistuvad teatud 
elemendid diskursiivsel väljal. Sellegi poolest jäävad nende elementide 
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tähendused vaidlustatuks, nende täielikku kinnistumist on võimatu saavutada, 
mistõttu eksisteerib ka alternatiivne kommunistliku pärandi ja sõjalistel välis-
missioonidel osalemise artikulatsioon. Seda vaidlustatust võimendab Gruusia 
liminaalne paiknemine ida/lääne neksuses ja sellest tulenev mitmetimõistetavus.  
 
Populistlik rahvusliku identiteedi diskursus 
Selle peatüki eesmärgiks on illustreerida, kuidas väljendub rahvuslik identiteet 
populistlikus narratiivis. See narratiiv on eksklusiivne, sest tugineb tugevalt 
vormelile grusiin = õigeusklik, välistades seega teiste religioossete gruppide või 
etniliste gruppide esindajad, hoolimata nende kodakondsusest. See võrrand 
moodustab sõlmpunkti, mis omakorda mõjutab, kuidas populistlik diskursus 
interpreteerib nõukogude aja pärandit, Stalinit, välispoliitikat või Balti riikide 
hetkeseisu. Õigeusklikkuse sõlmpunktist lähtuvalt on Euroopa Liit, USA, 
NATO ja lääs üleüldiselt kui konstitutiivne Teine; kui võõraste, välismaiste 
väärtuste pealesurujad. Õigeusklik Venemaa see-eest on selle narratiivi kohaselt 
aga lähemal Gruusia enda minapildile.  
Ka selle neksuse puhul muutub alternatiivsete/paralleelsete rahvusliku iden-
titeedi kontseptsioonide konstrueerimine võimalikuks Gruusia liminaalse posit-
siooni tõttu. Et Euroopa idapiirgi on pidevas kujunemisjärgus, ei ole ka ühest 
vastust küsimusele, kas Gruusia ühiskond kuulub läände või itta. Selline vahe-
pealsus viitab sellele, et riik võib olla nii seespool kui väljaspool seda, mida 
mõistetakse Euroopana ning lõplik staatus sõltubki eeskätt erinevatest artikulat-
sioonidest. Kui eelnevas peatükis keskendusin selle uurimisele, kuidas Euroopa 
Liidu- ja NATO-meelsed välispoliitikad on vastastikku loovas suhtes rahvusliku 
identiteedi liberaalse artikulatsiooniga, siis see peatükk oli pühendatud alter-
natiivsele liminaalsuse positsioneeringule, mida nimetan populistlikuks. Valisin 
selle termini, sest see diskursus on selgelt süsteemi- ja eliidivastane. See dis-
kursus apelleerib massidele ja inimestele, olles avalikult vastu immigratsioonile 
ja vähemuste õiguste kaitsele. Lisaks osalevad seda diskursust toetavad grupid 
sageli vandenõuteooriate (taas)tootmises. Liberaalid, Soros, vabamüürlased, 
LGBTQ lobistid jne õõnestavad selle diskursuse järgi õigeusklikku tsivilisat-
siooni ja niinimetatud traditsioonilisi väärtusi. 
Empiiriline andmestik pärineb enamalt jaolt kahest üleriigilise levikuga aja-
lehest, „Sakartvelo da Msoflio” ja „Asaval-Dasavali“, ning Gruusia Patriootide 
Ühenduse ja Euraasia Instituudi tekstidest. Need toimijad on intertekstuaalselt 
ja interdiskursiivselt omavahel seotud, moodustades koostoimes suure võrgus-
tiku, mis populistlikku diskursust toetab ja artikuleerib. 
Selle uurimistöö empiirilised leiud on mitmeti kasulikud edasiseks uurimis-
tööks. Usun, et tehes uurimistööd ühise naabruskonna osas, peame laiendama 
oma analüütilist fookust Brüsselilt idapartnerluse riikidele endile.  
Keskendudes rahvusliku identiteedi diskursustele ja nende vastastiksuhetele 
välispoliitikaga selliste rahvusvahelistes suhetes „väikesekaaluliste” toimijate 
puhul, panustame rahvusvaheliste suhete uurimisagenda laiendamisesse ja euro-
tsentristlike lähenemiste seljatamisesse. 
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Lisaks loob see uurimus võimaluse laiendada kasutatud lähenemist tulevikus 
ka teistele Lõuna-Kaukaasia riikidele ning koostada võrdlev uurimus Armee-
niast, Aserbaidžaanist ja Gruusiast. Millised on erinevad välispoliitilised diskur-
sused ja rahvusliku identiteedi kontseptsioonid ja kas ühine geograafiline asu-
koht (liminaalne positsioneering) loob sarnasusi või erinevusi? Uurimistöö 
edasiarendused võivad ka avada, millisel määral ja kui tugevalt esineb nende 
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